

NEW ZEALAND POPULATION REVIEW

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SPECIAL EDITION:
Festschrift to Richard Bedford

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Population Association of New Zealand

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Editors' Note

The Council of the Population Association of New Zealand (PANZ) and the editors of this issue of the *New Zealand Population Review* (NZPR) take much pleasure in releasing this special issue, or *Festschrift*, in honour of Emeritus Professor Richard Bedford, QSO, FRSNZ.

As papers in this issue attest, Richard Bedford's involvement with population, migration, development and related issues go back to the 1960s. His participation in PANZ, known as the Demographic Society in its early days, go back nearly as long. His involvement in PANZ has included serving as president, serving on the Council for many years, being one of the founding editors of NZPR, regular contributions to PANZ conferences including keynote speeches, and many related activities supporting the association. He is a life member of PANZ. Richard has also been active in advising on, and advocating for, population issues nationally and internationally, as well as being a significant contributor in other academic and policy spheres such as geography, migration and development. These numerous national and international engagements are elaborated in the first article in this issue.

Richard's contributions have been formally recognised in multiple ways. In 1990 he was awarded the New Zealand Medal for services to New Zealand. In 2000 he was elected to Fellowship of the Royal Society of New Zealand. The New Zealand Geographical Society awarded him the Distinguished New Zealand Geographer Medal in 2007, in recognition of his contribution to the discipline and its professional society since the early 1970s, and in 2008 he was made Companion of the Queen's Service Order for services to geography. In 2010, he was awarded the Royal Society of New Zealand's Dame Joan Metge medal in recognition of his research on migration in the Asia-Pacific region and his contributions to institution building in the social sciences. This year, 2015, he was elected as the President of the Royal Society of New Zealand, making him the first social scientist to lead the Society for at least 75 years.

The first paper in this *Festschrift* is written by special editor Robin Peace, and highlights Richard's research, teaching and institutional work, both within New Zealand and internationally, and importantly, it also reflects upon him as a person. The following papers are written by some of Richard's former students, colleagues and collaborators; they reflect on some of his work but also elaborate their own research. Once again, these connections are elaborated in the first paper.

We are honoured to recognise the enormous contribution that Richard Bedford has made to population studies and related fields, both in New Zealand and globally, and wish him all the best in the future, including in the important and demanding task of presiding over the Royal Society of New Zealand.

Islands, Islanders and a Man and His Manuscripts: Richard D. Bedford Writing Pacific Geographies, 1968–2015

ROBIN PEACE *

Abstract

Emeritus Professor Richard Bedford has been writing and publishing on the population geography of the Pacific since the mid-1960s. This paper reflects on his body of work – work that is interwoven with the intellectual debts and generousities that characterise his life. His scholarship is based on him being active in the field and meticulously, if somewhat less enthusiastically, behind the desk, analysing data that have responded to widening horizons and deepening relationships over almost 50 years.

I was invited to work with colleagues across three universities to compile this *Festschrift*. Meaning in German ‘celebratory writing’, a *Festschrift* is “a unique publication devoted to the lifelong ideas and influences of an exceptional scholar” (Lewis, 1996.) This special issue of the *New Zealand Population Review* honours the very significant contribution of Richard D. Bedford (aka Dick) to population geography, but also to geography as a discipline in New Zealand. According to Lewis (1996):

A scientist often wears several hats – teacher, mentor, administrator, and researcher. While many prominent awards honor the research role, a *Festschrift* volume uniquely recognizes the many facets of an outstanding and influential scientist. (n.p.)

And, moreover,

Researchers deserving of a *festschrift* share certain qualities These characteristics include outstanding mentoring skills, profound impact on an academic ... department’s growth or direction, technical mastery, significant contributions to research and theory, and broad interests. (ibid)

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It would seem fitting, by these definitions, to prepare a publication such as this for Emeritus Professor Richard D. Bedford, as his life's work as a population geographer in Aotearoa New Zealand more than meets these criteria.

While criteria of excellence provide the benchmark for such a publication (and this appeals to me in my current role as an advocate for evaluative reasoning in research and strategic planning), a second underpinning of a *Festschrift* is that its overall preparation and opening salvo is prepared by a former student – preferably one who was recruited as long ago as possible. Hence, it has fallen to me to prepare this introduction.

In 1971/72, when I was a disaffected and disconsolate geography undergraduate at the old city site of the University of Canterbury, Richard was appointed as a newly minted lecturer. In contrast to the seeming curmudgeonly old men on the staff, and the hard-drinking, rugby-focused, almost exclusively male staff and students, Richard, a young lecturer, barely six years my senior, was prepared to focus on people and to talk, in unassuming ways, about human beings in a way that made them seem to matter. The third-year migration paper Richard taught sowed the seeds for academic interests that were to re-emerge for me at some much later point. In addition, his enthusiasm for statistical work, not for its own sake but for what it could help me understand, motivated me to study hard enough to pass the compulsory 'stats' paper and for me to continue, throughout my life as a teacher, lecturer and public servant, to argue for the integration of 'quant' and 'qual'.

However, at the time, the gendered discourse of 'man and his environment' stuck in my nascent feminist craw, and the discipline, as it was rendered at Canterbury in those days, was never inclusive enough to destabilise or mitigate the embodied exclusions that marked geography (and its field trips) as an 'unsafe' disciplinary home for 'others' (Nairn, 1998, 1999). Thus, I did not stay in the academy but chose to leave New Zealand to travel in informal and unstructured ways which gave me the experience of the field in a different way: shoestring South-East Asia, Japan, the USSR and Europe fully provided other views of the world.

Sometime in the late 1980s, I was drawn back to the academic world of geographical scholarship through listening to Louise Johnson, an Australian feminist geographer and then staff member at the University of

Waikato, describing Cartesian dichotomies and the explanatory power of feminist epistemologies, at a New Zealand geography conference in Otago. The inspiration of that lecture prised me out of a Geography head of department role in a Wellington college and into the University of Waikato in 1992 where Richard was then head of department. In 1993, after I had completed a year of master's papers, Richard encouraged me to begin a PhD and become a member of the gender and geography teaching staff at the University of Waikato, where I stayed until 2000.

Feminist geography secured a niche at Waikato not ever replicated elsewhere in New Zealand, in no small part because Richard encouraged it to flourish (despite, by self-confession, not fully understanding its influence or intrinsic appeal). As he himself somewhat ruefully noted in relation to the publication of his own 1988 co-authored book (Bayliss-Smith, Bedford & Brookfield, 1988):

Feminist geography, post-colonial geography, post-structural geography were the order of the day, at least in the Department I moved to in 1989 as *Islands, islanders and the world: the colonial and post-colonial experience of eastern Fiji* hit the book stores (Bedford, 2005, p. 231).

Under Richard's mentorship, coupled with the work of Dame Professor Evelyn Stokes, Māori Geography also flourished at Waikato.

Our paths have continued to cross, both through my brief public service career in the Ministry of Social Development, and then as I engaged, through Richard's invitations, with the Building Research Capability in the Social Sciences (BRCSS) initiative and UNESCO-related work. His mentoring arm comprised such a subtle influence it could likely have gone unnoticed, except for the way it opened doors for a third career I did not know I was about to have.

But, returning now to the theme of 'islands and islanders', the Pacific is the geographical 'field' that is Richard's place. It is where he 'does' geography, but also much more. It is where man and manuscript are most richly embodied. What I barely knew then, but have since come to fully recognise, is that Richard has been immersed 'in the Pacific' since he began his master's degree at the University of Auckland in 1966 (Bedford, 1967, 1968) in the spaces, as they are now renamed, of Kiribati and Tuvalu. It is amplified in his ANU doctorate, completed in 1971: *Mobility in transition: An analysis of population movement in the New Hebrides*

(now Vanuatu). The changing place names signalled the times in which this early work was produced: the islands across the Pacific shifting from the burden of colonisation to assume the difficult work of independence and the reclamation of their status as ‘a sea of islands’ (Hau’ofa, 1993).

The 1970s and 1980s were also times of changing social and academic mores, where the discipline of geography began to fragment, the value of academic endeavour was beginning to be internationalised, and the era of ‘big men’ (Bedford, 2005) was challenged by the new roles emerging for husbands and fathers. All of these wider politics are, in my view, visible in the published trace of Richard’s career, and in what follows I want to focus on four themes.

First, I consider the intellectual debts that Richard himself acknowledges and the context in which his scholarship emerged and has been sustained. Second, and related to the theme of debt, is the evidence of his generosity in the difficult spaces of both mentorship and public service. Third is the evidence of wider horizons that appear and recede in the published record – windows opening to bigger, more reflective questions and closing again as local fieldwork takes precedence. And finally, the relationships with people and place, with islands and islanders, which are signified powerfully in manuscripts that embody deep love, an abiding sense of social justice, and a belief that words are needed to address and expose the contradictions and challenges of Pacific worlds. Richard’s corpus is extensive and this is in no way a comprehensive account, but rather a highlighting of the scope and tenor of his work.

Intellectual Debts

What was it like for a young 19-year-old white, male, monolingual New Zealander to arrive in Gilbert (or was it Ellice?) in 1966 to complete a project of little earthly value to the islanders but offering immense opportunities to the young man? As some anonymous commentator, perhaps Richard himself, states on his current Auckland University of Technology staff page:

Travelling to the Pacific Islands for the first time when he was 19, Professor Richard Bedford got the bug. Not the stomach-upsetting kind you might expect from the islands but the travel bug that would see his career focus on the field of population movement with particular reference to measurement and explanation of the spatial mobility of

Pacific Island peoples (<http://www.aut.ac.nz/research/professors-at-aut/richard-bedford>).

But it seems to me it was not a ‘travel bug’, per se, but a confrontation with a different world that challenged the surety and confidence of the ‘man’ and created a desire to share in that difference, initially no doubt to provide an ‘objective commentary’ on it in career-enhancing ways but, increasingly, because it mattered. It mattered geographically that the map of the Pacific was given more substance – that the ‘what’ and the ‘who’ rather than just the ‘where’ of islands and island peoples was given space in the professional record (Bedford, 2004; Bedford & Hugo, 2008; see also Underhill-Sem, 2004). It mattered to New Zealand that there was some more sophisticated understanding of the places of origin of waves of Pacific migrants (Bedford, 1992a, 1994, 2001a). It mattered to the sovereign island states that there was at least some capacity to enumerate their populations, and understand internal and return migration (Bedford, 1973, 1974, 1989, 2008).

Where did Richard’s ‘Pacific impetus’ come from? In 2005, Richard wrote an article for *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* entitled ‘Outside man revisited: Harold Brookfield’s contributions to population studies in the Pacific in the 1960s and 1970s’. In this piece, Richard recounted the influence of Brookfield on his own academic career, on geography and demography in the Pacific, and on the broader field of international geographic thought. More than any other manuscript, this writing identifies a debt to a geographer who was in many ways a complete maverick. Indeed, Brookfield’s views of the world, his search for understandings of the impacts of colonisation, his interpretations of dependency theory, and his passion to render numbers as servants rather than gods, may well have been more confronting to the young scholar than any dirt-floor accommodation on a remote island. Brookfield’s close mentorship and PhD supervision set the direction of Richard’s career for the 1980s.

Once the path was set, the direction barely wavered. There is a host of collaborators, co-editors and co-authors – easily close to a hundred – all of whom Richard would acknowledge as contributing to his scholarship.

Richard’s own reviews of the corpus of others’ work would also place Edward Soja (Bedford, 1998), Gerard Ward (Bedford, 1999a), and Murray Chapman (Bedford, 1999b) as scholars whose work influenced and challenged him in different ways. Soja provided an outreach to difference

and new thinking, which Richard clearly appreciated as a “fine intellectual challenge to established spatial or geographical imaginations” (Bedford, 1998, p. 49). Ward and Chapman were both also Pacific scholars.

Richard recognised the value of the first Population Studies Centre established in New Zealand through the determined work of Dr Ruth Farmer (Bedford, 1999c).

Richard also demonstrated a debt to the work of his colleague Dame Professor Evelyn Stokes (Bedford, 2005). In his obituary to her, Richard reflected on the leadership Evelyn had offered and recalled a whakataukī that Evelyn had taught him (and one that I also often heard him use):

... she taught me [that proverb]; one that always makes me think of her approach to her colleagues, her students and her friends:

*Mā wai e tō te waka o te mātauranga?
Māku e tō, māu e to, mā te whakarongo e tō.*

Who will bear the canoe of knowledge?
I will, you will, all who listen will (p. 244).

These are complex obligations, but they are not obligations that Richard requites; rather, as Millburn and Nicodemus (The Minimalists, n.d., n.p.) advocate, he “pays them forward”.

Generosities

In as much as Richard was indebted to the scholarship of others and the opportunities to work with others across his field, he was also generous in return. A tribute to Richard from Professor Graeme Hugo, written barely a year before Graeme’s untimely death on 20 January 2015, encapsulates both deep collegial respect and an awareness of the ingenious ways Richard enabled “the work of countless other scholars and policymakers throughout the region ... ” (Hugo, this volume). Richard rarely published on his own. As indicated above, his network of collaborators was very wide.

Mentoring of PhD students is a complex part of an academic’s life. Senior academics in small departments in New Zealand often end up with many – sometimes too many – students. In Richard’s case, supervision included many PhD students whose work extended his areas of engagement (for example, Younus, Bedford, & Morad, 2005) and laid the foundations for years of collaboration (in particular with Elsie Ho and

Jacque Lidgard; see, for example, Bedford, Ho, & Lidgard, 2000). Using a well-established name in a publication alongside that of an emerging scholar is a way of endorsing the new. It can also be seen as a form of uncomfortable patronage that belongs to the vested politics of knowledge in the university. By encouraging joint publications and being increasingly cognisant of the power dynamics inherent in such relationships, many PhDs published alongside him.¹

While mentoring is one particular form of intellectual generosity, it is not the only way Richard repays the community of which he is part. His second area of generous service is to international organisations and public agencies in New Zealand. His work with Brookfield in the 1970s led to collaboration in a UNESCO project in Fiji and he has remained committed to United Nation's migration work through work with the International Metropolis Project's Steering Committee and UNESCO's Management of Social Transformation (MOST) Council. In New Zealand, his engagement with public service work includes convening the Population Monitoring Group of the former New Zealand Planning Council, and being a leading director of the BRCCS initiative. For years, he engaged directly with the Department of Immigration on projects seeking to 'straighten the record' on New Zealand immigration data, during which time he valued the work of one of my undergraduate contemporaries who ended up with the job of 'sorting overstayers'. Richard always saw beyond the statistical spreadsheets, and he valued the contribution of immigration staff who produced the stories behind the figures.

In ongoing ways, Richard's impulse for service led to him sitting on advisory boards, chairing panels for funding rounds, consulting with colleagues in the former Department of Labour and Immigration, and working with others writing commissioned reports that are not always directly migration or even demography focused (Hong, Fletcher, Bedford, & Hugo, 1999; Bedford et al., 1999; Bedford, Spragg, & Goodwin, 1998; Lidgard, Bedford, & Joseph, 2000; Ho, Cheung, Bedford, & Leung, 2000. Bedford, 2001b, 2001c; Ho, Lidgard, Cowling, & Bedford, 2003).

The editorial advisory boards Richard has served on include *Population, Society and Place*, the *Journal of Migration and Ethnic Studies*, the *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, *Geographical Research*, the *Journal of Population Research*, and *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*. This is exemplary service to the international

community of scholars. Anyone who has worked with academics knows too well the fraught relationship between ‘ego’ and ‘artefact’ – between ‘owning’ the work rather than valuing the collaboration that has produced it – that underpins the publication of scholarly work. Again, providing unassuming balance and advisory leadership is a strength Richard brings to these roles.

A third element of his generosity is also apparent in the publication outlets Richard chooses. While there are more than 30 different journals in which his work is published, there are a few that stand out: the *New Zealand Geographer*, the *New Zealand Journal of Geography* and the *New Zealand Population Review* are outlets that Richard would say would accept demographic and migration work with a Pacific focus. But, in reality, Richard’s motivation was as much about publishing where his work would be most accessible to those people and governments to whom his work was most relevant, as it was about seeking the highest ‘impact factor’, or the most prestigious international journal. Likewise, *Pacific Viewpoint*, *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, the *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* and the *Australian Geographer* register strongly amongst his preferred outlets. Producing reputable and credible social science for local consumption before and during the perverse incentives of the New Zealand Performance Based Research Fund regime speaks to the commitments that Richard holds: to the Pacific, the relationships between New Zealand and the Pacific, and the trans-Tasman connections that bind both Australia and New Zealand to the Pacific.

Horizons

The work published in this special issue brings together the contributions of seven of Richard’s colleagues. They reflect the multiple horizons of his work.

Graeme Hugo’s thoughtful piece on the New Zealand–Australia migration corridor describes the significant trans-Tasman relationship between New Zealand and Australia at the crossroads of Asia-Pacific migration. Not only is this a fitting place to begin a collection of essays about migration demography ‘down under’, it also recognises the pre-eminent contribution of Professor Hugo’s work in Australasian

demography. The loss of Professor Hugo is acknowledged and his scholarship recognised and honoured.

Ian Pools' contribution on the demographic impacts of international migration references the wider international scene and underscores the unpredictability of migration flows and its overall impact on nation building. These are all elements Richard has sympathy with: "The pivotal space for the debate about immigration remains the nation" (Bedford & Ho, 2006, p. 61).

Reflecting this national focus, Jacques Poot and Lynda Sanderson return to the Western Bay of Plenty surveys that Richard initiated in 2001. Their paper provides a local view and discusses New Zealand regional demography – a parallel for Richard's work alongside his Pacific and Asian Pacific focus.

Elsie Ho's paper on the changing face of Asian peoples in New Zealand begins the Asian and Pacific narrative by drawing attention to the Pacific Rim – the edge of Richard's Pacific field – and emphasises Richard's engagement with the demographic influences from Asia, influencing not just migration to the Pacific but also to many other parts of the wider Pacific, including New Zealand.

Robert Didham outlines the complexities of Asian and Pacific migration to New Zealand. His paper puts to rest assumptions about commonalities amongst and within groups called 'Asian' or 'Pacific' peoples and complicates our understanding of difference through the diligent analysis of statistical data – the core desk work that Richard also valued for the insights it could provide.

John Gibson engages with Richard's most recent focus: registered seasonal migration from Vanuatu. This comprises important work that seeks to understand New Zealand's economic, political and social commitments to the Pacific. Richard has written extensively in this space in the last decade (including work with his daughter Charlotte, whose PhD involved considerable Pacific field research under the watchful eye of her supervisor, Professor Hugo, and accompanied by her father (Bedford, C., 2013; see also Bedford, C., Bedford, R., & Ho, 2009, 2010)).

The final overview is provided in Paul Spoonley's discussion of New Zealand's political economy of labour migration, which summarises the impact of labour migration in New Zealand since the 1950s, and focuses

our attention on the importance of economic imperatives in the New Zealand demographic narrative.

There are horizons other than those mapped in this volume by his colleagues. Interests that began in some of the smallest island states in the Pacific extended over the years, across many areas. There have been brief manuscript excursions into the European Union (Bedford, 1992b) and West Africa as a point of comparison with Melanesia (Bedford, Hugo, & Didham, 2011). There has been engagement with the Māori diaspora (Bedford & Pool, 2004), with transnationalism (Spoonley, Bedford, & Macpherson, 2003), and also with issues of gendered demography (Bedford, Callister, & Didham, 2010). In all of this work, Richard was a consummate population geographer: knitting small threads of evidence into larger tapestries so that the stories of islands and islanders could be more effectively told.

Relationships

In the process of preparing the manuscripts and being generous with his time, Richard also forged deep relationships, both professional and personal. In recent years, an evaluation colleague of mine has had the opportunity to travel with Richard to the Pacific on research work. Her sentiment, that here was a man who was, for a *Palangi*, unusually at ease in Pacific space, is echoed in the words of one of Richard's Pacific colleagues. The following excerpt, taken from a submitted abstract for this volume, captures both the quality and intensity of that ease.



“The *Palangi* professor is like a Dongan,” said the Noble Nuku of Kolonga, stressing Dongan with a D, not Tongan with a T, because that is how real Dongans from Donga dalk properly. After travelling with Dick Bedford to my father’s Tongan village Kolonga for two field trips in 2003 and 2013, and seeing the noble chuffed that the *Palangi* professor attended his church on Sunday, smiled at the kids and the elderly, and walked the coral reef looking at how climate change had left its permanence, I could tell he would always be welcome and warmly remembered.

Dick was more cross-culturally confusing than me. (I was born and raised in New Zealand, not in my ancestral islands. I speak English as my first language. I am also a half-cast, hybrid, mixed blood, mixed-up anthropologist who enjoys disrupting tidy demographic categories). He had been visiting the Pacific Islands since he was a 19-year-old university student. He was at home on atolls and reefs with mangroves and coconut trees, and related to the local people in a way that only a person who values small island societies can do.

I came into the university as academic staff when fertile tensions between Pacific Islander and *Palangi* researchers were about fighting for knowledge ownership and staking out independent territory. Frictions and factions have cultivated research approaches that are polarised, combative, and labelled ‘Pacific research versus *Palangi* convention’. And what has unfolded is an institution where younger-generation Pacific women assume they will have manifold problems working with older white men in suits who run the establishment. I never had those problems with Dick. He was a Pacific Islands geographer. I was a one-country anthropologist of Tonga. His fieldwork memory spanned almost 50 years to Kiribati and Vanuatu in the 1960s where he stored a library of islands, villages, languages, and peoples.

Fieldwork is not just about collecting facts and figures. It teaches us to see “research as relationship” (Ceglowski, 2000). I learned that from Dick. ... But more than that, it is about relationship and respect between generations and peoples who see themselves connected to a borderless ocean of small islands. (Teena Brown-Pulu, unpublished excerpt, 2014)

Conclusion

This *Festschrift* has not fully conformed to the requirements of the genre; i.e. to reflect on the work of the man through the lens of one’s own scholarship. However, it does offer the opportunity to consider how manuscripts embody their author. They do not tell the detail of their domestic lives but they provide windows through which to see the intellectual passions that drive them. In Richard’s case, the ‘field’ animated him to travel incessantly and to write about travellers

incessantly – migrants moving from place to place who changed demographic realities as they did so.

I conjure an image of Richard: head down at his desk – in his downstairs office in his home in Hamilton, or from an earlier time, surrounded by piles of paper in his University of Waikato office – poring over pages of data until he finds the empirical gem that confirms his current hunch. It is easy to see and understand the passion that drives his questioning and to value the pages of impeccable data that flow behind the narratives. However, I also wonder when – if – we might become an audience for a more private, more introspective narrative that tells what these engagements with islands and islanders, in the Pacific, in New Zealand, mean for the life of the ‘inside man’.

Kia ora, e hoa. E iti noa ana nā te aroha.

Note

- 1 It is hard to tell which of his co-authors were PhD students, and short of interviewing Richard, this aspect is hard to pin down. Certainly, I was one of them.

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Images of Richard Bedford



1973: Richard at the time he started research on Bougainville.



1984: Sailing in Noumea, while working at the South Pacific Commission.



2009: Interviewing RSE workers in Tavanamalo, Big Bay, Vanuatu.



2008: Receiving the Insignia of a Companion of the Queen's Service Order for services to geography.



1996: With the Geography Department members of staff, Waikato University.



2005. With the Population Studies Centre team, Waikato University.



2009: Attending the Sunday service at the Unity Church, Motueka, with Tongan RSE workers.



2005: With Professor Jacques Poot and Associate Professor Elsie Ho after jointly obtaining a Marsden Grant to study trans-Tasman migration.



2015: Professor Richard Bedford QSO, FRSNZ, Emeritus Professor at the University of Waikato and Professor of Migration Studies at the Auckland University of Technology.

The New Zealand–Australia Migration Corridor

GRAEME HUGO *

Professor Richard Bedford has made a seminal contribution to the understanding of population movement in the Pacific region, not only through his own prodigious research output but even more through his inclusive, enthusiastic, generous and ingenious efforts to encourage, support, facilitate and enable the work of countless other scholars and policymakers throughout the region. As one who has benefited enormously from this, it is an honour and privilege to be asked to contribute to this volume celebrating and honouring his continuing contribution. This paper focuses on just one of the myriad elements in the Pacific migration system in which his research has been of fundamental importance – the trans-Tasman movement between New Zealand and Australia. It seeks to provide both an update of evolving trends in this movement but also to reflect in a more general way about the significance and distinctiveness of international migration between neighbouring countries in the context of contemporary global migration. The paper is written using Australian migration and census data and largely from an Australian perspective.

The paper begins with a theoretical discussion of the significance of international migration between neighbouring countries in the contemporary global migration system and how the trans-Tasman corridor fits. It then examines changes in the permanent and temporary movements between New Zealand and Australia over the period since the introduction of restrictions on New Zealanders accessing security benefits in July 2001. In doing so, it addresses the discussion about New Zealand being used as a ‘back door’ for other birthplace groups to enter Australia (Bita, 2013a). New Zealanders are the third-largest birthplace group in

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
Australia and for several years in the last decade have represented the largest single birthplace group among permanent settlers. Yet they have not generally attracted a proportionate amount of attention among researchers, policymakers and the wider community. However, this has changed recently with calls to cap New Zealand migration to Australia (Bitu, 2013a). The final part of the paper discusses some of these issues.

Some Theoretical Perspectives

With the paradigm shift in migration theory away from destinations and unidirectional permanent relocation towards a focus on transnationalism involving complex flows and relationships between origins and destinations, the concept of migration corridors has emerged as a useful construct. Linkages between pairs of nation states involve not only flows of people but also goods, ideas, money, innovations and ways of doing things. These corridors once initiated are sustained and strengthened over time not only by increasing intensity and diversity of population and other flows but also by momentum gained through people-to-people connections between origin and destination, including family relationships. They can be enhanced by government initiatives through bilateral arrangements, especially free trade agreements which are proliferating in the region. Population movements, both permanent and temporary, play an important role in initiating, intensifying and diversifying these corridors.

The recent excellent international initiatives to bring together data on the numbers of persons born in another country for many nations have drawn attention to the dominance of the global migration system by a few major corridors of international migration and estimated the scale of the movement involved.¹ Figure 1 shows the 10 largest migration corridors for the 2010–13 period identified by the United Nations (2013). It is interesting that seven of the 10 largest corridors involve movements between two neighbouring nations. Moreover, the list omits some other major corridors of movement where the available data understate the level of migration because of the significance of undocumented migration. The large flows along the Indonesia–Malaysia and Bangladesh–India corridors are in this category (Kassim, 1997; Nanda, 2005).

Figure 1: Ten bilateral migration corridors with the largest number of international migrants per annum, 2010–13



Source: United Nations, 2013, p. 16.

Despite the significance globally of corridors of migration between neighbouring countries, these flows have been given little attention in migration theory, although they are often an important focus for policymakers. It is largely assumed that the flows are a function of proximity and conform to gravity model formulations. Moreover, in contexts like Mexico–United States and Indonesia–Malaysia, the steep gradient in wage levels and job opportunity bring in to play neoclassical economics explanations (Massey et al., 1993). Nevertheless, there are a number of distinctive elements of migration corridors linking neighbouring countries. The first relates to an overlap between internal and international migration. Several authors have argued that the dichotomisation of internal and international migration study has led to the linkages and synergies between movements within national boundaries and those crossing them being overlooked (King & Skeldon, 2010). Nowhere is this more marked than in the flows between neighbouring countries. One study of New Zealanders in Australia (Hugo, 2004), for example, concluded after an exhaustive analysis of their characteristics that trans-Tasman migration shared “more similarities with interstate migration within Australia than with other international flows into the country”.

This is not surprising because the increasing internationalisation of labour markets is especially intense between neighbouring countries. Indeed, some pairs of neighbouring countries in many respects constitute single labour markets. This may be enshrined in free trade agreements, common recognition of skills and qualifications, media (especially television) being equally available across national boundaries, enterprises having activities in both countries, linked banking systems, etc. In some countries there is even significant daily commuting across national boundaries as is seen in the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) based on Singapore. In some respects, then, corridors of movement between neighbouring countries represent an amalgam of the characteristics of internal and international migration.

Another feature of migration corridors between neighbouring nations is special visa and border-crossing arrangements that recognise the high levels of movement, the frequency of individuals crossing the border, and economic integration. In earlier times it involved nationals of one country being allowed free entry, but enhanced security has meant that it now can involve a special visa on arrival or an electronic passport check. Nevertheless, the relatively free movement of locals across national borders remains throughout much of Asia, while in some cases ‘smartcard’ systems operate (Ford & Lyons, 2007).

A third important dimension that characterises the migration corridors linking neighbouring countries is the presence of strong family and ethnic linkages across national boundaries. Transnational families are common with international boundaries splitting extended, and even nuclear, families because of the imposition of national boundaries during and after colonial times. There are also often ethnolinguistic linkages. Indonesian movement to Malaysia, for example, is facilitated by Indonesians speaking essentially the same language as Malaysians, being of common Malay ethnic heritage, being Muslim and often having immediate family members living in Malaysia.

With the increasing scale and complexity of global mobility and the recognition that migration is a structural component of the global economy, there is increasing interest in how policy intervention can facilitate positive developmental outcomes from migration. One dimension of this, identified in the Second United Nations High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, is that bilateral cooperation between origin and

destination countries is crucial to maximising the development benefits of migration. In a quite different but nevertheless relevant context, a Regional Migration Study Group (RMSG) was set up to examine how to best leverage migration in the US–Mexico–Central America region. Its final report (Papademetriou, Meissner, & Sohnen, 2013,) concluded that:


... getting migration and the issues that fuel it right is vital to relations within the region; it is also essential to the region's long-term economic development, prosperity, social order and security – and in many ways, its competitiveness in a fast changing interdependent global economy. (p. 1)

Migration is often viewed globally, but in order to maximise its positive impacts we need to identify and better understand the different elements in the global system. One of these elements is the migration corridors between adjoining nation states.

New Zealand Migration to Australia

The estimated resident population of New Zealand-born living in Australia was 608,820 in 2013, which, as Figure 2 shows, represents a peak not only in terms of numbers but also the proportion that they make up of the total population. This group is second only to the United Kingdom among foreign birthplace groups. As is common among neighbouring countries, there is a special arrangement governing migration between New Zealand and Australia. While there have been changes over the years, there has been more or less unrestricted movement of Australians and New Zealanders across the Tasman Sea separating the two countries (Bedford, Ho & Hugo, 2003; Carmichael, 1993). New Zealand citizens are granted a Special Category Visa (444) upon arrival and this remains valid as long as they wish to stay in Australia.


Figure 2: Australia: New Zealand-born in Australia, number and as a percentage of the total Australian population, 1861–2013



Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) historical migration statistics, Australian Censuses 1901 to 2011, & ABS 2013 estimated resident population data.

While trans-Tasman migration to Australia has occurred since early colonial times (Carmichael, 1993), Figure 3 indicates that it has been especially significant in the last three decades. In the earlier post-war period there were years when there was a net flow in the New Zealand direction and significant numbers of UK settlers with assisted passages paid by Australia simply transited in Sydney or Melbourne and moved straight on to New Zealand. In 1974, for example, there were 4864 permanent arrivals from New Zealand to Australia and 7051 departures from Australia to New Zealand (Carmichael, 1993, pp. 354–355).


Figure 3: Australia: New Zealand-born settler arrivals, 1960–96 and permanent additions, 1997–2013



Source: Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA), *Australian Immigration: Consolidated Statistics*; Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), *Immigration Update* (various issues); & Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP), unpublished data.

In recent decades, however, the net flow has been very much in Australia’s favour, as is apparent from Figure 4 which shows both permanent and long-term arrivals and departures over the last two decades. While the inflow from New Zealand has fluctuated, the level of movement in the other direction has been relatively constant. Net migration has fluctuated with a pattern of peaking in the early years of each decade.

Figure 4: New Zealand citizen permanent and long-term arrivals and departures, 1995/96 to 2012/13



Source: DIBP, unpublished data.

There are a number of dimensions of the trans-Tasman movements that emerge from an analysis of the permanent arrival and departure data; these are now considered separately.

Return Migration

Analysis of departures from Australia has long shown that New Zealanders have a greater propensity for return migration than most other immigrant groups in Australia (Lukomskyi & Richards, 1986; Rampa, 1988). In passing it should be noted that this reciprocity and circularity is one of the elements that makes New Zealand migration to Australia more similar in its characteristics to interstate migration within Australia than other international migration flows into the country. One of the most distinctive features of interstate migration in Australia is its low level of migration effectiveness because of the large counterflows for each substantial interstate migration (Bell & Hugo, 2000). The counterflow to New Zealand is made up of three components:


- New Zealanders who formerly settled in Australia but subsequently returned home

- Australia-born citizens including significant numbers of children born to New Zealand immigrant parents but also other independent migrants
- relay migrants of persons born in a third country who had moved to Australia as settlers and subsequently moved on to New Zealand.

Trends in each of the components over the last two decades are shown in Figure 5, with returning New Zealanders being the largest group. Moreover, the diagram understates return migration because many among the Australia-born category are the children of New Zealanders born during their parents' sojourn in Australia. Nevertheless, there is significant movement of Australian workers in the flow and numbers of former settlers who initially came to Australia and subsequently moved to New Zealand. This again reflects the fact that the two countries in many respects represent a single labour market.

New Zealand is the main destination of permanent departures from Australia with 17.4 per cent of the 2012/13 total permanent outflow from Australia. Over the two decades to 2013, 112,817 New Zealand-born persons departed permanently from Australia compared with 380,968 New Zealand-born permanent arrivals (a ratio of 1 for each 3 arrivals), and 84 per cent of those who left Australia returned to New Zealand.

Figure 5: Australia: Permanent departures to New Zealand by birthplace, 1991/92 to 2012/13



Source: DIBP, unpublished data.

Escalator Migration

Return migration of New Zealanders is hence significant, but it is interesting that over the last two decades 18,051 New Zealanders have settled in Australia and then subsequently moved on to a third country. This points to another dimension of the trans-Tasman movement which is similar to internal migration. The *Escalator Region Hypothesis* was developed in the United Kingdom to explain the progressive movement of internal migrants from a provincial area to a regional city and then to London (Champion, 2004; Fielding, 1992). Each time they move they gain experience, contacts, education and assets which facilitates the next move ‘up the escalator’. The three stages of the hypothesis are given in Table 1. Hugo (2008, pp. 81–84) demonstrates how this model is relevant to much movement of young Australians from regional areas or peripheral states like South Australia, initially to Sydney or Melbourne and then, having gained experience, confidence and linkages, on to London, New York or another world city.

Table 1: The Escalator Region Hypothesis

Stage 1:	The ER (escalator region or city) attracts many young people with potential in the early stages of their working lives – i.e. they step on the escalator by moving to the ER. (Internal)
Stage 2:	The ER provides the context where these immigrants achieve accelerated upward social mobility as they progress in their working life – i.e. they move up the escalator by living and working in the ER. (Internal)
Stage 3:	The ER then loses many of these people who step off the escalator and move to a higher-order city or region building on the economic and social capital they have accumulated while in the ER. (International)

Source: Fielding, 1992.

Hence for some young New Zealanders the move to a major Australian city is also a step on the escalator which will eventually take them elsewhere in the world. Of the 3521 New Zealand-born among the permanent departures from Australia between 2011 and 2013 who didn't return to New Zealand, Table 2 shows that the UK and North America accounted for 42.3 per cent. This would suggest that escalator migration of the type described above is significant in the third-country migration of the New Zealand-born. In addition, the dynamic economies of Asia and the Middle East are also becoming attractive to New Zealanders who have settled permanently in Australia. This is evident in the leading destination countries being Singapore (239), the United Arab Emirates (137), Hong Kong (129) and China (114). The significant flows to the Pacific nations of Samoa (105), Papua New Guinea (58) and Fiji (57) points to the development of a 'Pacific Migration System' involving not just the Pacific Island countries but also New Zealand and Australia (Bedford and Hugo, 2012).

Table 2: New Zealand-born permanent departures from Australia, 2011–13 by destination

Destination	Number	Percentage
New Zealand	14,407	80.3
UK/Eire	960	5.4
Other Pacific destination	321	1.8
USA/Canada	529	3.1
Middle East	24	1.2
Asia	1,070	6.0


Source: DIBP, unpublished data.

Relay Migration

One of the features of contemporary global migration that has rendered traditional permanent migration models less useful is the growing significance of migrants not settling permanently in the country that they initially move to but moving on to a third country. This type of mobility is strongly evident in the trans-Tasman flow. Two dimensions of this have been referred to in the two previous sections where it was pointed out that 16 per cent of the 112,817 New Zealand-born persons who left Australia permanently over the last two decades moved to a third country. Moreover, some 15.4 per cent of the 238,118 permanent departures from Australia to New Zealand over this period were persons who had settled in Australia after emigrating from a third country.

The particular element of relay migration that has attracted most attention in the trans-Tasman migration, however, is the increasing number of persons *not* born in New Zealand who are part of the trans-Tasman flow. Figure 6 compares the permanent inflow of persons who were granted 444 visas on arrival under the Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement (TTTA) with the number of New Zealand-born permanent arrivals. The area between the two lines comprises persons who had entered New Zealand as settlers, gained citizenship or permanent residence, and subsequently moved to Australia. The numbers of such arrivals peaked in 2011/12 at 14,215 when they made up 32.1 per cent of the total flow for New Zealand. In 2012/13 their numbers remained the same but their proportion exceeded a third (34.5 per cent). The only other year in which this has been recorded was in 2000/01 just before the changes in entitlements to social security benefits.

Figure 6: Australia: Permanent arrivals of New Zealand citizens and New Zealand-born persons, 1981/82 to 2012/13



Source: DIMIA, *Australian Immigration: Consolidated Statistics* (various issues); DIAC, *Immigration Update and Population Flows: Immigration Aspects* (various issues); DIBP, unpublished data.

There have been suspicions in Australia that some of these relay migrants have used New Zealand as a less difficult way of gaining permanent residence in Australia because for some years New Zealand’s Points Assessment Test Score was not as high as that of Australia. Indeed this was one of the factors motivating the Australian Government in 2001 to amend its regulations so that New Zealanders were not automatically eligible for social security payments in Australia (Bedford et al., 2003). Birrell and Rapson (2001, p. 61) argued that while the Australian Government’s stated motivation was to reduce Australia’s responsibilities for paying social security benefits, they also desired to limit the influx of people who would not meet the standards set by the official immigration programme and who had used the less-stringent entry criteria that applied in New Zealand at that time as a ‘back door’ entry to Australia. If this was an aim of the 2001 changes, they appear to have had some impact as the numbers of New Zealand citizens moving permanently to Australia fell from 42,254 in 1999/2000 to 21,644 in 2001/02 and 16,364 in 2002/03. Moreover, the proportion of non-New Zealand-born fell from 40.4 per cent in 2000/01 to 24.4 per cent in 2002/03. However, subsequently the numbers

began to increase to reach a record 44,304 in 2011/12, and at the same time the proportion of non-New Zealand-born also increased.

This issue has again been raised by the Australian media in recent times:

In the quiet week between Christmas and New Year, sometimes even New Zealanders are newsworthy. Generally the significant Kiwi population in Australia goes unnoticed and unremarked. On Saturday December 28, however, mastheads from Rupert Murdoch's News Corp Australia stable suddenly discovered the pressing threat posed to Australia by people crossing the Tasman. (Mares, 2014, p. 1).

One such headline, 'Immigration back door' (Bita, 2013b), maintained, "Tens of thousands of South Pacific and Asian immigrants were using New Zealand as a back door to duck Australia's tough migration controls."

The tabloid press is prone to reporting migration issues in a slanted way. As Suro (2009) has argued in the United States context, "Deeply ingrained practices in American journalism have produced a narrative that conditions people to associate immigration with illegality, crisis, controversy and government failure" (p. 185).

It is important, therefore, to examine the full situation with respect to the flow of non-New Zealand-born in the trans-Tasman flow. Undoubtedly there has been an increase in the numbers of non-New Zealand-born persons entering Australia through the 444 visa, as is shown in Tables 3a and 3b. The tables show the numbers from different backgrounds moving to Australia under the TTTA for four two-year periods: 1993–95, 1999–2001, 2001–03 and 2011–13. As well as the most recent figures, they show the pattern immediately before the 2001 changes to entitlements and after them. It is interesting that the numbers of both New Zealanders and the other birthplace groups increased substantially just before the changes but were halved in the two years following them. However, for the two years of 2011–13 they were at record high levels for both the New Zealand-born and the other groups. This shows that the current levels are similar to those in the period before the 2001 changes, with the main difference being that there has been a substantial increase in the number of New Zealand-born.

There have been significant increases in all groups moving across the Tasman compared with the period after the 2001 changes but not

compared with the period before 2001. Even during the high levels of recent years, the average number of Pacific- and Asia-born groups each year was around 9000 per year. Accordingly it would seem to be an exaggeration to talk of “tens of thousands of South Pacific and Asian immigrants” in this flow.

Table 3a: Largest birthplace groups of permanent arrivals arriving under trans-Tasman arrangements, 1993–95, 1999–2001, 2001–03 and 2011–13

	1993-95 Number	1999-2001 Number	2001-03 Number	2011-13 Number
New Zealand	17,737	45,396	26,707	57,046
Other Pacific	1,341	3,986	2,056	4,777
South-East Asia	790	1,817	665	3,324
East Asia	459	7,321	1,291	5,885
South Asia	204	4,700	1,427	3,980
Middle East/North Africa	155	1,157	433	1,322
UK	1,358	3,227	1,996	2,280
Other Europe	325	2,178	788	1,360
South Africa	115	1,185	857	2,189
Total	23,083	72,553	37,490	85,534

Source: DIBP, unpublished data.

Table 3b: Largest single countries of permanent arrivals arriving under trans-Tasman arrangements, 1993–95, 1999–2001, 2001–03 and 2011–13

1993-95		1999-2001		2001-03		2011-13	
UK/Eire	1,313	China	4,285	UK/Eire	1,942	India	2,721
W. Samoa	833	UK/Eire	3,227	W. Samoa	1,052	China	2,461
Fiji	318	India	2,104	India	877	W. Samoa	2,293
Vietnam	259	W. Samoa	2,012	Sth Africa	857	UK/Eire	2,236
Cambodia	207	Taiwan	1,509	China	665	Sth Africa	2,189
China	179	South Africa	1,185	Fiji	401	Hong Kong	1,721
Taiwan	161	Bangladesh	1,098	Taiwan	306	Fiji	1,225
Malaysia	119	Korea	972	Sri Lanka	245	Taiwan	1,082
South Africa	115	Sri Lanka	948	Cook Island	189	Singapore	1,021
India	110	Fiji	855	Iraq	160	Philippines	918
Netherlands	101	Fmr Yugoslavia	578	Philippines	160	Sri Lanka	765
Thailand	86	Hong Kong	570	USA	160	Korea	564

The assumption in the tabloid press articles is that the non-New Zealand-born migrants in the trans-Tasman flow had deliberately moved to New Zealand in order to gain citizenship so they could subsequently move to Australia. There is, however, no evidence of this. Over the 1993–2013 period the representation of the non-New Zealand-born in the trans-

Tasman flow ranged from 40.4 per cent (2000/01) to 15.5 per cent (2006/07). In only seven of the last 20 years is the proportion of non-New Zealand-born in the flow greater than their representation in the total New Zealand-resident population. To some extent, the increasing numbers of New Zealand-born in trans-Tasman flows is to be expected since the proportion of the New Zealand population who were born overseas has increased from 14.5 per cent in 1981 to 25.2 per cent in 2013. With their increasing representation in the New Zealand population, their share of emigration is also likely to increase. Moreover, it is true of internal migration in Australia that international migrants tend to have higher levels of migration *within* the country than the Australia-born (Bell & Hugo, 2000). This is due to the fact that as they adapt to participation in the labour market they often need to move to get the best fit between their qualifications and experience on the one hand and the job opportunities on the other (Bell & Hugo, 2000). This again indicates that in several respects trans-Tasman migration is more similar to internal migration within Australia than other international migration flows to the country.

Non-Permanent Movement

The permanent migration figures, however, are only the tip of the iceberg of trans-Tasman movement. In 2012/13 a total of 1,652,757 New Zealand citizen trips to Australia were recorded, equivalent to 37.3 per cent of the New Zealand resident population. A distinctive feature of New Zealander movement to Australia is a high level of temporary work-related migration as well as the significant return migration among many long-term settlers (Sanderson, 2009). The data we have considered so far has related to persons who indicated to border control in Australia that they intended to stay permanently or leave permanently, but it is apparent that they are only the tip of the iceberg of the trans-Tasman migration system. Australia recognises the following categories of international population movement for statistical purposes:

- Permanent movement – persons migrating to Australia and residents departing permanently
- Long-term movement – visitors arriving and residents departing temporarily with the intention to stay in Australia or abroad for 12 months or more, and the departure of visitors and the return of residents who had stayed in Australia or abroad for 12 months or more


- Short-term movement – travellers whose intended or actual stay in Australia or abroad is less than 12 months.

Figures 7a and 7b show the trends in short term and long term arrivals from New Zealand over the last two decades. The number of people indicating that they are staying temporarily but for more than one year have grown steadily, although, like permanent migration, numbers fell slightly in 2012-13.

These long term arrivals overwhelmingly came to Australia for economic motives as is reflected in the reasons they give on their arrival card (see Table 4). Short term arrivals, however, are much more numerous amounting to 1.192 million in 2012-13. Table 4 shows that while holidaying and visiting family are the main motives, employment and other economic drivers are also evident.


The large amount of business travel is clearly related to the integration of the economies of the two countries. This is further emphasised when we look at the reasons given by Australian residents leaving for New Zealand on a short term or long term basis shown in Table 5. It is interesting that the number of New Zealanders visiting Australia on a short term basis is only slightly more than Australians visiting New Zealand but that the inflow to Australia on a long term basis is almost seven times larger than the flow in the other direction. Tables 4 and 5 are clear evidence of the transnational family linkages which are very intensive between the two countries with visits to family and friends comprising a third of short term movement and also being of substance in long term movement as well.

Figure 7a: Long-term movement to Australia from New Zealand, 1991-92 to 2012-13



Source: DIBP, unpublished data.

Figure 7b: Short-term movement to Australia from New Zealand, 1991-92 to 2012-13



Source: DIBP, unpublished data.

Table 4: Australia: Long-term and short-term visitor arrivals from New Zealand, reasons for travel, 2012/13

Reason for travel	Number		Per cent	
	Long term	Short term	Long term	Short term
Other	1,459	45,901	12.1	4.0
Exhibition	5	1,070	0.0	0.1
Convention/Conference	388	43,966	3.2	3.9
Business	869	168,952	7.2	14.9
Visiting Friends/Relatives	971	376,104	8.1	33.2
Holiday	586	446,242	4.9	39.3
Employment	6,681	37,692	55.5	3.3
Education	1,082	14,529	9.0	1.3
Not stated	679	57,101		
Grand Total	12,720	1,191,557	100.0	100.0

Source: DIBP, unpublished data.

Table 5: Australia: Long-term and short-term Australian resident departures from New Zealand, reasons for travel, 2012/13

Reason for travel	Number		Per cent	
	Long term	Short term	Long term	Short term
Other	239	22,158	13.6	2.0
Exhibition	3	1,150	0.2	0.1
Convention/Conference	7	32,155	0.4	2.9
Business	199	144,732	11.3	13.2
Visiting Friends/Relatives	421	427,176	24.0	38.9
Holiday	280	459,010	15.9	41.7
Employment	472	6,927	26.9	0.6
Education	135	6,160	7.7	0.6
Not stated	97	41,613		
Grand Total	1,853	1,141,082	100.0	100.0

Source: DIBP, unpublished data.

Conclusion

One of the elements in the recent media discussion regarding trans-Tasman migration that was referred to earlier relates to the long-time stereotyping of them as ‘Bondi Bludgers’ (Mares, 2014). The tabloid press has long presented a picture of young New Zealanders moving to Australia, especially Sydney and coastal Queensland, and living off social security. While this became impossible with the 2001 changes, it lingers on with one recent newspaper headline being “Kiwi Layabouts Are Flooding In” (*Northern Territory Times*, 28 December 2013). The stereotype was always

unfair since analysis (ABS, 2010; Hugo, 2004) of each Australian census has indicated that:

- New Zealanders have had a higher rate of labour force participation than both the Australia-born and the total overseas-born population.
- New Zealanders are filling some important niches in the labour markets of regions that have experienced labour shortages. They are more represented in non-metropolitan areas than other overseas-born groups.
- New Zealanders have, on average, higher incomes than the Australia-born and a lower representation in the lowest income category than either the Australia-born or other immigrants.
- New Zealanders have low dependency rates.
- New Zealanders are over-represented in the skilled tradesperson occupations.

The debate that is emerging in contemporary Australia revolves around two key issues. On the one hand, there is a concern that many New Zealanders in Australia are experiencing significant hardship because since 2001 they have been denied access to a range of government-provided services, especially those linked to social security. The NGO Anglicare in Southern Queensland has reported New Zealand families with children experiencing significant hardship because they have been unable to access benefits. It is argued that New Zealanders are paying tax and contributing significantly to the economy but have to wait 10 years to access benefits. The 'Iwi n Aus' Foundation has been set up by New Zealanders to protest what they consider unjust and discriminatory laws that deny them this access and has organised rallies in several states.²

A second argument that has especially been put forward by Professor Bob Birrell of Monash University is that New Zealanders are competing with Australian entrants to the workforce for scarce jobs. He argues that the trans-Tasman flow needs to be controlled in the same way as other immigration to the nation so that it is capped at a particular predetermined level. One of the planks of the high level of positive attitudes to migration in Australia is that the Government controls the scale and composition of the intake (Markus, 2012), and some argue that this control is absent for trans-Tasman migration.

These issues have gained greater immediacy as the Australian economy slows down following the mining boom of the last decade.

However, it is important that the discourse about trans-Tasman migration in Australia adopts a wider perspective. Undoubtedly the close economic relationship between Australia and New Zealand has delivered significant benefits to both countries. Policy interventions that seek to modify the relationship should not be considered separately but as part of the wider arrangement. It is apparent that the migration of New Zealanders to Australia *is* different to Australia's migration arrangements with other countries. This is only partly because of the TTTA (Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement). It is also related to the two countries' adjacency and a myriad of diverse and strong economic, social, cultural and family linkages. The two countries, while distinct, are hardwired together, not only by the ANZAC tradition but by a plethora of other cultural, social, economic and family linkages which Australia doesn't have with other nations. In many ways we are dealing with a migration context that is intermediate between internal and international migration. The TTTA is an integral part of the relationship between the two nations and any attempt to tinker with its detail needs to be carefully considered in the context of the whole relationship and what the potential of the relationship is into the future. It is also not helped by misrepresentation of the facts concerning trans-Tasman movement and unfair and inaccurate stereotyping.

New Zealand and Australia share many values and common interests. They have a crucial role in the Pacific region which includes countries with the world's highest levels of international migration and greatest economic reliance on international migration (Bedford & Hugo, 2012). The Pacific faces many challenges such as the impact of climate change on livelihoods and the massive growth of its youth population. International migration will be of major significance in coping with these issues. In facing regional as well as their own migration challenges, New Zealand and Australia have much more to gain through cooperation than competition. The Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement has been a cornerstone of this cooperation and any initiatives to dilute or substantially change it should be undertaken carefully, be based on a thorough analysis of the evidence and consider the wider effects of any change.

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Notes

- 1 These include the United Nations (<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimatesorigin.shtml>), World Bank (<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22803131~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html>), and OECD (<http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/oecdmigrationdatabases.htm>).
- 2 <http://www.news.com.au/national/kiwis-in-australia-to-rally-against-unjust-immigration-laws/story-fncynjr2-1226837762019>.

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The Demographic Implications of Immigration

IAN POOL *

Abstract

What more appropriate context to honour Richard Bedford than to write on the subject to which he has made a major contribution: international migration. This has not just been in academic fora, but has also seen him take a very important ‘back room’ role in designing and monitoring the development of the government’s statistical instruments necessary for its analysis. My paper reviews the impact of international migration on population and social structures. But it also raises issues about these flows, and about the way that they are perceived in the national dialogue. It highlights the reality of wild fluctuations that have had a marked ‘churning’ effect on many factors of demographic and social structure. It expresses concern about the effects of these on the viability of migrant communities. It also addresses that most fundamental of questions: Has migration actually contributed to population growth, even in the decades since 1980 in which migration flows, in and out, have been massive? This recent turbulent era is compared with two past periods: from 1840 to 1880, when there was also turbulence and inflows almost unsurpassed in volume since (except in two recent years), and the more peaceful years between, 1880 to 1980, in which New Zealand’s population geography was in a state of relative equilibrium.

Richard Bedford has been the ultimate population geographer, his work covering every corner of this field. Arguably, his profile has been most prominent, and his inputs most influential, in the study of international migration. His input has been ‘catholic’, ranging from the business of mapping flows through to theorising about systems. No other New Zealand demographer, geographer or sociologist could hope to emulate his record. In honour of his contribution, I merely touch on one small segment of the field, namely, the contribution of immigration to New Zealand’s demography.

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Introduction

This paper explores the vital role that immigration plays in New Zealand's historic, current and future demography and population structures. Migration is constantly to the fore in the New Zealand media and in public policy discussions, ranging from housing in Auckland to national population change. There is nothing new in this. It has been a central theme of popular debate in New Zealand, from colonisation in 1840, and even before that – the threats of settlement by Wakefield schemes figured in parliamentary and other official discussions in Whitehall in the 1830s. However, perhaps the most scientific appraisal of the systemic role of migration here, and across Oceania, was delivered in a seminal paper prepared by Richard Bedford in 1992, published in a book edited by Mary Kritz, Lin Lim and Hania Zlotnik, three internationally respected migration experts (Bedford, 1992).

The eminent demographer Kingsley Davis pointed to the importance of immigration to New Zealand's population and society. His study (undertaken in 1974) showed that in the 1930s, the proportion of New Zealand's population who were foreign-born was higher than any of his comparators (Davis, 1974). At 19 per cent, it stood above the peak level that the United States (the 'poster child' of receiving countries) had reached in 1910 (13 per cent). He also showed that, as recently as 1970, the proportions of foreign-born from 'under-developed' countries (10 per cent in 1970) was well below the percentages for England and Wales (45 per cent), United States (34 per cent) and Australia (25 per cent). Of course, the situation has changed radically since then, as is discussed below, but has added to the perceptions of turbulence.

A useful and comprehensive model for studying the contribution of migration to national life is presented in Warren Kalbach's analysis of the impacts of migration on Canada – one of several in the 1961 Census Monograph Series that adopted wider briefs and contributed significantly to population studies (Kalbach, 1970). He analysed the historical context and the impacts of migration, including its contribution to growth, and other factors such as age and cohort changes, geographic distribution and urbanisation. Kalbach's work can be a guide to important issues that too often are passed over in the New Zealand literature, which has tended to focus on numbers and first-order questions of impact (e.g. on housing and

societal cohesion). Unfortunately, as Canadian data are richer than ours, I cannot replicate some aspects of his study, so what follows is not as elegant as Kalbach's work.¹

Despite these reservations, it should be recognised that New Zealand has been the subject of some very good migration research. For example, Ruth Farmer's authoritative paper (1985), which is empirical, also includes discussion of policy and other issues. Paul Spoonley and Richard Bedford's recent book (Spoonley & Bedford, 2012) could be seen as an update of Farmer's work, with greater (and appropriate) emphasis on diversity – an issue that was only emerging when she wrote. Wilfred Borrie's work (completed 1938; published in 1991), which Farmer used extensively, examined different European-origin settlement groups, but, curiously, failed to mention the Yugoslavs, who were the subject of Andrew Trlin's research (1979). His study may seem historic, but is particularly apposite for some of the debates being pursued at present, notably the socio-demographic viability of migrant ethnic minorities such as Croatians (for Dutch, see Van der Pas & Poot, 2011). On a slightly different tack, Jacques Poot took a lead role in the study of the economic contributions of migration (Poot, Nana, & Philpott, 1988). This book remains a rare gem of demo-econometric modelling that addressed a major public policy issue.

This is not a definitive literature review, but, before finishing, mention must also be made of the analysis by Jock Phillips and Terry Hearn of British migration to New Zealand from 1800 to 1945, which mixed quantitative and qualitative data (Phillips & Hearn, 2008). This work has enriched the field.²

Net Migration's Contribution to Population Growth

New Zealand has a long history of immigration, yet its contribution to national growth is perhaps less than is popularly assumed.³ Migration trends and policy, merely one component of our demographic system, are constantly confounded in public discourse with overall population trends and policy, allowing the 'tail of the dog to wag the dog'. The reality is that most of New Zealand's historic population growth has come from natural increase, a fact true for every quinquennium from 1876 to 2000, even in the 1970s, as is seen in Table 1.

Table 1 presents the contribution of migration to New Zealand's population growth. To analyse the impacts of migration, I use arrivals and departures data to measure net migration, simply because that classification has remained consistent from 1840. Moreover, alternative measures of net flows are confounded by category-jumping. As Farmer (1985) noted, "Migration statistics based on intended period of residence or absence are subject to errors simply because people may change their intentions" (p. 55). Arrivals and departures record definite border crossings, but also include vast numbers of tourists, whose flows are not always predictable. Tourists, whose arrivals are registered, may stay to work and even settle, category-jumping to 'permanent and long term', or leave on schedule, whereupon their departure is recorded. Data presented by Spoonley and Bedford (2012, p. 55, and Tables 3.1 and 3.5) show disjunctions between 'permanent and long term' and total movements, and the effects of New Zealand-born arrivals.

By adding in Māori estimates for the early period, when Māori natural increase rates were negative, migration is even more important as a contributor to growth. Among the settlers, however, high fertility modified this a little in favour of natural increase.

As Table 1 shows, over the entire 160-year period 1840 to 2000, natural increase was, by far, the more important factor, and migration very much the minor player. In fact, from 1876 to 2000, migrants comprised only 23 per cent of the new stock of people in New Zealand; bringing this forward to 2010, the figure is still only 25 per cent.

In the decade 2001 to 2010, an era of large inflows, only 36 per cent of growth was due to net immigration, although its contribution varied enormously by quinquennium; i.e. migration contributed 56 per cent of all growth in 2001–05, but only 22 per cent in 2006–10.

Table 1 provides the percentage contributions of migration to overall growth over long periods; of course, reproduction and replacement that flow on from migration in second and later generations must be recognised, but we do not have the data to examine this.⁴

Table 1: Percentage contribution of migration to New Zealand's population growth, 1840–2000

Period	%*	Non- Māori only
1840–1875	81	73
1876–1900	30	24
1901–1925	31	32
1926–1950	11	-
1951–1975	25	-
1976–2000	Negative **	-
2001–2005	56	-
2006–2010	22	-
2010–2014	21 ***	-

Notes: The periods vary in duration.

*These data include Māori, who were excluded from official data until 1916. I use estimates until vital data become available, and also up until World War II when Māori registrations became more complete. It is assumed that few Māori were involved in international migration in early years, and when external mobility became common they were already included. These Māori data come from my work-in-progress (book in press). In early periods the inclusion of Māori dampens the effects of natural increase as Māori levels were negative until the end of the 19th century, strongly so in the first decades after Waitangi.

**Natural increase: 686,184; net immigration: -39,542

*** Natural increase: 153,487; net migration: 41,784. This proportion is close to 20 per cent, the 'rule of thumb' for post-war New Zealand; overlaps with quinquennium 2006–2010.

Moreover, the contribution of migration to New Zealand's population stocks has been highly concentrated temporally in time. Of all net migrants over the period 1840–2000, 41 per cent had arrived before 1900, with 20 per cent arriving in just two quinquennia: 1861–65 and 1871–75. That means that a fifth of all migrants over that 160-year period arrived during 6 per cent of the period, with this enormous inflow occurring before 1876. There are several reasons behind this. Between 1861 and 1865, the gold rushes and the second New Zealand Wars (1860s) brought in a net of 93,169 people. Serving the Crown for the Waikato Wars alone were 12,000 imported imperial troops, many of whom stayed on as settlers. The Vogel Schemes attracted a net 81,973 people between 1871 and 1875;⁵ however, as it encouraged 'family' migration, its real effect was to increase the number of births by 50 per cent between that five-year period and the next (1876–80). Neither of the net inflows that greatly inflated the size of the settler society then, nor that in 1871–75, was to be exceeded until the next century, again in just two quinquennia: 1971–75 (116,917) and 2001–05 (182,043). But, by the 1970s, there were 25 times as many people in New Zealand as there had been in 1860, and 49 times as many Pakeha.

Fluctuations and Planning for the Future

Fluctuations in net migration trends are intense, but do not seem to have manifest rationale beyond the net migration effects of random perturbations in total arrivals and departures. Nineteenth-century population geographer Ernest Ravenstein's law (Ravenstein, 1885; Taylor 2003) perhaps best explains the fluctuations, namely that each stream of migration produces a counterstream. Disjunctions between Australian and New Zealand business cycles may also have a causal effect on migration trends (Poot, 2010). For example, between 1971 and 1975, New Zealand received 116,917 net migrants, but in the next quinquennium, we lost 98,800. Later decades followed these swings: higher in a first quinquennium; lower, even negative, in the second. The year 2014 has had one of the highest net migration rates on record, enough to bring up the rate for quinquennium 2009–14, but still not up to the level for 2006–10 (with which it overlaps by one year).

Does this presage a shift in what, since the 1970s, has been a systematic pattern, or will the next few years, 2015–19, fall below even what is a low contribution of migration over the five-year period 2010–14? Or, given the inherent instability of migration patterns, discussed below, will these scenarios fail to predict what actually occurs? The extent to which returning New Zealanders contribute to this proportion will also be a key factor: there seems to be a shift in New Zealand birthplace/previous residence composition of the flows.

Table 2: Fluctuations in net migration 1971–2010, by quinquennium (net numbers)

Start of decade	Net number	End of decade	Net number
1971–1975	+116,917	1976–1980	–98,800
1981–1985	+17,638	1986–1990	–43,285
1991–1995	+ 54,344	1996–2000	+ 30,561
2001–2005	+ 182,043	2006–2010	+ 47,797

Source: Statistics New Zealand, arrivals and departures data.

This instability makes analysis, projections and planning very difficult, despite the false certainty of bank economists, usually based on quarterly or annual figures. In fact, net external migration is the most severely distorting short-term dynamic in our population system. Long-term demographic distortion over recent periods has been due to phasic shifts in fertility levels and patterns; however, reproductive trends are far

less turbulent than migration in the shorter run (Pool, 2003: Figures 4 and 5). In addition, the sources of migration also change, with returning New Zealanders and overseas-born people of New Zealand descent one major grouping, and an alternative source being persons from other origins, the mixes of which also vary from time to time.

We must be very clear about how migration might, or should be, used as a population policy lever and how inflows will have an impact, including looking beyond its impacts on our society and culture (the fear of some conservatives) and the landscape. As an example, reporting on the Gallup's Potential Net Migration Index, the *New Zealand Herald* has suggested that New Zealand is a "dream migration destination for millions around the world" and that "New Zealand's population could rise by 134 per cent [if] everyone chose to live where they wanted". According to this story, "New Zealand's population of 4,242,048 would swell to 9,926,393" (Tan, 2014). However, the last time that such high levels of population growth were achieved by migration in New Zealand (1.33 times, 1874–1878), this was from a small base and driven by the sizeable and once-off Vogel-assisted migration schemes. The real impact came from the fact that Vogel migrants were families who very quickly went on to achieve 'hyper-fertility' (Pool, Dharmalingam & Sceats, 2007). Additionally, for those times, they also attained exceptionally high levels of childhood survivorship, mainly because of their high socio-economic status relative to Māori or any other population (Pool & Cheung, 2003, 2005). This impetus continued, over the following decades (1.35 times, 1878–96; 1.20 times, 1886–96; 1.25 times, 1896–1906), although by then, the driving force was reproduction and no longer migration.⁶

Migration's contribution to sustained growth comes only when immigrants settle and remain permanently. In earlier periods this seemed to be true, even after the contribution of net immigration to overall population growth had dropped to historically low levels (Table 1, 1926–50). Yet, overseas-born were still 21 per cent (male) and 18 per cent (female) of the total at the 1936 Census. Because of the 'baby boom', and in the face of post-war assisted passage and similar migrant schemes, percentages of overseas-born fell well below 20 per cent between the 1945 to 1991 censuses. Despite the massive recent inflows and outflows, the negative migration levels between 1976 and 2000 meant that only 22 per cent of the population were overseas-born in 2001, lower than in 1926 (27

per cent males, 23 per cent females). This had risen to 24 per cent by 2013, but was still far below pre-World War I levels.

Demographic Distribution and Diversity

The structures and dynamics of the population geography of colonial and post-colonial New Zealand have gone through three very distinct phases (Pool, 2002), which have had significant impacts at a regional level. These phases are discussed below.

Explosive Colonisation – Population-geographic instability until 1891

The first phase, lasting until the 1890s, was tumultuous and saw a total turnaround in geographic distribution, with the South Island becoming the dominant region.

In 1840, there were perhaps 70,000 to 90,000 Māori and 2000 Pakeha in New Zealand, mostly living in the North Island (Te Ika a Māui). Following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the massive inflows of Pakeha went to both islands, settling around colonial towns, especially the key port of entry, Auckland.

The Pakeha population of the South Island (Te Waipounamu) grew rapidly, as settlers stocked the huge ‘runs’ made available through Crown Purchase, and later with wheat farming on small-farmer allotments, their growth bolstered by more intensively populated settlements. However, the North Island still had more Pakeha (57 per cent) than the South in 1858, and if Māori are counted, the inter-island imbalance was far more marked – more than three-quarters of New Zealanders lived in the North about the time of Judge Fenton’s 1857/58 Māori census and the coterminous Pakeha census (held on 24 Dec 1858).

From the gold strikes of the late 1850s, immigrants flowed disproportionately to the South Island for gold and farming, while the decade of New Zealand Wars made the north less attractive. As Table 3 shows, in 1881 Canterbury and Otago had a majority of all the overseas-born. Between 1874 and 1881, Auckland’s Pakeha population grew more slowly than for New Zealand as a whole. This redistribution to the south was thus rapid and dramatic. By 1881, Te Waipounamu had a larger proportion of all New Zealanders than Te Ika a Māui.

Dating back to the 1820s, Māori voyaged and traded very successfully both within Aotearoa and overseas, particularly to Australia but as far afield at least as California. (Less definitive records also suggest trade with, but certainly travel to, the United Kingdom). Trade contacts were slowed as Australian and Pakeha competition rose, and virtually eliminated by the New Zealand Wars of the 1860s. Pre-colonial and colonial Pakeha movements across the Tasman previewed post-colonial mobility, emerging most dramatically with gold miner-migrant waves that involved Pacific-wide, probably global, ‘systems’, as documented by James Belich (2009). (Eleanor Catton’s *Man Booker* prize-winning novel vividly portrays their gritty reality (Catton, 2013)). Fortune hunters streamed from California to the Coromandel (1852), off to Victoria, back to Nelson, Otago, Westland and Thames-Coromandel again. Thus, both Māori and Pakeha were early on creating what Richard Bedford was later to analyse as ‘Oceanic migration systems’ (see also Bedford, 1992).

This period also saw intense local movement of Māori, both because of the confiscations, especially expulsions (what would be called ‘ethnic cleansing’ today) of Waikato-Tainui into the King Country, Ngāti Awa and Tūhoe in the eastern Bay of Plenty, and in Taranaki, and the severe displacements due to the Native Land Court (NLC).⁷

Table 3 points to a major impact of migration – the way that changes in flows affect regional differences in the distribution of the foreign-born. Although fertility had become dominant as a driver of national growth by the 1880s, it was migration that was still producing regional differences in composition, at least as measured by changing patterns of residence of the foreign-born. We can say that with some degree of certainty because geographical differences in Pakeha fertility were minimal; levels varied from high (mining regions) to very high (most of the remaining areas). But by the 1890s, levels nationally had declined significantly, while regional differentials had opened up (Pool, Dharmalingam, & Sceats, 2007, pp. 137–48).

Table 3: Distribution (%) of the overseas-born population by region, by gender*

	Auckland	Wellington	Canterbury	Otago	Other	Total
Males						
1881	19	11	23	29	18	100
1921	34	22	15	10	19	101
1961	43	24	13	6	15	101
2001	60	15	9	3	12	99
Females						
1881	20	12	25	29	14	100
1921	33	22	16	11	19	100
1961	43	23	12	6	16	99
2001	60	15	9	3	12	99

Note: * Accurate reconciliation of areas over time is impossible. The regions here are 'provinces', historically or their approximations in recent years: e.g. for Auckland, summing several 'statistical areas'.

Recolonisation – Population geographic equilibrium, 1890s–1970

This led to the next phase, one of equilibrium in New Zealand's population geography, yet, paradoxically, contextualised by destabilising exogenous events. There were two World Wars, a very deep depression and, after six decades of steadily declining fertility reaching bare replacement in the 1930s, there was the 'baby boom', when New Zealand Pakeha outran, in terms of reproductive rates and intensity, all other comparable Western developed populations. As was true for numerous Western countries – the United States was an exception – New Zealand's baby boom extended into the 1970s, and did not end in the 1960s (Pool, Dharmalingam, & Sceats, 2007, Chapter 5). The genesis for this boom was a radical shift from later marriage and high rates of female celibacy that had endured from the 1880s to the 1940s, to a regime of early and almost universal marriage, producing New Zealand's long (1943–73) and bi-modalised baby boom (peaks in birth numbers were in 1960 and 1970). A further paradox was that this was a period in which immigration contributed less to population growth (Table 1), yet the overseas-born were still a significant minority until 1936. The baby boom extinguished this, so that overseas-born reached the proportions they had been at in 1936 only by 1996.

By 1901, the inter-island tide had turned so that by then only 46 per cent of New Zealanders and 49 per cent of Pakeha lived in the South Island. The North Island gradually increased its dominance, in part because early fertility declines had started in the south. The last areas of higher fertility were the North Island's pioneer regions, where land had

just been taken from Māori. Moreover, as Peter Brosnan's (1986) study on inter-regional migration showed, this was also an era of relative stability as measured by mobility.

The overseas-born redistributed to the north, but in a gradual fashion, and their distribution across New Zealand was still relatively even up to the early 1960s. In 1911, a bare majority of Pakeha were urban, but when Māori are included, the figure for urban dwellers sat at 48 per cent (still far higher than in numerous European countries). While few Māori were urban in 1926, 56 per cent of all New Zealanders and 58 per cent of Pakeha were urban. Auckland's metropolitan dominance was still not marked although it was increasing, and secondary cities, such as New Plymouth, Whanganui, Napier, Timaru and Invercargill, still performed numerous basic and specialised economic and social roles. Farming became increasingly mechanised on the owner-operated efficient units that lasted until the 1970s, when agri-business became more common. Urban centres mainly serviced the hinterland, exporting to 'Mother England' from ports all round the country. James Belich (2001) states that New Zealand was in a period of "recolonisation" at this time; it was the "town supply farm of London" (pp. 29–30). Brian Easton (1997) underlines this point: "Selling meat and dairy products transformed the political economy ... which was to dominate New Zealand until the 1960s" (p. 45). This was a major determinant of New Zealand's population geography.

New Zealand- and overseas-born were more evenly distributed throughout the country than more recently, although Pakeha were gradually redistributing northwards. Diversity was limited, even among the overseas-born population. Farmer (1985) noted that "New Zealand ... stood out among New World immigration countries for the very high proportion of its people of British origin" (p. 79). Borrie's (1991) study shows, however, that New Zealand was perhaps more diverse than this suggests. There were other Europeans living in New Zealand, some in planned settlements. Additionally, there were small communities of Indian and Chinese origin, as well as small numbers of Pacific Island Polynesians.⁸

From 1901 to 1926, the proportion of Pakeha in the South Island, and the proportion of the total population who were Māori, remained virtually unchanged. Also, during the longer period 1926–66, the percentages of the overseas-born, total and working-age (20–59 years)

populations in the 'Big 3' metropolitan areas (Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch) did not change much. Moreover, the Big 3's clusters at working ages were similar to those for New Zealand as a whole (Pool, 2002, Tables 2, 3, 4).

Renewed population-geographic turbulence: Since 1970

The population geography then changed radically. Britain entered the Common Market, and New Zealand globalised rapidly and also restructured financially and economically (Le Heron & Pawson, 1996, p. 6). Demographically, fertility rates plummeted during the 1970s because of shifts in reproductive regimes (such as a return to later childbearing and changing conjugal patterns from marriage to cohabitation) interlocking with labour force changes. Since then, fertility has remained consistently around replacement levels. In a sense, the last 40 years has seen the reverse of the earlier period of 'recolonisation'. Since 1976, reproduction has been in equilibrium, whereas the population geography has gone through a very substantial upheaval. This has been particularly true for external migration. Last but not least, this period has seen New Zealand's ethnic make-up become far more diverse (see Spoonley & Bedford, 2012, Table 4).

During this period, external migration has taken the form of large inflows, but also large outflows which have produced, as noted earlier, both the heaviest net immigration gains and net emigration losses on record. During this time, the New Zealand diaspora also emerged. There had always been one but it became a much higher-profile issue in the late 1970s, as did return flows of New Zealand-born or former residents. By 2001, levels of overseas-born had gone back to the high proportions seen in the early inter-war period.

Yet, somewhat paradoxically, as Table 1 shows, in comparison with natural increase, net migration had made a strong contribution to national population growth since 1976, the numbers of arrivals cancelling out numbers of departures. This meant that international migration was very much a demographically destabilising force because of its intense fluctuations – driven as much by emigration, by the departure of New Zealand residents, as by the arrivals of overseas-born, to say nothing of changes in sources and other factors of the composition of flows. Last but

not least, the recent period has seen New Zealand's ethnic make-up become far more diverse.

Metropolitanisation also increased for both Māori and Pakeha, and with it the rapidly growing dominance of Auckland. Auckland's growth is still driven primarily by natural increase. International net migration counteracts a net loss by migration to other regions of New Zealand – particularly nearby commuting and retirement areas.

Table 4: Birthplace composition of the overseas-born, selected censuses (%)

	'Preferred' sources ¹	Other sources ²	NEI ³	Total
1951	92 (86) ⁴	7	1	100
1966	91 (75)	8	1	100
1986	85 (61)	10	4	100
2006	53 (28)	30	18	100

Source: Spoonley & Bedford (2012), Tables 3.3, 3.11 and 3.12. See also the text and other tables in Chapter Three. Permission to quote from these tables was given by Paul Spoonley.

Notes: 1. Migration sources: 'Preferred sources' were those so categorised before the 1986 policy review; i.e. Australia, Pacific, UK, Ireland, North and West Europe, North America.

2. 'Other Sources' is the rest of the world.

3. NEI (not elsewhere included) are insufficient data.

4. Figures in brackets relate to the subset of 'Preferred': UK + Ireland + Australia.

New Zealand is sharing in a global trend towards agglomeration and the demographic dynamics that drive it.⁹ More than half (52 per cent) of New Zealand's overseas-born now live in Auckland and the more-even distribution of the past has disappeared. The Big 3 metropoli, but increasingly Auckland alone, have seen a concentration of people at working ages, and an even more marked clustering of those in the professional and managerial sectors, finance, insurance, real estate and services.

The reproductive capacity of New Zealand is now concentrated in the largest metropoli, which house proportionately more potential parents and thus generate disproportionate numbers of live births. But (and here is the rub), these same parents are the birth 'delayers', so that total fertility rates, especially in central city areas, are down towards European sub-replacement levels. Inter-regional migration has increased, but even more intense are inter-metropolitan and intra-metropolitan/regional movements.

Demographic Renewal and Dividends

In the popular discourse, net immigration is viewed by some as means of replenishing not only the labour force but also working-age groups, and therefore as a means of delaying long-term ageing. It is seen as a factor of demographic revitalisation. This argument is superficial, for population ageing is a complex process, as Natalie Jackson (2011a) outlines in her paper on the demographic forces shaping New Zealand.

New Zealand's cohort flows have been due primarily to the baby boom, ending about 1973, then the radical decline to exact- or below-replacement fertility since then. These trends have produced badly disordered cohort effects, which are of major policy significance (Pool, 2003). For ageing to be averted, net migration would have to be so perfectly regulated that each year it would neatly fill cohort gaps, 'smoothing the population surface', as it were. For policy and planning, the smoother the progression of cohorts across age structures, the easier it is to service needs. A United Nations (2000) study showed that 'replacement migration' is unlikely to generate demographic renewal unless flows are so huge that they distort cohort structures and are likely to generate xenophobia.

Beyond the vast overall fluctuations shown earlier, even in narrower age ranges there is churning, particularly at the key labour force ages, as is seen for two adjacent calendar years (Table 5). I purposely use two adjacent years to illustrate the superficiality of many of the migration commentaries that make deterministic statements on the basis of very short-run observations; my objective here is to emphasise the turbulence and unpredictability of migration trends. The net result of churning is that migration is very ineffective in adding to population growth (Note 3, Table 5) and the labour force as an instrument for smoothing distributions.

Table 5: Net migration by quinquennial age-group, labour force ages, 2005 and 2006

Age group	2005	2006
20–24	-1,672	-4,424
25–29	3,075	-2,066
30–34	5,368	394
35–39	3,569	-964
40–44	3,601	-1,173
45–49	2,287	-3,029
50–54	2,185	-1,901
55–59	1,817	-2,312
Total	20,230	-15,475

Notes: 1. Net gain over two years: -4755.
 2. Total flows over two years: -37771.
 3. Effectiveness index = (a)/(b) x 100 = 13 per cent.

Beyond this, migration actually speeds up population ageing, because arrivals are concentrated at ages 20–50 years, among people already well into their life cycles, while family reunion brings in an older population.¹⁰ At the 2013 Census, the New Zealand-born population had a median age of 36 years, while the overseas-born median was 42 years. Both the replacement of overseas-born by migration, as well as replacing the middle-aged native-born, would have to be tightly regulated in migration policy if smooth progression were to be achieved and ageing averted. That would be impossible anyway because of the confounding effects of flows of New Zealand citizens.

Furthermore, while overseas-born do marry and have New Zealand-born children, at least 70 per cent of the overseas-born in 2013 came from homelands dominated by sub-replacement fertility. For example, those born in Asian countries, who are now twice as numerous as those born in Pacific countries, have the sub-replacement fertility of their home populations. The real long-term answer to ageing, and even to possible population decline, is fertility – not another baby boom as that would be demographically disastrous, but many years during which New Zealand remained consistently at replacement level.

More sustained economic growth comes from ‘demographic dividends’, arising during a window of opportunity when the population at labour force ages is high relative to those at dependent ages (Pool, 2007a). Normally, this is when fertility has declined, but long-term ageing has not yet set in. For New Zealand, this window lasts from 1976 to 2016. It has been squandered because New Zealand has failed to invest in young

workers, in whom, incidentally, large sums were invested when they were children (Pool, 2007b). We seem to prefer to send them as ‘guest workers’ to Australia, to use John Key’s term (Watkins, 2014), thus the need to replace them with migrants.¹¹

The overseas-born, particularly those born in Asia, are bridging a short-term gap at working ages, but in the longer term, say 2025 to 2030 when ageing sets in, the work force will have to be replenished by New Zealand-born, disproportionately Māori and Pasifika, who are heavily over-represented at childhood ages. Jackson (2011b) has demonstrated that this wave could give New Zealand a second-chance at a demographic dividend, provided that we do not squander this second window of opportunity. For success, the New Zealand-born young must be well educated and integrated into a proactive domestic labour market.

Conclusion: Migration, Population Systems and Nation-Building

Immigration has played a major role in shaping New Zealand’s population architecture. Among OECD countries, only Luxembourg has a significantly higher percentage of foreign-born than New Zealand (36 per cent). Among those where migration is a significant policy issue, Australia is slightly higher at 25 per cent, but Canada (20 per cent), the United States (14 per cent) and the United Kingdom (10 per cent) all fall well below New Zealand (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Migration has been the Gaudi of nation building: unpredictable without having formalised and consistent rules, structures and flows. It has brought economic benefits, if for no other reason than by bridging gaps in working-age cohorts and in labour force skills (not dealt with here). Its economic impact is undoubtedly larger than this. Socially and culturally it enriches New Zealand.

However, migration has also created demographic turbulence throughout much of New Zealand’s history. In recent years, the mix has become especially complex, not just because of ethnicity, which tends to excite the most comment, but through birthplace and residential history, regardless of ethnicity. There are the overseas-born shifting to New Zealand for the first time, returning New Zealand-born and former residents, and the children born overseas to former New Zealanders by

birth or residence. All this adds to demographic turbulence and its social and economic consequences.

Ultimately, migration must be assessed as one among several demographic factors in nation building. How this meta-objective is to be achieved is a different and very problematic story. Alan Simmons (2011) posits three different nation-building scenarios for Canada: (i) more babies, (ii) more immigrants – neither of which can be directed by policy and have distorting effects on the population, economy and society – or (iii) adapt to slow growth by increasing levels of productivity, exploiting underutilised labour pools and exporting jobs.

These same choices also confront New Zealand, although we have not really looked closely at all three options. Instead, we have focused on migration as a singular panacea. As this paper has shown, however, migration is not likely to provide this demographic prop, even under the most favourable of circumstances and then only if flows are highly regulated. Instead, for New Zealand, migration is a turbulent phenomenon that destabilises demographic and social structures. There is another more latent issue that has emerged in this paper, and which demands far greater attention than it has received to date: the demographic viability of migrant communities. Churning occurs within, as well as between, origin groups in ways (e.g. destabilised age distributions) that make community replacement difficult and that affect the age-sex balance. Too often, a response by members of these groups, especially smaller groups, will be to move to where communities have more viable structures, sometimes outside of New Zealand (see, for example, Ho & Bedford, 2008). But the regulation of flows is an impossibility as it would require close monitoring and intervention to change the composition and size of flows. In any case, given the significance among migrant groups of New Zealand-born or citizens by naturalisation, neither of whom can, or should, be subject to controls of this sort, it would be have limited overall impacts.

Reproduction seems to offer a far more stable alternative and, for New Zealand, has the advantage that fertility rates in this country have been consistent, fluctuating very modestly around replacement, for roughly 40 years, a longer period than the baby boom. Were this to change, however, past experience (e.g. the onset and the end of the baby boom) suggests that shifts in levels could be quite dramatic, and there could be calls for intervention. But the management of fertility patterns and levels

is difficult and undesirable, as it so easily shades into neo-eugenics. Again, there is no simple panacea; what seems a simple question unravels into a multiplicity of issues spanning bio-social factors of reproduction (e.g. fecundability by age), the nature of conjugal unions, education and training, career patterns, work-family life-leisure interactions, and the shifting morphologies of wider families (Pool, Dharmalingam, & Sceats, 2007).¹²

The third scenario is interesting, but demands resort to strategies that are far from demographic, such as increased levels of investment by employers in plants, machinery, education and workforce training. The Japanese, for example, are exploring the exploitation of underutilised labour pools by encouraging increases in labour force participation by women. Their experiences will be worth following. New Zealand has far higher levels of female labour force participation than in Japan; however, many of these workers are casual and in part-time employment, so perhaps there is scope for change there. Another possibility relates to older people in the workforce – already their participation rates are increasing. Earlier in this paper I also discussed the demographic dividend available through the more efficient use of young Maori and Pasifika workforces.

However New Zealand proceeds, it will be constrained by its demographic history. Australia and New Zealand have two properties that are unique among Western developed countries: a recent history of severe short-term turbulence and fluctuations driven by migration trends and, longer-term, large swings in fertility levels – and New Zealand represents probably the more extreme case of the two countries.

That we know as much as we do about the role of migration as a factor of nation building is, in no small measure, due to the contribution of Richard Bedford. New generations of demographers, population geographers and other social scientists will need to build on this knowledge base if New Zealand is to satisfactorily weather the impacts of migration on population and nation building.

Notes

- 1 It should be noted that, like New Zealand, Canada has problems recording ethnicity, an essential variable if diversity is to be studied using consistent classifications.

- 2 They have also put the remarkable sample they generated into the public domain, which is very generous.
- 3 Let me put on record the fact that I favour migration and consider that every wave of migrants has made rich contributions to New Zealand society, its culture and economy. But in this paper I raise two concerns: how migration makes this contribution; and its reliability as a population policy lever, which is the role prescribed for it by many in business, economics and politics. This raises a further issue: Are migration trends so complex and variable that it is impossible to manage the process by regulation?
- 4 An in-depth study of differences between the foreign-born and New Zealand-born in fertility and mortality would indeed be very interesting, but well beyond the scope of this paper.
- 5 From approximately 1870 to 1875, the New Zealand Government of Julius Vogel sought vast amounts of money from overseas lenders to fund public works and immigration projects. The money obtained allowed the central government to provide free and assisted passage to large numbers of immigrants from the United Kingdom.
- 6 There are two backstories to this. First, North Island Māori had to be brutally displaced so that the huge inflows of settlers could be given the more productive areas of Te Ika a Māui (the North Island). Secondly, the incoming settlers wrought radical changes to the landscape and the farming economy. Under Māori, even after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, much of the North Island, where most Māori lived, was devoted to horticulture, including the production of grain and potatoes for export to Australia and elsewhere. The invasion of the Waikato was driven by Pakeha, who wanted to eliminate Māori horticultural production and trade because it competed with Pakeha commerce, and to change the farmscape to ovine pastoralism. This later gave way to intensive dairying which today is again altering landscapes (references to the 19th century come from Pool, in press).
- 7 Essentially, the NLC enabled ‘clearances’, not too different from those in the Highlands and Ireland, so that both Māori and Celtic peasants were forced onto small residual patches of land. Highland clearances were still occurring in 1882, while our NLC-driven clearances continued full force into the early 20th century. This allowed the ‘swamping’ (Belich, 1996, *passim*) of North Island Māori by settlers. In New Zealand and Celtic Britain, and in similar situations elsewhere, clearances ensured that pastoralism would become the dominant form of rural production (Pool in press; Wood, Brooking & Perry, 2008).

8 In 1891, the Auckland census enumerator excitedly reported five Rarotongans in Orakei (Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives, 1891, G-2). Although there were fears earlier that indenturing of Indian labourers in Fiji would result in an overspill into New Zealand, few Indo-Fijians came before the 1970s. From that date, with diversification, New Zealand has been enriched by the grandchildren of the Fijian sugar-plantation labourers immigrating in large numbers as professionals and small business owners (Phillips, 2012).

9 These trends, and the resultant urban engorgement of functions that were once more evenly spread across the country, a process called *agglomeration*, is a current fashion in economic thinking, as epitomised in Glaeser (2012). The World Bank, in its 2009 study *Reshaping Economic Geography*, also extolled large cities, seeing them as the outcome of market forces.

Reviewing arguments about the forces, and the desirability, of agglomeration, and then linking these back to migration is outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is an issue that impinges on it, because some rather hyperbolic observations, as exemplified by Glaeser's book's title, can see agglomerations almost as the singular panacea for humanity's needs, or at least better than the alternatives. This view is also appearing in New Zealand, but it ignores why urbanites flock to lifestyle blocks or outer suburbs. Even the urbane French, as population geographer Pierre Merlin (2009, pp. 23, 25) notes, are engaging in '*J'exode urbain*' of peri-urbanisation and '*rurbanisation*'; the quintessential urban French person is a suburbanite, a *banlieusard*, rather than a central city dweller or *citadin*. Thus, this leaves me with a less enthusiastic view of agglomeration, at least for New Zealand's urban areas; I also wonder whether the authors of the Introduction to the World Bank's iconic study, in their religious zeal for large urban areas, had ever visited somewhere like Lagos.

For New Zealand, a modified centre-periphery perspective seems more realistic, seeing New Zealand businesses and their locations, and thus by extrapolation our largest agglomerations, as "really branch-plants with their true executive hearts in Melbourne or Sydney or wherever" (Pool, 2014). This will affect their long-term viability and thus have a major impact on migration trends, domestic and international, and, as a consequence, on overall population patterns.

10 This is a statistical fact, but it should not imply that I am against family reunion – rather the contrary, as it brings a generational balance into migrant communities, and is often morally desirable.

11 The underlying causes of squandering lie especially with the neo-liberal policies that New Zealand has followed over the last three decades. The superannuation scheme eliminated by Muldoon might have financed such

investment, but squandering has also come from economic restructuring with little attention being paid to human capital issues, resulting in large numbers of young workers leaving to work offshore; severe budgetary welfare cuts, and the stalling of the reinstated superannuation scheme have also played their parts (Pool, 2007b).

- 12 These complexities are reviewed in a recent article in the *Guardian*, extracted from *Le Monde* (Chemin, 2015), comparing Scandinavia and France, which have high sub-replacement fertility levels, just below New Zealand's, whereas "much of central and southern Europe has subsided into a strange demographic winter". In France and Scandinavia, intricate policy mixes covering a wide range of family-building factors address the fact that "There is nothing straightforward and natural about 'the family'. It is a very complex world, based on social norms, what the American sociologist Ronald Rindfuss calls the 'family package'".

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Researching Duration of Residence: From Census and Postal Surveys to Integrated Data Infrastructure

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Abstract

By international comparison, New Zealanders have high geographical mobility. Around the turn of millennium, Richard Bedford initiated a series of surveys of mobility behaviour, focused on the Western Bay of Plenty (WBoP). The surveys were the first to yield sizeable New Zealand samples of recalled mobility behaviour, motivations and intentions. The surveys were instrumental in developing the one-off national Survey of Dynamics and Motivations for Migration in 2007. New data sources are now emerging. They include linked censuses, Integrated Data Infrastructure data and geo-referenced data from social media and mobile devices. In this paper we use hitherto unused data from the 2003 WBoP survey as a benchmark for a discussion of the evolution of research on duration of residence and the strengths and weaknesses of past approaches. We emphasise demographic differences between in-migrants and out-migrants, the fundamental role of the life course, and the apparent declining attachment to current residence. The emerging new data environment offers much scope for innovative future research on residential mobility and migration.

By global standards, New Zealand has a high level of residential mobility (e.g. Esipova, Pugliese, & Ray, 2013). At the time of the 2013 Census, only 41.5 per cent of the population stated that their usual residence was the same as five years previously. Census respondents had lived on average 7.5 years at their usual address, a very similar duration as recorded in previous censuses.

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The research described in this article was undertaken independently from Lynda Sanderson's employment at the New Zealand Treasury. The views, opinions, findings and conclusions expressed in this article are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the New Zealand Treasury or the University of Waikato.

Such mobility data were scant until questions on past residence were included in the census, starting in 1971. However, residential mobility over the life course cannot be fully understood with data from successive, but unlinked, censuses. In contrast, administrative data can report a sequence of moves and completed residence spells over a long time frame, but usually say little about the characteristics or motivations of movers and stayers.

Ongoing monitoring and analysis of geographical mobility of individuals and households is important for several reasons. Firstly, even though much of past long-run population growth in New Zealand was due to natural increase, the contribution of internal and international migration to population growth is growing because of population ageing. The impacts of migration flows vary widely across regions (e.g. Poot, 2005). Thus, geographic mobility of the population can have a substantial impact on the size and composition of regional and urban populations which, in turn, will have a big impact on turnover in the housing market and on the myriad other socio-economic consequences that can be identified by means of migration impact assessment (see Nijkamp, Poot, & Sahin, 2012). Furthermore, it is becoming clear that procedures for projecting the future population would benefit from more accurate information regarding geographic mobility behaviour. Finally, new scientific insights may emerge from future multi- and cross-disciplinary research on migrant behaviour (e.g. Cushing & Poot, 2004), both from studies concerned with in-depth objective information and from studies that utilise subjective information concerned with perceptions, motivations, aspirations, expectations, resilience, well-being, etc.

In the New Zealand context, Richard Bedford has played a major role in the development of data collection regarding internal migration.¹ In the present context, two contributions stand out. One is the guidance he provided for the development of Statistics New Zealand's Survey of Dynamics and Motivation for Migration (DMM). This survey was conducted in the first quarter of 2007, as a supplement to the Household Labour Force Survey.² The other initiative has been a series of surveys of migration into and out of the Western Bay of Plenty (WBoP), commencing in 2001. These surveys were effectively a pilot for the DMM survey. The motivation for the WBoP surveys was to obtain better understanding of population dynamics in this region, which was the fastest-growing region

in New Zealand at the time. A later survey also included the eastern Bay of Plenty. While the surveys had various methodological limitations (e.g. Lidgard & McLeay, 2002), they provided information that was hitherto not available in the New Zealand context as they were the first to yield sizeable samples of recalled mobility behaviour, motivations and intentions, albeit for just one region.³

As a recognition of the pioneering contribution of the WBoP surveys and as a vehicle for discussing strengths and weaknesses of statistical analyses of duration of residence data, we provide in the present paper some examples of duration analysis with the 2002 WBoP survey. We highlight mobility issues such as differences between inward and outward movers, key demographic determinants, and duration dependence (i.e. the probability of a further move depending on the time that has passed since the previous move). The employed techniques have their origin in social mobility analysis as it emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. McGinnes, 1968; Pickles, 1983). The techniques are now well established and perhaps even somewhat neglected in recent years in mobility research, but they may yet see a revival in the emerging new data environment of linked censuses, the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI) of linked administrative and survey data, and the big data generated through GPS-driven tracing of movements and online activity of individuals.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the development of the WBoP survey and the resulting data. Some methodological issues in measuring residence spells are outlined in the third section. This is followed by an illustrative analysis, using the WBoP survey, of the kinds of questions that have been addressed in duration of residence analyses. The final section provides a retrospect and prospect and considers the potential of newly developed data sources for understanding geographic mobility.

The 2003 Western Bay of Plenty Survey

The second of the series of surveys of regional migration in the WBoP area was conducted in early 2003 by the Migration Research Group (led by Richard Bedford) and the Population Studies Centre at the University of Waikato. The survey formed part of a wider study of demographic change in the WBoP region, commissioned by the WBoP Smart Growth Project and

with financial assistance from the Department of Labour, the Department of Geography at Waikato University, and the FRST-funded New Demographic Directions Programme.

The primary goal of the survey was to assess the reasons why recent in-migrants chose to settle in the WBoP District (essentially the rural part of WBoP) or in Tauranga District (essentially the urban part of WBoP), and why former residents chose to leave these areas. A secondary goal was to obtain some insight into satisfaction with life in the WBoP among in-migrants and out-migrants. As such, the survey was sent to households who had recently either moved into the Tauranga or WBoP districts or who had left either of these areas to move elsewhere in New Zealand. The bulk of the questionnaire focused on migrants' personal characteristics and household situations before and after the most recent move (Bedford, Lidgard, & McLeay, 2005; Lidgard & McLeay, 2002; McLeay & Lidgard, 2006).

Surveyed households were identified using the New Zealand Post's (NZ Post) New Zealand Movers Mailing List, now called the New Zealand Change of Address Database (NZCOA). The list was compiled by NZ Post from details of people completing Change of Address requests.⁴ NZ Post estimates that around 80 per cent of New Zealand households and individuals used this service to advise NZ Post when they changed their address. Around two-thirds of these recorded movers allowed NZ Post to include their name and address information in a database which was available, under controlled conditions, to companies and other organisations wishing to communicate with residents, for purposes that included direct marketing as well as research.⁵

The WBoP survey was first conducted in November 2001 and was repeated annually until 2005. The first wave of the survey targeted households who had moved either into or out of the Tauranga or WBoP districts between 1 October 2000 and 30 September 2001. Here we focus on the second wave of the survey, sent out in February 2003, which tracked migrants recorded as having moved between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2002.

We emphasise a hitherto unutilised part of the survey: medium-term mobility histories. Survey participants were asked to list the details of their mobility histories since 1990, including place of residence, years at

that location, and main activity at each location. For each individual we therefore have a record similar to that in Table 1.

Table 1: Example of a mobility history of a 2002 out-migrant from WBoP

Location	First year at the latest location	Last year at location	Main activity at location
Tauranga	1990	1991	School
Hamilton	1991	1995	University
Auckland	1996	1998	Job
England	1999	2000	Overseas
Tauranga	2000	2002	Working and seeing family
Wellington	2002	Current location	Job

Given the way the information has been recorded, a ‘move’ represents a change in location. In some cases these moves remain intra-regional (e.g. a move from Whakatane to Ohope). However, moves within the same locality (for example, within Tauranga) were generally not recorded by the survey respondents.⁶ Location details were coded into one of 18 regions: nine within New Zealand and nine overseas.⁷


There are two key areas of concern with the kind of mobility history data that can be derived from the WBoP survey. The first issue concerns the accuracy of retrospective mobility data. Inaccuracies in dates and details of recalled past life-course events can of course be problematic when trying to construct longitudinal information from a one-off survey (e.g. Beckett et al., 2001). On the other hand, this approach to longitudinal data gathering is of course much cheaper than a survey with repeated interviews (waves). In the case of the WBoP survey, there is also a rounding issue. Dates of residence are given as year of arrival and year of departure from a given residence. As such, there will be a large degree of variance in actual residential durations between observationally equivalent records. For example, a record that states years of residence as 1996–1997 could indicate a, admittedly improbable, period of just a few days (arriving in December 1996 and moving on in January 1997), or alternatively imply duration of residence of up to 2 years (arriving January 1996 and leaving in December 1997).

Hence we create a timeline of location data for each individual, allowing for two possible residential locations over the course of each year.⁸ When a respondent indicated that they lived in more than one location during a year, the first location is assigned to the first half-year and the

second location is assigned to the second half-year. When there was no clear indication of the time of year in which a move occurred, moves have been randomly allocated to one of the two half-year periods. As such, the duration of residence is subject to some measurement error, but this error is believed to be uncorrelated with other factors that we consider.

Due to the design of the survey, the data set exhibits a strong degree of censoring. Each respondent's first residential spell is left-censored in that it is not known when the person moved to the address at which they lived at the earliest recorded date, 1990. Also, the construction of the survey around change of address notifications between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2002 means that there is a large heaping of short, uncompleted (right-censored) spells of residence in February 2003. This censoring of some residence spells is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the residence histories of three hypothetical individuals. All three were recruited to the survey because they moved to WBoP (location labelled W) between October 2001 and September 2002. For person 1, the time in location A is left-censored, B and C are completed spells (of duration $T_{12}-T_{11}$ and $T_{13}-T_{12}$, respectively), but time in W is right-censored. Similarly, for person 2, spell D is left-censored and spell W right-censored. Note that person 3 moved again (to F) after having been recruited into the survey by the move to W (with the time in W being a completed spell of duration $T_{32}-T_{31}$).

Figure 1: Examples of duration spells, including those left- or right-censored



A second difficulty with the use of self-reported retrospective mobility data is the absence of retrospective data on migrant characteristics. Some characteristics, such as ethnicity and education, can be expected to remain the same throughout the observation period (at least among older people); others, such as income level and marital status, are expected to vary over time, and these variations may be closely linked to mobility patterns (e.g. changes in income associated with job mobility or changing family/household status; see Statistics New Zealand, 2010). The WBoP survey included questions on current but not on past characteristics.⁹ In this respect, rich longitudinal data such as are now available through the IDI are a major leap forward. Combining age at the time of the WBoP survey and the reported calendar year of a relocation allowed us to calculate and consider age at the time of a move.

The 2001/02 survey was sent to 2429 people, and 788 completed questionnaires were returned, a response rate of 32.4 per cent. Dropping incomplete responses left a sample of 1654 residential spells regarding 674 people. This is estimated to be about 15 per cent of the total number of people who moved into or out of WBoP during the September 2001/02 year. Table 2 summarises the basic demographic characteristics of the survey participants and compares these with corresponding 2001 Census data.¹⁰

Table 2: In- and out-migrants from the Western Bay of Plenty, by age group and gender

	Census Number of Movers 1996–2001		Census %		Survey Number of Movers 2001–2002		Survey %	
	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out	In	Out
Age group								
15–24	3093	2502	15.5	25.7	30	21	6.6	9.5
25–39	8346	3621	41.9	37.1	133	85	29.3	38.6
40–64	8127	3462	40.8	35.5	207	77	45.6	35.0
65+	372	168	1.9	1.7	84	37	18.5	16.8
Total	19,938	9753	100.1	100.0	454	220	100.0	99.9
Gender								
Male	10,782	5094	54.1	52.2	236	108	52.0	49.0
Female	9162	4662	45.9	47.8	218	112	48.0	51.0

Source: Statistics New Zealand, unpublished 2001 Census data, and WBoP 2001/02 Survey data.

The survey captures the WBoP's 2:1 ratio of in-migrants to out-migrants in the 2001 Census data almost perfectly. In both the 2001 Census and the survey, out-migrants from the WBoP are relatively

younger than in-migrants (aged younger than 40 is 62.8 per cent of out-migrants versus 57.4 per cent of in-migrants in the census, and 48.1 per cent of out-migrants versus 35.9 per cent of in-migrants in the survey). This is likely to be related to WBoP's attraction as a retirement destination for in-migrants, while the relative youthfulness of out-migrants may reflect movements associated with labour market events, tertiary education or family formation. Relative to the census, the sample has fewer young people (under age 25). This may be due to a number of factors, including a higher propensity among young people to move as part of a household (with an older household head being the survey respondent) or to move out of a family home while keeping the home address as a primary contact address, as well as potentially reflecting a relatively lower response rate among younger age groups (Kotaniemi et al., 2001).

Table 2 shows that, relative to the 2001 Census, the 65+ group is greatly over-represented in the survey among both in-migrants and out-migrants. This is not surprising since we expect this older age group to have been more likely to have notified NZ Post of their move and agreed to their change of address information to have been made available for commercial purposes and research. While not shown in the table, it is noteworthy that there are relatively large proportions of both in-migrants and out-migrants in the survey in the age group of 70+.

Other comparisons with the census (not shown in Table 2) indicate that the sample population is biased towards New Zealand Europeans (about 85 per cent) and that particularly Māori are under-represented. However, differences in the response options with respect to ethnicity and the possibility of multiple responses in the census make it difficult to compare the WBoP survey and the census in this respect. The sample population of migrants is also more highly educated than the population generally (60.4 per cent of the survey respondents had a post-school qualification as compared with 42.8 per cent of the census population in 2001) and the survey respondents had a higher average income than the population as a whole. This is consistent with a large number of studies that show a positive relationship between education, or income, and geographic mobility (e.g. Greenwood, 1997).

Given that the WBoP sample represented only 15 per cent of the total number of people who moved into or out of the region during the September 2001/02 year, there are likely to be sample selection biases in

the data, although it is impossible to assess how large they are (the higher average education possibly signals a selection effect). Additionally, it must be accepted that surveys of migrants from other areas may yield different results. This is one issue that motivated the nationwide DMM survey. However, these data weakness are not so important in the present context, given that the purpose of our paper is to illustrate the nature of the duration of residence data and to use analysis of the WBoP data as a benchmark for other approaches.

Measuring Moves and Residence Spells


As noted in the introduction, Census respondents had lived on average 7.5 years at their usual address. However, this so-called ‘truncated’ duration of residence is not the same as the average number of years a person lives in a particular dwelling, the ‘completed’ duration. While statistical models make it possible, under strong assumptions, to infer the distribution of completed residence spells from truncated-duration census data (e.g. Poot, 1987), the ‘churn’ in the housing market cannot be fully understood without direct information on the completed spells of households’ residence at a particular location. Our sample of WBoP survey data does provide such information. For each individual we have details of their location history between 1990 and early 2003. Observed mobility patterns in this sample are skewed by the selection criterion for the survey – all survey participants are expected to have moved either into or out of the WBoP/Tauranga districts between October 2001 and September 2002. The year of arrival at the current location is shown in Table 3.¹¹ Given that September year 2002 includes only one quarter of 2001 and three quarters of 2002, it is not surprising that the corresponding frequencies in Table 3 are 165 and 446 respectively, or roughly 1:3.

Table 3: Year of arrival at final location

Year of arrival	Frequency	%
1990–2000	53	8.3
2001	165	24.4
2002	446	65.9
2003	10	1.5
Total	674	100.0

The average number of locations lived in during the 13-year period considered was 3.45. As this includes both the initial location in 1990 and the final location in 2003, this implies that the sampled individuals made an average of 2.45 moves during the period 1990 to 2003. The frequency distribution of moves is shown in Figure 2. The largest number of recorded moves made was eight (reported by eight respondents).

Figure 2: Frequency distribution of the number of moves per person, $n = 674$




The average duration of residence in a single location was 4.1 years. However, this mean includes both left- and right-censored observations and therefore underestimates the true average duration. Excluding right-censored spells (the short final spells created by the sample selection process) gives a mean duration of 5.1 years. Even this figure significantly underestimates completed residence durations, as initial residence spells that commenced prior to 1990 are left-censored.¹² The mean duration of residence of the observed completed (uncensored) residence spells among the people in the WBoP survey was 4.7 years. Not surprisingly this is quite short (compared with the average of 7.5 years of truncated residence duration in the census), given that to be recruited into the survey one had to be a mover in the September 2002 year.

The effect of censoring is to create a bi-modal pattern of observed residence durations (see lower right panel of Figure 3). Aside from the strong heaping of short spells created by right-censoring, we also see a clear difference in average durations between uncensored and left-censored spells. This is caused by a dichotomy between two groups: people whose residence remained largely the same over the 13.5 year period – aside from

the single move that was required to draw them into the sample frame for the migration survey – are clearly dominating the left-censored spells. ‘Repeat migrants’ who moved one or more times in addition to this final move are common among the uncensored spells. As our mobility history covers only 13.5 years, the exclusion of those migrants who made only a single move (and hence whose entire mobility histories are either left-censored or right-censored) removes almost all the spells greater than 10 years in duration. Similarly, in order to fall fully within the 13.5-year time period, residence spells for those migrants who made at least two moves (and whose middle residence spells are therefore completely observed within the data) are constrained to be relatively short.

Figure 3: Histograms of duration of residence (in years) by censoring status



Two main theories can be put forward to explain the U-shaped pattern of all spells combined, at the bottom right of Figure 3. One relates the observed differences to personal characteristics, suggesting that some people are inherently more likely to move than others. Under this theory, the probability of moving remains relatively constant over time, for any individual, but differs between individuals. The simplest form of such heterogeneity is the dichotomy between ‘movers’ and ‘stayers’, for which

the first New Zealand evidence was reported by Rowland (1976). The second theory draws on the idea of ‘cumulative inertia’, in which people build attachments to their home areas which strengthen over time (e.g. Huff & Clark, 1978). For example, they may make new friends or business contacts, buy property, join clubs, or simply come to have location-specific knowledge such as the best route to work or the best place to buy fresh produce, all of which raise the implicit or explicit costs of moving. In this theory, the differences between movers and stayers are not inherent, but causally driven by their previous mobility histories. In New Zealand, the first statistical support for this theory can be found in Poot (1987), using only census data on ‘years at current location’. In the next section we control for some salient features of the migrants and look more closely at the question of what factors drive the observed completed residence spells and the intended duration in the current location.

Analysis of Residence Spells

The analysis of residence spells is in statistical theory referred to as *survival analysis*, which is a set of methods used for studying the occurrence and timing of specific events. Survival analysis is also known by a number of other names, including ‘event history analysis’ (sociology), ‘reliability analysis’ (engineering), ‘duration analysis’ (economics), ‘transition analysis’ (economics and sociology) and ‘lifetable analysis’ (demography). Many techniques and associated software have been developed for this kind of analysis, including in the social sciences (e.g. Allison, 2014; Blossfeld, Golsch, & Rohwer, 2007). The purpose of the present section is not to provide a detailed analysis of the retrospective residence histories that were recorded by respondents in the WBoP survey; rather, as is appropriate for this special issue, the present section simply illustrates the most common form of analysis with this kind of data.

Event history analysis can be used to estimate the probability of an event taking place (in our case, a move) at any given point in a spell (in our case, residence at a particular location) after accounting for external factors. This probability is commonly summarised in terms of the *hazard rate* – the probability that a spell will end at time t , conditional on having ‘survived’ until t . The overall distribution of spell durations is summarised using the cumulative distribution function, $F(t) = Pr(T < t)$. That is, $F(t)$ is the probability that the duration of the observation in question, T , is less

than some specified duration, t . The associated probability density function, $f(t) = dF/dt$, gives the probability that the duration is exactly equal to the specified duration t . As such, the probability that a given observation will survive at least until time t can be defined as $S(t) = Pr(t \geq T) = 1 - F(t)$, the *survival function*. In turn, the probability that a spell will end exactly at time t , the hazard rate, is defined as $\lambda(t) = f(t)/S(t) = -d \ln S(t)/dt$. With respect to the mobility data from the Western Bay of Plenty survey, the hazard function summarises the probability that individuals will move from their current location to a new location, given their duration at their current location.

Conventional methods of analysis have difficulty dealing with censored data, as discussed before. However, survival analysis can allow for right-censored observations to contribute to the estimation of hazard rates without creating a bias. Left-censored spells are more difficult to deal with. While there is no a priori reason to assume that there are any systematic differences between spells that begin within the observation period compared with those that started earlier, the probability of observing a spell that is already in progress at the start of the observation period is greater for spells with a longer total duration. If there is a possibility that hazard rates are duration dependent, this bias towards long spells will create a systematic bias in the estimated hazard rate. As such, unless there are strong reasons to believe that hazard rates are independent of the current spell duration, left-censored observations must be discarded.

A number of difficulties remain with respect to the estimation of hazard rates. One of these is the existence of unobservable heterogeneity among the sample population. Failure to account for unobserved heterogeneity creates a bias towards the appearance of positive duration dependence (cumulative inertia); see, for example, Pickles, Davies, and Crouchley (1982). This occurs because those individuals who are inherently more likely to experience a transition at any duration will yield many relatively short spells, while those individuals with an inherent low probability of a transition at any duration will generate a smaller number of long spells, giving the impression of negative duration dependence (inertia).

Finally, most aspects of survival analysis require some assumptions to be made about the *distribution* of spell durations. These

assumptions can often not be justified on theoretical grounds. The range of survival analysis techniques can be broadly divided into parametric and non-parametric approaches. Parametric approaches rely on an assumption about the shape of the 'baseline' hazard function, $\lambda_0(t)$ – the relationship between the probability of a transition and the time at risk, controlling for all explanatory variables. For example, we might assume that the baseline hazard is constant (no duration dependence), monotonically increasing or decreasing (negative or positive duration dependence, respectively), or even non-monotonic. Alternatively, if our focus is on the relationship between spell duration and external explanatory variables, we might prefer to use a semi-parametric method in which the underlying baseline hazard function is allowed to take any shape, and the effect of covariates is estimated as causing a shift from this baseline (Cox proportional hazard models) or an effective re-scaling of time (accelerated failure time models). Below we will refer to the results of a Cox proportional hazard model.

Considering the actual duration of residence distribution in the WBoP data, we restrict the data to uncensored spells only, to avoid biases associated with censoring (i.e. we consider only the data in the top left panel of Figure 3). We first compare the WBoP data with the 2001 Census data by measuring the truncated duration of residence as at March 2001 among the WBoP survey respondents. Figure 4 matches the survey data with the census data and shows a remarkable correspondence (the only clear outlier is the lack of males in the survey being three years at their 2001 residence). Both data sets suffer from 'heaping', in that durations up to 12 months are recorded as '0 years at current residence' even though any duration of 7 to 12 months should have been rounded to the 'one year' category (Poot, 1987). Figure 5 shows the cumulative years at current (March 2001) residence. Again there is remarkable similarity between the census and the survey data, except that there appear to be too few males in the survey with residence spells of less than 10 years.

Figure 4: Year at current address in March 2001: comparing census and WBoP data





Figure 5: Cumulative years at current address in March 2001: comparing census and WBoP data




The data captured in Figure 5 are adequate to update the estimates of parametric duration of residence distributions with 1976 Census data that were reported in Poot (1987). Space constraints do not permit us to give full details here but several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, and not surprisingly given Figure 5, the census and survey

estimates are quite similar. Secondly, a Weibull distribution fits the data well and provides evidence of cumulative inertia. Thirdly, and most interestingly, the slope coefficient, which signals cumulative inertia when it is less than one, is closer to one than in Poot (1987).¹³ This suggests, quite plausibly given the long-run decline in home ownership rates (e.g. Morrison, 2005), that place attachment in New Zealand has become less over the last three decades.

However, the main benefit of the survey data over the census data is that completed residence spells are observed so that the restrictive assumptions underlying the estimates based on truncated durations can be relaxed. In order to avoid the complications of censoring we removed the first, last and second-to-last locations and considered only completed spells (which yielded a sample of 174 people who made 325 moves) and fitted a Cox proportional hazard model in which the hazard is assumed to be parametrically related to age of the survey respondent at the time of any given move. As noted before, the WBoP survey did not report other retrospective time-varying personal characteristics.¹⁴ The coefficient on age is 0.98 and significant at the 1 per cent level. This suggests that the likelihood of a move declines on average by 2 per cent for every year of the life course.

Stata generates a smoothed graph of the hazard function, which is displayed in Figure 6. Interestingly, this shows that the hazard is *increasing* with increasing duration of residence (the final turnaround may be peculiar to the nature of the data – an overall observation window of 13.5 years), which is the opposite of the conclusion obtained from the truncated residence distributions. However, here we control for age and it is well known that the cumulative inertia effect is much stronger at older ages (e.g. Poot, 1987). The increasing hazard rate is consistent with the fact that the WBoP survey was not a survey of the entire population but of 2001/02 movers only, thereby likely to yield relatively many short-duration spells. Generally, we conclude – as Andrews, Clark, and Whittaker (2011) did with a much more detailed duration analysis with British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data – that the longer individuals stay in a region, the less likely they are to move to another region, but that this is predominantly due to a person becoming older and not due to the presence of cumulative inertia once controlling for age.

Figure 6: The smoothed hazard function of completed residence spells in the WBoP survey



A final interesting feature of the WBoP survey, subsequently also adopted in the DMM survey, is information on migration intentions. For each of the 674 people in the WBoP survey, we observe their past completed spells as well as their reported intended duration in the current residence at the time of the survey. Table 4 reports the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of intended duration of stay on personal characteristics including age and the duration of all past spells.¹⁵ This permits us to split the effects of age and cumulative inertia. The results show that age is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, with a coefficient that is a little smaller for out-migrants than for in-migrants. Growing older by a decade leads one to report an increase in intended duration in one’s current residence of about one and a half years.

Additionally, in-migrants who stayed longer at any location in the past also intend to stay longer at their current location. For them, an extra year at a location in the past increases the intended duration in the current location by 0.15 years. However, the past-spells-duration coefficient is negative and not statistically significant for out-migrants. Nonetheless, the negative sign for out-migrants is consistent with the upward sloping hazard function of Figure 6.

Table 4: OLS models of intended duration of stay

	In-migrants	Out-migrants
Age	0.170*** (0.022)	0.154*** (0.028)
Past spells duration	0.146* (0.076)	-0.049 (0.108)
No education	6.200*** (1.015)	4.351*** (1.492)
Secondary education	-0.239 (0.638)	-0.032 (0.764)
Single	0.441 (0.698)	-1.052 (0.793)
Family with children	-1.836* (1.152)	-2.599* (1.635)
Māori	3.185*** (1.500)	0.462 (1.710)
Constant	1.190 (0.998)	3.011 (1.227)
<i>n</i>	702	431
Adj R^2	0.152	0.086
Ramsey RESET	5.31***	1.65
Breusch-Pagan Heteroscedasticity	0.00	2.57

Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses.
 2. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.15$.

As in actual mobility behaviour, intended duration of stay is the longest for those with least education (the omitted category is those with university education). Interestingly, intended duration of stay is significantly less for families with children than for the omitted category of couples. This may be related to the fact that the intended duration question did not distinguish between future short-distance mobility (i.e. a change of address within WBoP) and migration to another region.

Table 4 reports also an ethnicity effect is statistically significant among in-migrants: Māori in-migrants expect to stay in the WBoP longer than non-Māori, possibly linked to return migration to whānau and iwi. However, it should be noted that both regressions have relatively low explanatory power and a diagnostic test (the Ramsey RESET test) also indicates possible misspecification in the in-migration regression.

Retrospect and Prospect

In this paper we used hitherto unused data from the 2003 WBoP survey of migrants (namely the respondents' recalled information regarding past

residence spells) as a benchmark for a discussion of the evolution of research on duration of residence and the strengths and weaknesses of past approaches. Unlike most research on internal migration in New Zealand which tends to inform on the most recent move or a change of address over a five-year period with cross-sectional data (e.g. Statistics New Zealand, 2008), we highlighted the importance of considering population heterogeneity and duration dependence in longitudinal mobility processes.

The largely illustrative analysis reported in this paper shows that, despite many limitations and constraints in the WBoP survey data, those data are consistent with the census where comparisons could be made and, moreover, the analytical results are generally consistent with a priori expectations regarding the underlying residential mobility processes. Interestingly, we find evidence of observable and unobserved heterogeneity in mobility modelling between in-migrants and out-migrants. This implies that when migration flows appear balanced at present, and net migration is consequently zero, the nature and characteristics of intra- and inter-regional migration may still be changing. This may affect migration modelling and projections – a warning first given by Rogers (1990).

Our illustrative analysis reconfirms the importance of the life course: age remains the most important determinant of migration. It determines the duration of observed residence spells, as well as the likelihood of future moves. We find that education, household composition and ethnicity also affect intended residence durations. Of course, there are various factors that may matter but could not be taken into account and these would include features of the region or neighbourhood (e.g. Rabe & Taylor, 2010).

The widespread observation that the likelihood of a future move is lower the longer a person has been in place is predominantly the result of ageing but, less convincingly, of cumulative inertia at a given age. In any case, our Cox regressions suggest that increasing attachment to place appears to have become less pronounced than it was three decades ago. While such lower duration dependence may be welcomed economically, as it signals greater flexibility in housing and labour markets, it lowers accumulation of social capital (e.g. Roskrige et al., 2013) and, in any case, may well be offset by the acceleration of structural ageing which New Zealand is facing in the coming decades.

Event history analysis of longitudinal data is technically complex, as can be seen from recent applications to migration analysis by Andrews, Clark, and Whittaker (2011) in the United Kingdom, and Sander and Bell (2014) in Australia. Nonetheless, with the development of ever more sophisticated data sets, there is considerable scope in the future for broader and deeper research on mobility and on the interactions between mobility, housing and the labour market.

Ongoing work by Statistics New Zealand to link existing data sets, along with the emergence of new data sources based on individuals' use of social media and mobile communications technologies, are rapidly changing the mobility research landscape (Statistics New Zealand, 2012). However, these new data sources are not without their own challenges.¹⁶

Perhaps the clearest potential comes from the development of the IDI – a collection of administrative and survey data linked at the level of the individual. While linked employer-employee data has been available in New Zealand for a number of years, the location information associated with this individual data relied on a single data source – Inland Revenue. As some people interact with Inland Revenue only infrequently, this increases the probability that any observed address might be out of date. As additional data sources have been linked through the IDI (e.g. Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), health, education and social welfare data), it becomes increasingly realistic to construct residence history tables based on address details supplied to the providers of these services.¹⁷ These residence histories can be set alongside longitudinal information on employment, benefit receipt, educational attainment, migrant status and many other individual characteristics. Moreover, the integration of Births, Deaths and Marriages data in 2015 will also raise the potential for the researcher to optimally account for the intricate impact of household composition and change (e.g. Dieleman, 2001; Nordvik & Turner, 2014; Steele, Clark, & Washbrook, 2013), albeit with limited ability to identify *de facto* relationships.

A second dramatic development in research potential associated with the IDI comes from potential to link both past and prospective surveys into the longitudinal administrative data. Although to date the only Household Labour Force Survey supplement to have been linked into the IDI is the New Zealand Income Survey (NZIS), the links have been created that would readily permit additional supplements, such as the

DMM, to be added in future. Moreover, the existence of the IDI changes the scenario for all future survey development, as it provides the opportunity for researchers to work with Statistics New Zealand to design or re-design survey content in the expectation that the surveys may be linked into the IDI. This allows for a reduction in respondent burden, as some of the required information may be already available from other sources, and hence allows survey questions to be better tailored to those characteristics and motivations that cannot be observed elsewhere.

Finally, there continues to be debate in the social sciences over the relative merits of revealed preference (objective) data versus stated preference (subjective) data for understanding the behaviour of individuals and households (in the residential mobility context, see Mulder, 1996, and Vasanen, 2012). Most surveys of migration tend to report a complex and diffuse set of motives for the migration (Bedford, Lidgard, & McLeay, 2005; Morrison & Clark, 2011), while econometric modelling continues to highlight the importance of economic drivers of migration for those of prime working ages (Greenwood, 1997). The consideration of time-varying place characteristics and the possibility of spatial spillovers (which can be measured through the IDI) may well offer promise for future micro-level analyses of mobility and can be combined, or contrasted, with information on motives and intentions.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

- 1 Richard Bedford has also provided major inputs into the development of international migration data, both in terms of comments on the information collected on arrival and departure cards and in terms of the development of the Longitudinal Immigration Survey: New Zealand (LisNZ). These contributions are outside the scope of the present paper.
- 2 One of the major uses of the DMM survey was the contribution of its data to a comprehensive online report on internal migration in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2008). Sloan (2013) and Sloan and Morrison (2015) used the survey data to study the post-move satisfaction of individuals. Surveys of migrants that include residence histories and data on outcomes, aspirations and attitudes are complex, which – together with a shortage of researchers in this field – may explain why a Confidentialised Unit Record File (CURF) of the DMM survey has to date been rather underutilised.
- 3 Long-run longitudinal surveys readily provide accurate information on actual residence spells and are undoubtedly superior in this respect to one-off surveys that inform on recalled residential mobility. Such surveys are rare in New Zealand but one example is the Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study of a cohort of 1037 babies born between April 1972 and March 1973 in Queen Mary Maternity Hospital in Dunedin (see, for example, Milne, Poulton, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2001), most of whom continue to be interviewed at the present time. Examples of recent international studies of longitudinal mobility behaviour include Andrews, Clark, and Whittaker (2011), who use British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data, and Sander and Bell (2014), who use Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey data.
- 4 This practice is still continuing at present and can now be done in a NZ PostShop or online.
- 5 NZCOA can be rented by organisations and businesses to update their own existing databases. However, NZCOA cannot be used by these organisations or businesses to solicit or send marketing material to others.
- 6 In the small number of cases where intra-regional moves were provided, we excluded those from the analysis in order to avoid mixing intra-urban mobility with inter-regional mobility.
- 7 The regions are: Tauranga District, Other Western Bay of Plenty, Eastern Bay of Plenty, Waikato, Auckland, Wellington, Remainder of the

North Island, South Island, Remainder of New Zealand, Australia, United Kingdom, Other Europe, Asia, North America, South America, Africa, Pacific Islands, and Other Overseas. A final code indicated Not Applicable cases (i.e. no fixed abode or unknown).

- 8 This turns out to be sufficient for all but two individuals. In these cases the moves were recorded in the closest period. Not all the respondents provided complete residence histories. Of the 705 individual records available, 24 people failed to give details going back to 1990, while four did not complete the later years of their mobility history. These people have been excluded from the analysis.
- 9 In contrast, the DMM survey included a few questions on past socio-economic status.
- 10 Note that the census question concerned the address five years previously, not one year. Hence census data referred to movers over the 1996–2001 period, as compared with movers over the 2000–2001 period in the survey.
- 11 Even though respondents were recruited based on change of address notification in September year 2002, 53 people stated that their last move took place prior to 2001, 10 stated their last move occurred in 2003 (i.e. a move subsequent to the one that got them into the sample), and three (omitted) people recorded no moves at all during the sample period.
- 12 A number of people (144) gave information on the duration of prior residence in their 1990 location. Including these records gives a mean residence duration of 5.1 and 6.4 years, respectively, depending on whether the final right-censored spells are included or not. However, these additional records show some sample selection bias towards long-term residents. The average duration of a residence spell that commenced prior to 1990 was found to be 24.2 years. It seems likely that those who felt they had spent a particularly long time in their pre-1990 residence (for example, since birth) were more inclined to make a point of recording the date of arrival in that location. Including these spells in the analysis would therefore be expected to lead to a bias towards long-durations, and therefore they, too, are treated as if they were left-censored.
- 13 When pooling age groups, the slope coefficients for the 1976 Census data were typically around 0.5–0.6 (see Poot, 1987, Table IV). The 2001 data suggest coefficients of the order of 0.8.
- 14 Other quasi-time-invariant characteristics considered (levels of education, household composition and, for immigrants, decade of arrival)

turned out to be statistically insignificant determinants of the hazard rate.

- 15 Hence the data consist of 702 spells of the 454 in-migrants and 431 spells of the 220 out-migrants.
- 16 One such move has been the development of a Longitudinal Census, linking individual census data back to 1976. This development, while exciting, may be of limited use for retrospective mobility research. As Statistics New Zealand does not keep name and address details from the census, the longitudinal nature of the data set is based on probabilistic matching based on age and the meshblock in which respondents reported living five years previously. As such, retrospective links are complicated both by recall difficulties and by matching errors. The possibility of linking census data into the IDI would allow future censuses to be linked directly through individual identifiers, vastly improving the opportunities for longitudinal research.
- 17 However, the level of noise in this measure is likely to differ across population subgroups, as some groups or individuals may have more or less frequent interactions with the different service providers.

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The Changing Face of Asian Peoples in New Zealand

ELSIE HO *

Abstract

Richard Bedford has made a major contribution to the understanding of diverse Asian peoples in New Zealand. In particular, his work has demonstrated how changing immigration policies have led to new patterns of ethnic diversity, residential and business concentration, and settlement and employment trajectories, as well as changing family dynamics, mobility patterns and transnational networks (for example, Bedford & Ho, 2008; Bedford, Didham & Ip, 2009; Ho & Bedford, 2006, 2008; Spoonley & Bedford, 2012). This paper builds on this understanding to analyse the changing characteristics of Asian peoples in New Zealand since 1986, the year when New Zealand abolished a traditional source preference in the selection of prospective immigrants in favour of criteria based on individual merits, skills and qualifications. The discussion is organised into six parts to illustrate the multiple dimensions of difference within New Zealand's growing Asian communities: more diverse Asian ethnic groups, changing age-sex structure, different labour market experiences, growing mobility and transnational connections, complex patterns of mixed ethnicity, and increased concentration in Auckland. The study challenges the popular perception of 'Asian' as a single category.

The 2013 Census reveals that New Zealand's population is becoming increasingly diverse. In 1986, 85.1 per cent of New Zealand's population were of European ethnic origin, 12.4 per cent Māori, 4.0 per cent Pacific and 1.7 per cent Asian. By 2013, the non-European ethnic groups (Māori, Asian and Pacific) had all increased their proportion of the New Zealand population (to 14.9 per cent, 11.8 per cent, and 7.4 per cent respectively), and a new group had emerged, namely those who identified with ethnicities in the broad Middle Eastern, Latin American and African category (MELAA), accounting for 1.2 per cent of the population. Over this period, the Asian population increased almost nine-fold from 53,883 in

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1986 to 471,711 in 2013, and the proportion of the population who identified as European had dropped to 74 per cent.

The rapid growth of the Asian population over the recent decades is largely driven by immigration. The 1986 Census of Population and Dwellings is a very useful marker for the end of an era in New Zealand's history of immigration — it took place just before a fundamental change in government policy in August 1986 that abolished a traditional source-country preference (the United Kingdom, Ireland, Europe and North America) and opened up immigration to non-traditional sources. This policy change, combined with the subsequent introduction in 1991 of a points selection system which rated prospective immigrants on their qualifications, work experience, age and settlement factors, and the introduction of policy initiatives in the 2000s to facilitate the transition of international students to work and residence, has led to much larger and diverse flows of new immigrants of Asian ethnicities entering New Zealand over the recent decades (Bedford, Ho & Bedford, 2010; Bedford, Ho & Lidgard, 2002, 2005; Spoonley & Bedford, 2012; Trlin, 1992, 1997).

The term 'Asian' is increasingly used as an ethnic category in New Zealand but it does not have a universal, uncontested definition. The Statistics New Zealand definition refers to people who self-identify with ethnicities associated with the vast geographical region of Asia, from Afghanistan in the west to Japan in the east, and from China in the north to Indonesia in the south. Hence, the label Asian includes a wide range of ethnic groups such as Chinese, Indian, Korean, Filipino, Japanese and Thai, and these groups differ in terms of place of origin, language spoken, religion, culture, settlement history and so on. However, the meaning of the term Asian is often not well understood by the general public nor in policy contexts (Rasanathan, Craig, & Perkins, 2006). For example, there is a popular assumption that Asians in New Zealand were all born in Asia. Although a majority of the people who self-identify with Asian ethnicities were born in countries in Asia, one in five were born in New Zealand. There are also Asian migrants to New Zealand who were born in countries in Europe, Africa, the Americas or the Pacific. Another misconception is that people who self-identify with Asian ethnicities in New Zealand are non-European, non-Māori or non-Pacific. Yet the reality is that peoples of Asian ethnicities can and do identify with more than one ethnicity. Indeed, there is a trend towards higher degrees of mixed ethnicity as the New

Zealand-born component of the Asian population increases (Bedford & Ho, 2008).

This paper analyses the changing characteristics of the Asian population since 1986. It covers six themes that can be used to illustrate the growing diversity of the various ethnic groups that come under the broad label of Asian ethnicity: more diverse Asian ethnic groups, changing age-sex structure, different labour market experiences, growing mobility and transnational connections, complex patterns of mixed ethnicity, and increased concentration in Auckland. The paper concludes with a discussion of the challenges of understanding the multiple dimensions of difference within New Zealand's Asian communities.

More Diverse Asian Ethnic Groups

New Zealand's two largest Asian ethnic groups, Chinese and Indian, have settled in New Zealand since the nineteenth century (Ip, 1995; Leckie, 2007; McKinnon, 1996). Together these two groups accounted for 78.4 per cent of the total Asian population in 1986 (Table 1). Until the mid-1980s, their proportions of the total New Zealand population remained very small – only 0.8 per cent of the total population were Chinese in 1986 and 0.5 per cent were Indian. Following immigration policy changes in 1986, the Chinese and Indian populations have increased dramatically. The 'new' Chinese and Indian immigrants come from a much wider range of source countries, and tend to have higher levels of education and skills and much more investment capital than their predecessors. The first wave of post-1986 Chinese immigrants came from Hong Kong and Taiwan, but since 2000, the majority of Chinese arrivals have come from China (PRC) (Ho & Bedford, 2006; Ip, 2003). Indian immigrants also come from various countries, including India, Fiji, South Africa, Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom and Malaysia. Much of the Indian migration from Fiji came after the military coup in 1987, but after 2000, immigrant numbers from India have grown significantly (Lewin et al., 2011). Indeed, between 2001 and 2013, the Indian ethnic group grew much more rapidly (150 per cent) than the Chinese ethnic group (63 per cent). By 2013, there were 171,411 Chinese and 155,178 Indians living in New Zealand, accounting for 4 per cent and 3.7 per cent respectively of the total New Zealand population (Table 1).

For people who self-identified with Other Asian ethnicities, their proportions of the total Asian population also changed dramatically between 1986 and 2013. Cambodia and Vietnam were the major sources of refugees for New Zealand during the 1970s and early 1980s (Statistics New Zealand, 1995). In 1986, the Cambodian and Vietnamese populations in New Zealand made up 7.4 per cent of the total Asian population. By 2013, although their numbers had increased (by 281 and 285 per cent respectively), they only accounted for 3.2 per cent of the Asian population as growth in Other Asian cohorts also increased from a broader base.

Over this post-1986 period the largest percentage increases were recorded for the Filipino, Korean and Thai groups. In 1986, the Korean population in New Zealand was fewer than 500. By 2013, it was 68 times as large as it had been two and a half decades earlier. The Filipino and Thai populations also increased from less than 1500 and 400 in 1986 to just over 40,000 and 8000 in 2013 – an increase of 2595 per cent and 1949 per cent, respectively. It is also interesting to point out that while the Korean population had increased very rapidly between 1986 and 2001, the Filipino ethnic group grew much faster (264 per cent) than the Korean ethnic group (59 per cent) between 2001 and 2013, and replaced the Korean ethnic group as the third largest Asian ethnicity in 2013, behind Chinese and Indian.

Percentage increases in the Sri Lankan and Japanese populations between 1986 and 2013, though not as large as those of the Korean, Filipino and Thai, were between 894 per cent (for Sri Lankan) and 690 per cent (for Japanese). It is also evident from Table 1 that many smaller Asian ethnic groups, such as Malay, Indonesian, Afghani, Pakistani, Burmese, Bangladeshi, Nepalese and Laotian, have all grown in size over the recent decades, resulting in new patterns of ethnic diversity within the Asian population.

Given the differences in Asian migration histories, it is not surprising that there are considerable variations in the proportions of the New Zealand-born in different Asian ethnic groups (Table 2). The Chinese, Indian, Cambodian and Japanese groups, which have longer settlement histories in New Zealand, have relatively large proportions of their populations born in New Zealand (ranging from 23.2 to 30.3 per cent). Among the more recently established groups, the Koreans have the lowest proportion (10.9 per cent) of New Zealand-born (Table 2).

Table 1: Number of people in selected Asian ethnic groups, 1986, 2001 and 2013

	Numbers			% change	
	1986	2001	2013	1986–2001	2001–2013
Chinese	26,616	105,057	171,411	294.7	63.2
Indian	15,810	62,190	155,178	293.4	149.5
Filipino	1,497	11,091	40,350	640.9	263.8
Korean	441	19,026	30,171	4214.3	58.6
Japanese	1,788	10,023	14,118	460.6	40.9
Sri Lankan	1,134	7,368	11,274	549.7	53.0
Cambodian	2,256	5,268	8,601	133.5	63.3
Thai	393	4,554	8,052	1058.8	76.8
Vietnamese	1,728	3,462	6,660	100.4	92.4
Malay	765	2,052	4,794	168.2	133.6
Indonesian	534	2,073	4,137	288.2	99.6
Afghani	36	807	3,417	2141.7	323.4
Pakistani	...	1,017	3,261	...	220.7
Burmese	249	573	2,187	130.1	281.7
Bangladeshi	...	1,140	1,623	...	42.4
Nepalese	36	387	1,590	975.0	310.9
Laotian	585	1,401	1,374	139.5	-1.9
Eurasian	1,365
Tibetan	...	39	93	...	138.5
SE Asian undefined	...	381	1,998
Other Asian undefined	...	4,122	5,859	...	424.4
<i>Total Asian</i>	<i>53,883</i>	<i>238,176</i>	<i>471,711</i>	<i>...</i>	<i>42.1</i>
<i>Total NZ</i>	<i>3,263,283</i>	<i>3,737,280</i>	<i>4,242,048</i>		

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Notes: 1. Includes all people who stated each ethnic group, whether as Statistics New Zealand their only ethnic group or as one of several. Where a person reported more than one ethnic group, they have been counted in each applicable category.
2. Data not available.

Table 2: Proportion born in New Zealand, selected Asian ethnic groups, 2013 (%)

	Male	Female	Total
Chinese	28.6	24.4	26.4
Indian	22.6	23.9	23.2
Filipino	15.9	12.5	14.0
Korean	11.6	10.3	10.9
Japanese	37.0	22.5	27.9
Sri Lankan	14.5	15.0	14.8
Cambodian	32.3	28.5	30.3
Thai	27.7	14.4	19.2
Other Asian	23.5	21.3	22.4
<i>Total Asian</i>	<i>23.6</i>	<i>21.3</i>	<i>22.4</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Changing Age-Sex Structure


The changing age and sex structures of the Asian population in New Zealand between 1986 and 2013 reflect the impact of immigration. Figure 1 gives the age-sex pyramids of the Chinese, Indian, Other Asian and Total Asian populations resident in New Zealand in 1986 and 2013. It is readily apparent from the diagrams that the three Asian sub-populations display rather different age and sex structures in 2013 than they did in 1986.

Between 1986 and 2013, the proportions of children (aged younger than 15 years) and young adults (aged 15–24 years) dropped in the three Asian subgroups whereas the proportion of people aged between 25 and 59 years increased markedly. However, the compositions of the working-age population in the three Asian sub-populations differ. In the case of the Chinese, there is much more extensive growth in the 20–34 and 40–59 age groups; whereas for the Indian ethnic group, there is a more gradual expansion in a wide age range (25–54 years). The Other Asian population is quite different again from the Chinese and the Indian populations. A much more dominant feature of the age-sex pyramid of this sub-population is a distinctive female bias in the 25–59 age groups (Figure 1).


Because the Other Asian population includes a wide range of ethnic groups, the age and sex compositions of selected main Asian groups are further examined. Table 3 gives the age compositions of the Chinese, Indian, Filipino, Korean, Japanese, Sri Lankan, Cambodian and Thai ethnic groups in the 2013 Census. All groups have the largest proportion in the 25–44 age group (from 29.4 per cent to 38.6 per cent). The Japanese, Cambodian, Filipino and Indian groups also have high percentages of children whereas the Chinese, Korean and Thai groups have larger proportions in the 15–24 and 45–64 age groups. Although only 3.1 per cent of the total Asian population was over 65 years of age, the Chinese, Sri Lankan, Cambodian and Indian groups, which have longer settlement history in New Zealand, have much higher percentages of older people in their populations, ranging from 5.2 per cent (for Cambodian) to 8.4 per cent (for Chinese).

Figure 1: Age-sex pyramids of Chinese, Indian, Other Asian and Total Asian ethnic populations, 1986 and 2013


Chinese



Indian



Other Asian



Total Asian




Table 3: Proportion in each age group, selected Asian ethnic groups, 2013 (%)

	0–14 years	15–24 years	25–44 years	45–64 years	65 years and over
Chinese	18.4	18.0	32.6	22.7	8.4
Indian	21.0	16.8	37.9	19.2	5.2
Filipino	24.0	15.6	38.6	19.6	2.1
Korean	17.9	22.7	29.4	26.4	3.7
Japanese	28.8	15.8	37.5	15.0	2.9
Sri Lankan	19.7	15.3	33.2	24.1	7.7
Cambodian	25.2	15.9	34.3	18.7	5.9
Thai	20.3	19.3	37.7	21.2	1.5
Other Asian	26.1	19.4	34.7	16.8	3.0
<i>Total Asian</i>	<i>20.6</i>	<i>17.6</i>	<i>35.2</i>	<i>20.8</i>	<i>3.1</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

It is also interesting to examine the proportion of New Zealand-born by age group (Table 4). The majority (70.4 per cent) of Asian children were born in New Zealand, with much larger percentages in the Cambodian (88.4 per cent) and Chinese (83.4 per cent) groups. The proportion of New Zealand-born in the Asian population decreases with age, but there are considerable variations across ethnic groups, reflecting uneven immigration and different settlement histories. Of the older people born in New Zealand, nearly all were either Chinese or Indian (Table 4).

Table 4: Proportion born in New Zealand by age, selected Asian ethnic groups, 2013 (%)

	0–14 years	15–24 years	25–44 years	45–64 years	65 years and over
Chinese	83.4	27.8	9.9	9.5	8.3
Indian	71.9	24.2	6.6	7.2	3.3
Filipino	42.8	19.0	1.8
Korean	49.6	8.1	0.7
Japanese	74.2	26.6	4.7	3.3	...
Sri Lankan	57.1	16.8	2.6
Cambodian	88.4	39.7	4.7
Thai	70.5	20.9	1.8
Other Asian	63.6	20.6	4.3	1.5	...
<i>Total Asian</i>	<i>70.4</i>	<i>23.1</i>	<i>7.8</i>	<i>6.1</i>	<i>5.4</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Note: ... Percentages are not given because of very small numbers.

In 2013, there were 93 men per 100 women in the Asian population (Table 5). A much more balanced age-sex distribution is found for the Indians and the Sri Lankans, but gender imbalances were particularly evident in the Thai (56 per 100), Japanese (59 per 100) and Filipino (80 per 100) populations, especially from 25 years onwards. This pattern can be partly explained by intermarriages of Asian women, especially Filipino, Japanese and Thai, with New Zealand men of European, Māori and Pacific ethnicities (Bedford & Ho, 2008; Friesen, 2008). There were also larger proportions of females than males in the Chinese, Korean and Cambodian populations aged 25 years and older. This is suggestive of the transnational family phenomenon, especially amongst Chinese and Koreans (Ho, 2002; Pe-Pua, Mitchell, Iredale & Castles, 1996; Skeldon, 1994). The growing transnational migration of Asian peoples in recent decades will be discussed in a later section of this paper.

Table 5: Sex ratios of selected Asian ethnic groups, 2013

	0–14 years	15–24 years	25–44 years	45–64 years	65 yrs and over	All ages
Chinese	106	101	81	79	92	89
Indian	105	135	106	101	95	109
Filipino	107	100	76	54	32	80
Korean	105	104	74	84	107	89
Japanese	100	78	38	42	46	59
Sri Lankan	101	112	108	100	101	105
Cambodian	103	106	89	82	70	92
Thai	110	97	39	28	36	56
Other Asian	104	97	85	84	75	92
<i>Total Asian</i>	<i>105</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>86</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>89</i>	<i>93</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Different Labour Market Experiences

New Zealand's immigration policies since the mid-1980s have been focused on recruiting people with skills and investment capital that are deemed to be important for the country's economy. However, in the late 1980s and 1990s, immigrants from ethnic minority backgrounds faced formidable barriers to employment opportunities in New Zealand. The biggest barriers were the non-recognition of overseas qualifications and experiences and the reluctance of employers to hire new immigrants from a different

culture or ethnicity. This meant that many highly qualified and skilled Asian immigrants who entered New Zealand under the points system were not able to transfer former training and skills into jobs in New Zealand, and had to accept positions not commensurate with their education and experience, or had remained unemployed (see, for example, Basnayake, 1999; Boyer, 1996; Department of Internal Affairs, 1996). Immigrants who entered under business immigration schemes also experienced difficulties transferring their proven business skills to the New Zealand market (Forsythe Research, 1998; Ho, Bedford, & Goodwin, 1999). After 2000, incremental adjustments to immigration policy meant that some of the major difficulties concerning professional qualifications and statutory registration requirements were reduced (Spoonley & Bedford, 2012). However, analysis of the 2001 Census data showed that labour market performance among immigrants of Asia ethnicities remained poor, with higher proportions not in the labour force and higher rates of unemployment in comparison with immigrants from Australia, Europe, South Africa and North America (New Zealand Immigration Service, 2003; Statistics New Zealand, 2004). Furthermore, recent Asian immigrants (those who have lived in New Zealand for less than five years at the time of the census) have lower labour market participation rates and employment rates than more established immigrants (Boyd, 2003).

There are considerable variations in English language ability and educational qualifications among immigrants of Asian ethnicities, and these characteristics can impact on labour market outcomes. In order to better understand how well Asian immigrants fare in the labour market in the first five years after their arrival, the labour market outcomes of the four largest Asian ethnic groups (Chinese, Indian, Filipino and Korean) are compared using data from the 2013 Census, with particular emphasis on working-age migrants (15–64 years). The key indicators of labour market outcomes used in this analysis are labour force status and employment status. In addition, data relating to educational qualifications and English language ability of the four Asian ethnic groups are examined.

In 2013, there were 107,403 recent immigrants of Asian ethnicities living in New Zealand (Table 6). Of these, 34 per cent were Indian, 28.1 per cent Chinese, 14.3 per cent Filipino and 5.9 per cent Korean. Altogether, recent immigrants made up 22.8 per cent of the total Asian population (Table 6). Across ethnic groups, the Filipino group had a considerably

higher proportion of recent immigrants (38.2%) compared with the Indian, Korean and Chinese groups (23.5%, 21% and 17.6%, respectively).

Table 6: Number and proportion of recent immigrants, selected Asian ethnic groups, 2013

	Recent immigrants ¹			% of total ethnic population		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Chinese	13,563	16,623	30,186	16.8	18.3	17.6
Indian	20,454	16,056	36,510	25.3	21.6	23.5
Filipino	7,098	8,310	15,408	39.6	37.0	38.2
Korean	2,844	3,495	6,339	20.0	21.9	21.0
<i>Total Asian</i>	<i>52,527</i>	<i>54,876</i>	<i>107,403</i>	<i>23.1</i>	<i>22.4</i>	<i>22.8</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Note: ¹ People born overseas who have lived in New Zealand for less than five years at the time of the census.

Analysis of 2013 Census data shows that recent immigrants from the four Asian ethnic groups experienced a range of labour market outcomes (Table 7). While Filipino and Indian recent immigrants had considerably high labour force participation and employment rates, especially for men, Chinese and Korean recent immigrants had much lower labour force participation and higher unemployment rates. Overall, Filipino recent immigrants had the highest labour force participation rates (84.6 per cent for men; 76.2 per cent for women) and the lowest unemployment rates (5.9 per cent for men; 8.1 per cent for women). On the other hand, Chinese recent immigrants had the lowest proportion in the labour force (44.5 per cent for men; 40 per cent for women) and the highest proportion unemployed (15.1 per cent for men; 17.4 per cent for women).

With regard to employment status, a majority of Filipino and Indian recent immigrants were paid employees (92.1 to 96.8 per cent). In comparison, a lower proportion of Korean and Chinese recent immigrants were paid employees (75.7 to 84.2 per cent). Across ethnic groups, self-employment rates were highest among Koreans (5.4 per cent of females and 8.6 per cent of males were employers, and 5 per cent of females and 7.4 per cent of males were self-employed without employees), followed by the Chinese. Filipino recent immigrants were the least likely to be employers or self-employed (Table 7).

On the whole, recent Asian immigrants were highly qualified, with more than a quarter (28.9 per cent for men; 32.4 per cent for women)

holding university qualifications. Filipino and Indian recent immigrants were the most likely to have university degrees, especially women (46.9 per cent for Filipino; 41.1 per cent for Indian). In addition, more than 90 per cent of Filipino and Indian recent immigrants indicated that they were English speakers (Table 7). In comparison, the proportions of English speakers among Chinese and Korean recent immigrants were much lower, and more than a quarter did not speak conversational English.

Table 7: Labour force status, employment status, highest qualification and language indicators for recent immigrants of selected Asian ethnic groups, aged 15 to 64 years, 2013 (%)¹

	Chinese		Indian		Filipino		Korean		Total Asian	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
<i>Labour force status</i>										
Participation rate ²	44.5	40.0	84.1	66.4	84.6	76.2	52.8	39.4	69.0	54.4
Full-time employment rate ³	64.0	51.4	74.8	63.0	81.3	70.5	71.7	57.2	72.5	59.9
Part-time employment rate ⁴	20.9	31.2	17.7	22.6	12.8	21.5	17.7	32.9	18.2	26.3
Unemployment rate ⁵	15.1	17.4	7.5	14.4	5.9	8.1	10.6	9.9	9.3	13.8
<i>Employment status (for those employed full time or part time)</i>										
Paid employee	82.3	84.2	93.3	92.1	96.8	96.8	75.7	79.3	90.9	89.8
Employer	4.3	3.3	0.7	0.7	8.6	5.4	1.7	1.7
Self-employed	6.0	5.2	2.9	2.5	0.7	0.7	7.4	5.0	3.3	3.3
Unpaid family worker	2.1	3.4	0.4	1.2	2.2	0.9	1.9
Not specified	5.3	3.9	2.7	3.5	8.3	8.1	3.2	3.3
<i>Highest qualification</i>										
Degree and above	22.4	24.4	34.1	41.1	36.1	46.9	14.1	18.1	28.9	32.4
<i>Language indicators</i>										
Not English speaker	24.4	26.0	5.2	8.7	1.7	1.7	25.2	28.8	12.2	15.7
English speaker	73.2	71.9	93.3	90.1	96.8	97.5	71.5	69.5	86.0	82.8
Speaker of other languages	78.2	82.0	62.8	71.5	78.5	81.7	84.6	86.4	72.3	79.4

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Notes: ¹ People born overseas and resident in New Zealand for less than five years.

² The proportion of people aged 15 to 64 years who, at the time of the census, were working or looking for work.

³ The proportion of people aged 15 to 64 years who were employed full-time at the time of the census, out of all people who are in the labour force.

⁴ The proportion of people aged 15 to 64 years who were employed part-time at the time of the census, out of all people who are in the labour force.

⁵ The proportion of people aged 15 to 64 years who were without a paid job and were looking for work, out of all people who are in the labour force.

... Percentages are not given because of very small numbers.

Labour force participation rates of Chinese and Korean immigrants tended to improve with duration of residence in New Zealand. However, participation rates of all Chinese and Koreans aged 15 to 64 years in the 2013 Census were still 10 to 20 percentage points below the Indian and Filipino groups, whereas unemployment rates of Koreans (10.9 per cent for men; 12 per cent for women) were two to four percentage points higher than Filipinos, Indians and Chinese (Figure 8). Part of the discrepancy in labour market outcomes between Asian ethnic groups can be explained by differences in English language proficiency. Large proportions (15.5 to 21.1 per cent) of Chinese and Koreans aged 15 to 64 years did not speak conversational English at the time of the 2013 Census, compared with only 1 to 7 per cent of Filipinos and Indians (Figure 8). Besides, educational qualifications are not necessarily transferable: migrants from non-English-speaking countries may find it more difficult to find employment in line with their qualifications than migrants from English-speaking countries.

Although employment is a major factor for positive settlement, not all migrants choose to come to New Zealand for economic reasons. Among Asian migrants, a desire for a more relaxed lifestyle, an opportunity to live in a clean and safe environment, and the possibility of a better future for children are some of the commonly cited reasons for choosing to live in New Zealand (Lewin et al., 2011; Meares, Ho, Peace, & Spoonley, 2010a, 2010b).

As mentioned above, the Chinese and Korean ethnic groups fare worse in the labour market than do the Indian and Filipino groups. In order to cope with the challenge of unemployment or being under-employed in New Zealand, the Chinese and Koreans have adopted a number of approaches including opting for early retirement, upgrading their qualifications, or establishing their own businesses and becoming self-employed. Figure 8 shows that in 2013, rates of self-employment (with or without employees) were highest among Koreans (35.2 per cent for men; 26.9 per cent for women) and lowest among Filipinos (3.6 per cent for men; 3.5 per cent for women). Many Koreans may opt for self-employment because of the difficulty in obtaining suitable waged or salaried employment in the New Zealand labour market (Meares et al., 2010a). The Chinese also had high self-employment rates (24.8 per cent for men; 16.9 per cent for women) in 2013. This group has a strong tradition of self-employment and are the most likely to have gained residence under

business migration provisions (Ho et al., 1999; Meares et al., 2010b). Taken as a whole, it is more common for Asian peoples to be self-employed without employees than to be employers (Figure 8).

Table 8: Labour force status, employment status, highest qualification and language, selected Asian ethnic groups, aged 15 to 64 years, 2013 (%)

	Chinese		Indian		Filipino		Korean		Total Asian	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
<i>Labour force status</i>										
Participation rate	67.7	58.5	82.0	69.3	84.5	77.9	64.9	56.3	74.6	63.1
Full-time employment rate	76.5	65.1	80.0	67.6	81.0	71.8	70.6	54.4	77.6	65.0
Part-time employment rate	14.9	25.5	13.0	22.1	12.9	21.3	18.5	33.6	14.4	25.1
Unemployment rate	8.6	9.5	6.9	10.2	6.1	6.9	10.9	12.0	8.0	9.9
<i>Employment status (for those employed full time or part time)</i>										
Paid employee	70.1	78.1	81.0	86.3	94.2	94.2	58.6	64.6	77.1	82.4
Employer	9.7	6.4	4.5	2.9	0.7	0.9	12.3	10.1	6.4	4.5
Self-employed	15.1	10.5	10.2	6.1	2.9	2.6	22.9	16.8	11.9	8.2
Unpaid family worker	2.4	2.9	1.3	1.7	0.1	0.4	3.3	5.8	1.7	2.3
Not specified	2.7	2.6	3.0	3.0	2.1	1.9	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.6
<i>Highest qualification</i>										
Degree and above	33.3	34.7	38.8	34.5	34.7	44.4	25.8	27.5	30.6	33.6
<i>Language indicators</i>										
Not English speaker	15.5	16.9	4.5	6.8	1.7	1.4	19.8	21.1	10.0	12.0
English speaker	82.0	80.7	93.5	91.6	96.9	97.5	78.0	73.2	87.8	85.9
Speaker of other languages	75.5	79.2	66.3	72.6	75.0	74.4	88.2	89.5	72.9	77.6

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Note: For definitions of labour force status categories, see Table 7 above.

In addition to the above options, Asian migrants have also employed the strategies of astronauting, return migration and onward migration to a third country. The next section discusses the mobility patterns and transnational connections of New Zealand's Asian populations in recent decades.

Growing Mobility and Transnational Connections

In today's highly globalised world, migration is no longer viewed as a permanent one-way movement as described in the traditional settler migration model. Increasingly, scholars recognise that contemporary

migrants lead transnational lives and often maintain economic, cultural, social and familial links with their homeland (Chiang, 2004; Ho, 2003; Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2004; Yeoh, 2009). In New Zealand, a family strategy commonly practised by Chinese middle-class migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan, especially in the 1990s, was the strategy of 'astronauting' where one or more parents returned to their country of origin to work, leaving their children to be educated in New Zealand (Ho & Farmer, 1994). This is a deliberate strategy of living in two (or more) countries in order to maximise lifestyle, education, employment, business and travel opportunities for family members.

Recent research suggests that transnational mobility has intensified through the course of life. Of particular note is the return migration or on-migration to a third country of young Asian migrants. Unlike their parents' generation who chose return migration as a strategy to cope with problems of unemployment and under-employment, young Asians in early career stages are opting to relocate to their former homeland or re-migrate to a third country in search of more enriching life experiences, higher salaries and better career prospects (Ho & Bedford, 2008). Another growing feature of transnational families is the movement of older members. Rather than being left behind in one country, older people are increasingly circulating between two or more locations to visit spatially dispersed family members and to provide care to children and grandchildren (Ho, Lewin, & Ip, 2011).

Transnational mobility is by no means confined to migrants of Chinese descent. The mobility patterns of new immigrants to New Zealand between January 1998 and December 2004 has been the topic of a study by New Zealand's Department of Labour (Shorland, 2006). Using an immigration database that has been set up by the Department, the study explored two dimensions relating to migrants' subsequent movement patterns after taking up residence in New Zealand: the total amount of time spent away from New Zealand since taking up residence, and the number of periods of absence from New Zealand. There were 257,230 migrants in the database. Table 9 below gives the subsequent movement patterns of new migrants from China (PRC), India, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and Hong Kong.

There were 85,784 new migrants from the six sources in Asia approved for residence between January 1998 and December 2004 and who

had taken up residence by December 2004. A majority (73.5 per cent) came from PRC China (33,476) and India (29,609). The numbers from the other four sources were much smaller: 9570 from South Korea, 6705 from the Philippines, 4438 from Taiwan, and 1986 from Hong Kong (Table 9). Most of the migrants from South Korea and the Philippines had low absence rates: half (49.5 per cent) of the migrants from the Philippines and one-third (33.3 per cent) from South Korea had spent no time absent from the country, and a further 39.9 per cent and 49.4 per cent, respectively, were absent for less than 25 per cent of the time since taking up residence. In terms of the number of periods of absence, about one in 10 migrants from South Korea had five or more periods of absence over the analysis period; people in the older age groups (45–64 and 65+) were more likely to spend lengthy periods absent. On the other hand, only 3 per cent of migrants from the Philippines had five or more periods of absence (Table 9).

Table 9: Total time spent absent since taking up residence and number of periods of absence, by selected Asian nationalities

	Nationality					
	China	India	S. Korea	Philippines	Taiwan	HK
Total number	33,476	29,609	9,570	6,705	4,438	1,986
Proportion of time spent absent since taking up residence (%)						
None	27.5	36.3	33.3	49.5	5.2	14.3
<25%	38.9	41.5	49.4	39.9	28.9	37.2
25–<50%	10.3	6.7	6.7	3.7	9.9	9.5
50–<75%	7.1	5.1	3.9	2.7	9.9	8.5
75–<100%	16.2	10.4	6.7	4.1	46.0	30.6
Number of periods of absence (%)						
0	27.5	36.3	33.3	49.6	5.3	14.2
1–2	51.1	53.2	42.7	39.7	56.7	52.0
3–4	13.8	7.6	13.4	7.8	19.5	19.3
5–10	6.6	2.4	8.6	2.4	14.8	11.4
11+	1.0	0.5	2.0	0.6	3.7	3.0

Source: Shorland, 2006.

During the analysis period, migrants from China and India were more mobile, with 16.2 per cent and 10.4 per cent respectively spending 75 per cent or more of their residence absent. Like the South Koreans, Indians in the older age groups (45–64 and 65+) were more likely to spend lengthy periods absent. However, for migrants from China, those aged younger than 16 years or in the 25–44 and 45–64 age groups were more likely to have spent three-quarters or more of the time since taking up residence

overseas (Table 9). In terms of the number of periods of absence, the Chinese who had moved tended to have had more periods of absence than the Indians.

Migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan had quite different patterns for the aggregate time absent — only 5.2 per cent of migrants from Taiwan and 14.3 per cent from Hong Kong had spent no time outside New Zealand since arrival. At the other end of the scale, Taiwanese topped the high absence rate with almost half (46 per cent) living overseas for more than three-quarters of the time during the analysis period. In the case of Hong Kong, a third (30.6 per cent) had spent 75 per cent or more of the time since taking up residence living outside New Zealand (Table 9). Across age groups, migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan in the working-age groups (25–44 and 45–64) were much more likely to spend lengthy periods away from New Zealand. Children under the age of 16 years also had high absence rates, but they were less likely to have five or more spells of absence. Those migrants who had spent considerable time out of New Zealand after taking up residence might have included entrepreneurs who were involved in business activities both within New Zealand as well as other parts of the world; some might have been spouses or children who spent time away from New Zealand to be with family members overseas; and some might have been people who had returned to their former homeland to work, or re-located to a third country while maintaining family ties in New Zealand. As mentioned previously, these transnational strategies are popular options for immigrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong in an effort to maximise opportunities for education, employment and social advancement for family members (Ho, Ip, & Lewin, 2010).

What is clear from this analysis is that immigrants from different parts of Asia have distinctive strategies relating to both residence in New Zealand as well as to ongoing links with other countries after taking up residence, as these are reflected in the number of trips they subsequently make away from New Zealand. There is great potential to leverage these transnational networks in ways that will benefit New Zealand (Ho, Ip, & Lewin, 2010). So far, however, there is a lack of coordinated and deliberate strategies to tap into the opportunities and potential resources offered by the growing transnational networks in Asia.

Complex Patterns of Mixed Ethnicity

Another topic of interest is the mixed ethnic background of Asian peoples. Over recent decades, the proportion of Asian peoples who belong to more than one ethnic group has changed. In 1986, nearly one in four Asians said they had multiple ethnicity, compared with one in 23 (4.3 per cent) New Zealanders overall (Statistics New Zealand, 1995). Between 1986 and 2013, the proportion of multi-ethnic Asians had reduced significantly, from 22.5 per cent to 8.6 per cent (Table 10). The main reason for this was the substantial increase in Asian immigration during this period, with a majority of the overseas-born Asian immigrants belonging to only one ethnic group. However, Asian ethnic groups vary greatly in the proportion of people belonging to more than one ethnic group. Table 10 shows that in 2013, the Cambodian, Thai and Japanese groups had large proportions (ranging from 15.1 to 27.2 per cent) of people of mixed ethnic background. Koreans and Sri Lankans were the least likely to belong to more than one ethnic group (Table 10).

Table 10: Proportion of selected Asian ethnicities who belong to more than one ethnic group, 1986, 1991 and 2013 (%)

Ethnic group	1986	1991	2013
Chinese	26.5	15.9	12.1
Indian	23.3	11.9	8.0
Filipino	21.9	13.8	8.7
Korean	8.8	7.4	2.8
Japanese	22.3	20.0	27.2
Sri Lankan	10.3	5.4	5.1
Cambodian	5.3	8.1	15.1
Thai	23.5	14.9	17.0
<i>Total Asian</i>	<i>22.5</i>	<i>13.1</i>	<i>8.6</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

There is a higher degree of mixed ethnicity among New Zealand-born Asians and children. A recent study using 2006 census data showed that six out of 10 (61.8 per cent) Filipinos born in New Zealand identified with more than one ethnicity, whereas the proportions of mixed ethnicity among New Zealand-born Chinese and New Zealand-born Indians were 40 per cent and 30.2 per cent, respectively. On the other hand, the great majority of the overseas-born component in the three groups — 96 per cent of overseas-born Filipinos, 96.6 per cent of overseas-born Chinese and 97.3

per cent of overseas-born Indians — identified with only one ethnicity (Bedford & Ho, 2008). Asian children aged between 0 and 14 years are more likely to belong to more than one ethnic group. A third (33.1 per cent) of the Filipino children in the 2006 census were recorded as being of mixed ethnicity, while for Chinese and Indian children the proportion was 27.1 per cent and 17.3 per cent, respectively (Bedford & Ho, 2008). Looking to the future, when there will be a much larger proportion of New Zealand-born in the Asian populations, there will be higher proportions of Asian peoples who belong to more than one ethnic group.

Amongst Asian people of mixed ethnicity, the most frequently reported non-Asian ethnicity was European (Table 11). At least one in four Chinese and Indians of mixed ethnic background were of Māori descent, and similar proportions of Chinese and Indians of mixed ethnicity also had Pacific ethnicity. In the case of Cambodians, however, people of other Asian ethnicities made up the majority (60.3 per cent) of those of mixed ethnicity. In all Asian groups, only a very small proportion gave Middle Eastern/Latin American/African (MELAA) and Other ethnic groups as part of their ethnic identity (Table 11).

Table 11: Mixed ethnicity of major Asian ethnic groups, 2013 (%)

Ethnic group	People of Asian ethnicity and					
	% with European	% with Maori	% with Pacific	% with Other Asian	% with MELAA	% with Other
Chinese	63.9	26.2	26.5	20.2	1.3	3.0
Indian	61.7	27.2	28.0	13.0	2.2	3.6
Filipino	74.7	12.7	6.0	16.1	1.4	4.3
Korean	64.4	12.6	5.4	25.5	1.4	4.7
Japanese	81.3	13.0	6.8	10.6	1.9	3.7
Sri Lankan	60.7	4.2	6.8	28.8	1.6	11.0
Cambodian	31.4	10.9	5.8	60.3	--	5.5
Thai	73.9	11.0	3.5	26.5	0.9	6.4

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Increased Concentration in Auckland

At the 2013 Census, about two-thirds of the Asian population lived in the Auckland region. Between 1986 and 2013, the numbers and proportions of Asian peoples resident in the Auckland region increased from 22,026 (40.9 per cent) in 1986 to 52,602 (52.8 per cent) in 1991, then to 151,602 (63.7

per cent) in 2001 and 307,233 (65.1 per cent) in 2013. When compared with New Zealand's total population, Auckland was home to one-third of all New Zealanders in 2013, up from 27 per cent in 1986. The growing concentration of Asians in the Auckland region is primarily because a majority of new Asian immigrants who arrived in New Zealand after 1986 have settled in this region (Ho, 2013).

As Table 12 shows, the Korean group had the greatest concentration (72.9 per cent) in the Auckland region in 2013 (Table 12). This region was also home to at least two-thirds of Chinese, Indians, Afghani, Pakistani and Bangladeshi, and at least half of Filipino, Sri Lankans, Vietnamese, Thai, Malays, Indonesians and Laotians. Although less than half of Nepalese, Eurasians, Japanese, Cambodians and Burmese lived in the Auckland region in 2013, the region was still the most common region lived in by these groups (Table 12).

Table 12: Asian ethnic groups living in the Auckland region, 2013

Ethnic group	Number	%
Chinese	118,230	69.0
Indian	106,326	68.5
Korean	21,981	72.9
Filipino	20,502	50.8
Sri Lankan	6,906	61.3
Japanese	6,720	47.6
Vietnamese	4,359	65.5
Cambodian	4,188	48.9
Thai	4,152	51.6
Malay	2,508	52.3
Indonesian	2,484	60.0
Afghani	2,421	70.9
Pakistani	2,253	69.1
Bangladeshi	1,092	67.3
Burmese	1,056	48.3
Laotian	822	59.8
Eurasian	630	46.2
Nepalese	534	33.6
<i>Total Asian</i>	<i>307,233</i>	<i>65.1</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

The Chinese, Indian and Other Asian populations show different residential patterns in the Auckland region (Freisen, 2008; Mehta, 2012). Auckland suburbs with the greatest density of Chinese people are Auckland Central, Epsom, New Lynn and Dannemora, while high Indian

population density is noted in Auckland Central, Sandringham, Mount Roskill, Mangere and Dannemora. Koreans are mostly concentrated on the North Shore, whereas Vietnamese and Cambodians are mostly found in southern Auckland, especially in Otahuhu, Papatoetoe and to the west of Manukau Central. Overall, the residential patterns of various Asian groups in Auckland have changed over the past 20 years. The majority are living among other ethnic groups, rather than living in relatively exclusive residential communities. However, their high visibility in certain suburbs in Auckland may create a false impression that they are clustering in particular neighbourhoods and forming distinctive ethnic enclaves.

Conclusion

The Asian population in New Zealand is not a homogeneous group. The people grouped under the generic label of Asian are very diverse along many characteristics including ethnic origins, place of birth, spatial distribution, period of arrival, duration of residence in New Zealand, English language proficiency, socio-economic status, health status and so on. Given the complexities within the Asian communities, interpreting population statistics using Asian as a single category is misleading (Horner & Ameratunga, 2012; Rasanathan et al., 2006). To avoid overgeneralisation and the problem of the averaging effect, it is necessary to disaggregate data where appropriate to give a better understanding of the experiences of New Zealand's diverse Asian communities. While this study has only focused on six themes to illustrate the multiple dimensions of difference within this population, more remains to be done.

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Demographic Interdependencies: New Zealand in the Asia-Pacific Migration Context

ROBERT DIDHAM *

Abstract

People of Pacific and Asian ethnicities have long been an integral part of the New Zealand population. Interconnections between New Zealand, Asia and the Pacific extend as far back as the earliest contact with New Zealand. This paper presents an overview of these two groupings of ethnicities, based primarily on 2013 Census data, draws together migration and policy themes, and discusses the interconnection between demography and policy fields.

People of Pacific and Asian ethnicities have long been an integral part of the New Zealand population. Interconnections between New Zealand, Asia and the Pacific extend as far back as the earliest contact with New Zealand. After the decline of trans-eastern-Pacific voyaging and trading by Polynesians and the settlement of New Zealand by Māori (Howe, 2006), people starting arriving to New Zealand from the Pacific islands with the European voyages of discovery and settlement in the late 18th century. Some of the earliest Asian settlers and sojourners arrived during that period with ship crews, followed by further arrivals of labourers as colonial expansion spread across the Pacific. Asian arrivals were almost exclusively male and the earliest were from India or South-East Asia (including both military sepoy deserters from the British Indian forces and country-trade lascars (Swarbrick, 2012)) with later Indian labour from both India and the Malay Peninsula imported for work in New Zealand and the Pacific, notably in Fiji. Later in the 19th century, gold rushes lead to significant male Chinese migration.

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While there is a significant literature on early Chinese, and to a lesser extent, Indian migration, most of the focus in Pacific research has been on the more recent migration flows (Gendall, Spoonley, & Trlin 2007). The relationship between the later arrivals and descendants of the various waves of migration generates a complex web of interactions that have been only partially researched, especially for the early years.

This paper draws upon a number of migration and settlement themes that have been explored over the years by Richard Bedford in his scholarly work. Among these themes are settlement histories of multigenerational families, imbalances in sex ratios, and the consequences of different levels of enumeration on the data and its interpretation. Children of immigrants, the subsequent histories of these children, and the maintenance of connections between generations across time and space are themes that are becoming increasingly central to the understanding and interpretation of migration outcomes, adding layers of complexity that will emerge in future research.

Policy interactions

Thanks in large part to indefatigable migration researchers such as Richard Bedford, we know a great deal about the broad patterns of recent migration and settlement in New Zealand, especially in terms of the flows and interaction between people and policy (Bedford, Ho, & Lidgard, 2001; Bedford & Hugo, 2008; R. Bedford, Burson, & C. Bedford, 2014). A key element in these patterns is the nature of connections between families in New Zealand and other countries of Asia and the Pacific, as well as within New Zealand. In part, this emerges from an awareness that the New Zealand political focus has been shifting away from the Pacific to look towards the future global economic and social powerhouses of Asia in the context of trade and skill exchange (Spoonley & Bedford, 2012). But we should not overlook the centrality of the individual, and of families, underlying the processes operating at the nation-state scale. There is a long-standing social and economic diasporic relationship between people across New Zealand, the Pacific and Asia. For example, individual remittances within families in New Zealand and Tonga contribute significantly at the national economic level (Connell & Brown, 2005). The international and intra-national relationships operate within and are constrained by the political frame of overlapping and competing policy

fields and the way in which states and communities operate to manage borders.


This paper looks first at people of Pacific ethnicities, then at people of Asian ethnicities within New Zealand, and finally draws together some common themes that are emerging. We should not lose sight, at any stage in this discussion, of the idea that when we use the term ‘Pacific’ (and ‘Asian’), we are dealing with a grouping of ethnicities; a grouping that is highly diverse, cut and diced according to a range of colonial perceptions and, as a group, non-existent except within ‘settler’ nation contexts – as Melani Anae succinctly noted in the context of New Zealand versus the Pacific, “Pacific Islanders exist only in New Zealand” (Anae, 1996, p.128). This important caveat aside, however, the key reason for this approach is that the two migration streams have, each in slightly different ways, generated substantial debate within a number of sectors of New Zealand society over the last three decades. The larger Pacific inflows preceded the Asian inflows, but both provoked xenophobic reactions, such as the ill-considered ‘dawn raids’ (Liava’a, 1998) in the case of the Pacific migrants and the embarrassing ‘Asian angst’ episode (Hannis, 2008; Mok, 2007) in the Asian case. Much of the recent debate continues to implicate indigeneity (Bedford & Pool, 2001; Bromell, 2009; Houkamau & Sibley, 2015; Kukutai, 2011; Ward & Liu, 2012) and population futures (Hawke et al., 2014).

The policy changes underpinning the history of these events are well known (Crocombe, 1992; McKinnon, 1996; Spoonley & Macpherson, 2004) and need not be restated here. While the Pacific and Asian groups are different demographically, we can see patterns that point to potentially similar futures. The settlement experiences of these broad groups differ in terms of both timing and speed. They also differ as a result of different policy histories applicable to selection and entry into New Zealand.

However, much of the debate around immigration is to do less with the nature of the change as the rate of change. This can be illustrated by observing the change over time in the growth of the Pacific and Asian populations in New Zealand (Figure 1). In both cases, the strongest reactions coincide in time with the steepest parts of the curves. Persistently, the debates tend to be couched in language that is implicitly racist, based on skin colour or language, and regularly confounds people born overseas with those born in New Zealand (Bedford, 2002). People

consequently tend to be aggregated into geo-spatially defined groupings of ethnicities and the imagined populations are then treated monolithically (Bedford, Lidgard, & Ho, 2003).

Figure 1: Growth of Pacific and Asian populations compared with Māori, per cent of New Zealand population, 1916–2013 Censuses




Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Section 2: Pacific Population in New Zealand

People of Pacific ethnicities have played a major role in New Zealand’s society and economy for more than a century (Bedford, 1994). There is now a sizeable New Zealand-born population characterised by multiple ethnic identity.

By 2013, more than 63 per cent of Pacific people living in New Zealand were New Zealand-born, as shown in Figure 2. (Many of those who have moved to Australia are also New Zealand-born and most are New Zealand citizens.) The age-sex pyramid also illustrates the youthful structure of the Pacific population in New Zealand.

Figure 2: Age-sex pyramid, people of Pacific ethnicities by birthplace, 2013

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Differences in migration histories and fertility rates have produced internal diversity in the Pacific group, and the ethnic composition of those who are New Zealand-born differs from that of those who are overseas-born. For example, in 2013, well over 70 per cent of the Tokelauan, Niuean and Cook Island Māori populations were born in New Zealand, in contrast with the more recent migrant groups from Micronesia and Melanesia, with under 40 per cent New Zealand-born (Table 1). New migration from Melanesia is primarily labour migration and heavily dominated by men, with more than twice as many males as females. The overall sex ratio of the Pacific population in New Zealand continues to reflect a larger number of females than males. With nearly two-thirds of the population born in New Zealand, sex ratios at birth favouring males, and a young population, further research is needed to explain why this is a persistent feature of the group. There has been a general demographic feminisation across the New Zealand population over the recent decades (Callister & Didham, 2012) which together with changing patterns of inter-ethnic partnering (Didham & Callister, 2014; Rocha, 2013) adds interest to the diversity of sex ratios among ethnic and migrant populations.

Table 1: Sex ratios (males per 100 females) among people of selected Pacific ethnicities, by birthplace, 2013

	Male	Female	Total	NZ-born sex ratio	OS-born sex ratio	Total sex ratio	Per cent NZ-born
Samoan	44,250	45,021	89,271	98.3	92.9	96.4	62.7
Cook Islands							
Māori	23,169	24,072	47,244	96.2	88.1	94.8	77.4
Tongan	17,691	17,691	35,385	100.0	99.9	100.1	59.8
Niuean	9,108	9,360	18,468	97.3	84.6	94.6	78.9
Tokelauan	2,517	2,682	5,199	93.7	83.1	91.0	73.9
Fijian	2,769	2,913	5,679	95.0	100.4	98.4	39.8
Kiribati	336	345	684	97.7	84.8	88.2	32.7
Nauruan	21	27	45	70.4	79.5	74.0	36.8
PNG	120	132	252	90.2	78.5	81.8	31.4
Rotuman	168	219	384	77.0	86.1	81.1	49.8
Tahitian	465	594	1,059	78.3	72.6	77.3	76.4
Solomon Islander	96	108	204	88.9	86.1	89.6	34.5
Tuvaluan	789	825	1,611	95.9	92.1	93.4	46.6
ni-Vanuatu	66	57	123	113.8	281.9	221.6	25.7
Other Pacific nei	615	525	1,140	117.6	85.6	104.5	52.8
<i>Total Pacific</i>	<i>89,778</i>	<i>92,010</i>	<i>181,791</i>	<i>97.6</i>	<i>93.8</i>	<i>96.4</i>	<i>62.3</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.


Note: numbers may not add due to rounding. nei = not elsewhere included.

Another source of diversification is changes to ethnic identification and the development of multiple ethnicities (Bedford & Didham, 2001), with subsequent complex connections for families and individuals; this has been referred to as ‘cultural entanglement’ (Said, 1993; Wagner, 2001). Almost two-fifths (38 per cent) of the Pacific population in New Zealand in 2013 stated more than one ethnicity on their census form, with well over a third (37 per cent) identifying with ethnicities outside the Pacific grouping. Of those with ethnicities only in the Pacific grouping, seven per cent had multiple Pacific ethnicities, and the majority of these were New Zealand-born.

As is common with all migrant settlers, people of Pacific ethnicities have partnered with people of other ethnicities. The extent to which this is a feature of the Pacific population is the principal reason why the prioritising of ethnic data in an attempt to force people into a single group has become strongly discouraged (Didham, 2005; Didham & Callister, 2012).

Figure 3 shows the age-sex structure of the Pacific population in New Zealand at the 2013 Census, distinguished by whether or not they also identified as Māori. It can be seen that almost equal numbers of Pacific males and females identified as both Pacific and Māori. Much of this will be due to inter-ethnic partnering, but some will be adoption of one or other ethnicities for a variety of reasons. More than a quarter of Pacific children were also Māori children.

Figure 3: Age-sex pyramid of Pacific and Pacific-Māori population, New Zealand, 2013.



Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

The Pacific diaspora

New Zealand remains the primary destination within the Pacific migration system for people from most countries in the eastern Pacific, and is increasingly becoming a destination for those from the western Pacific. In some cases, the New Zealand-based Pacific populations are the largest in any country, including their ‘home’ countries. Niuean and Tokelauan communities are the standout examples, with home island populations estimated in 2013 as 1200 and 1500, respectively, but with New Zealand-based populations several times larger. New Zealand is home to more than

4100 people of Niuean ethnicity who were born in Niue, and there are a further 18,500 people of Niuean ethnicity who were born in New Zealand (Table 2). Tokelauans, with a different set of migration and demographic histories, both across the Pacific and within New Zealand, include 1300 born in Tokelau but 5200 born in New Zealand.

While some Niuean and Tokelauan in New Zealand may no longer have strong cultural and social connections with their home islands, for the most part, the home islands form a fundamental part of Pacific personal geographies, and certainly of generational histories. Strong family connections are maintained both between New Zealand and the home islands and also with family members who have migrated to other destinations within the Pacific and beyond, or returned to their birth countries. In some cases, these ties go back across several generations of migrations. Because of social networks, both physical and virtual, and changes in patterns of partnering within New Zealand, all countries within the Pacific are now closely interdependent. The depth and nature of the ties reinforce the view that the Pacific region as a whole has significance on a global scale, and that countries on the periphery are an integral part of the web of connections.

Table 2: Birthplace and ethnicity, selected Pacific ethnicities resident in New Zealand, 2013.

Birthplace	Ethnicity					
	Cook Island Māori	Fijian	Niuean	Samoan	Tongan	Tokelauan
Cook Islands	12,630	12	51	63	48	6
Fiji	27	8,271	33	252	207	21
Niue	24	9	4,101	111	105	3
Samoa	81	21	303	49,830	252	396
Tonga	36	42	93	99	22,173	0
Other Pacific	15	24	21	162	99	1,317
New Zealand	47,244	5,682	18,468	89,271	35,385	5,199
Other	954	195	339	4,353	2,064	234
Not stated	831	189	471	1,761	1,125	141
<i>Total</i>	<i>61,839</i>	<i>14,445</i>	<i>23,880</i>	<i>145,902</i>	<i>61,458</i>	<i>7,314</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

The relationship between country of birth and ethnicity is complex. Migrants from any country may identify with a number of ethnicities, especially when the countries themselves are culturally diverse, as is the

case, for example, in Fiji, and are part of extended international island migration webs, as is Samoa. People may therefore identify with several ethnicities, and these may change over time. Tables 2 and 3 show some of these complexities for selected ethnicities. Table 2 focuses on the more ‘traditional’ migration source countries connected with New Zealand, while Table 3 provides some information on three of the newer, but growing, migration streams.

Much has been written about the relationship between the ‘island-born’ and the New Zealand-born populations. The striking aspect of these data is the diversity of other birthplaces within the ethnic communities which not only point to significant contact within New Zealand, where it has been assumed most of the inter-ethnic partnering within the New Zealand-based communities occurs (Callister, Didham, & Potter, 2007), but also indicates growing contact through intra-regional education and labour migration around the Pacific (Hugo, 2004). The relationship between migration, education, labour and partnering is intertwined with timing and life-stage events (Jang, Casterline, & Snyder, 2014) and remains to be investigated in respect to the wider Asia-Pacific migration system.

Table 3: Birthplace and ethnicity, i-Kiribati, Tuvaluan, ni-Vanuatu, resident in New Zealand, 2013.

Birthplace	Ethnicity		
	i-Kiribati	Tuvaluan	ni-Vanuatu
Fiji	54	108	6
Kiribati	1,218	159	0
Nauru	51	132	0
Tuvalu	9	1,353	0
Samoa	3	42	0
Vanuatu	3	0	345
Other Pacific	33	27	0
New Zealand	681	1,611	123
Other	33	105	15
Not stated	33	75	9
<i>Total</i>	<i>2,115</i>	<i>3,612</i>	<i>501</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Section 3: Fijian-Indian Peoples – A Case Study in Enumerating Ethnic Identity

Fijian Indians are a community with a multigenerational presence in Fiji, and with ancestral links to India and other parts of the Indian diaspora, including New Zealand. Many of those with Indian ethnicities living in New Zealand who have migrated to this country were born in Fiji.

The current New Zealand standard ethnic classification's placement of Fijian Indians is a salient reminder of the difficulties of capturing ethnic identity. Currently a person of Fijian Indian ethnicity is coded under the broad 'Asian' grouping of ethnicities (Didham, 2005; Statistics New Zealand, 2005). However, sections of the Fijian Indian population consider that they should be included in the Pacific grouping of ethnicities, on the grounds that their ethnicity has diverged from other Indian ethnicities and that they do not belong within the Asian grouping. Moreover, until recently, Indians born in Fiji were not accorded full citizenship rights, which were restricted to Melanesians (Goss & Lindquist, 2000); however, this is no longer the case (legislated by the Citizenship of Fiji Decree in 2009), and all citizens are officially referred to as Fijians.

The design of the New Zealand census question on ethnic identity has an unexpected impact on the ability to look at members of this population in New Zealand. What might be termed 'tick box tyranny' (Didham, 2014) becomes important for the analysis of Pacific population flows. (This argument resonates with similar discussions around the positioning and labelling of 'New Zealand European' within the ethnicity classification and the use of the term 'New Zealander' as an ethnicity (Kukutai & Didham, 2012)). The ethnicity question includes a tick box labelled 'Indian'. People will generally tick this option, unless they feel very strongly that this does not adequately describe their ethnic identity, in which case they can write their identity. It is argued that this inclusion of a tick-box option of 'Indian' has a strong influence. For example, as Table 4 shows, in 2013, out of those 155,178 people who chose an Indian ethnicity, the majority (143,520, or 92 per cent) were recorded as 'Indian not further defined (nfd)' (i.e. they had only ticked the 'Indian' option). Of the 11,658 people who chose to be more specific, nearly 94 per cent were Fijian Indian. Among those who wrote in other responses, there was a strong relationship between the New Zealand-born and the overseas-born

components, although in the majority of cases, the New Zealand-born were young children and the overseas-born were their parents who, in many cases, may have completed forms on behalf of their children.

Table 4: People of Indian ethnicities by birthplace, resident in New Zealand, 2013

Ethnicity	Birthplace							Total
	NZ	Pacific	Asia	Africa	UK/ Ireland	Middle East	Other or Not stated	
Indian nfd	34,005	34,119	67,440	3,504	933	810	2709	143,520
Bengali	30	0	126	3	0	0	6	165
Fijian Indian	1,833	8,886	18	3	6	6	183	10,929
Gujarati	6	3	12	0	0	0	0	21
Indian Tamil	72	0	216	3	6	0	6	303
Punjabi	90	0	231	0	0	3	6	324
Sikh	51	9	144	0	6	0	3	213
Anglo Indian	90	0	171	6	45	0	12	324
Indian nec	78	6	168	459	48	0	6	765
<i>Total</i>	<i>36,012</i>	<i>42,156</i>	<i>68,295</i>	<i>3,957</i>	<i>1,044</i>	<i>819</i>	<i>3,714</i>	<i>155,178</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Note: nfd = not further defined; nec = not elsewhere classified.

Hidden within the 'Indian nfd' category are potentially many who would describe themselves as Fijian Indian. One way of getting some insight into this is to note that the 2013 Census counted 9327 people of Indian ethnicity born in New Zealand and coded as children in families with at least one parent born in Fiji. This represents 32 per cent of all New Zealand-born Indian children in families. Because this includes only those who were still living at home and coded as a child in a family, this represents only a portion of New Zealand-born Fijian Indian youth. Many will have left home, or may be second generation with New Zealand-born parents, or have formed families of their own and be coded as parents. Some may have adopted Indian ethnicity for a number of reasons and may have ties with the Pacific. Thus, the number of people of Indian ethnicity with parents born in Fiji will be greater. Overall, 35 per cent of people of Indian ethnicity were born in New Zealand. If the data for children by birthplace of parents and the birthplace data for all people of Indian

ethnicity is indicative, more than a third of the Indian population in New Zealand have familial ties with the Pacific.

It is noteworthy, though, that around 10 per cent of the people of Fijian ethnicity born in Fiji also have Indian ethnicity, peaking at around 20 per cent for those in New Zealand longer than 10 years. This contrasts with fewer than 2 per cent overall of the Indians born in Fiji also having Fijian ethnicity, similarly peaking at around 4 per cent for those who migrated more than a decade ago. In part this reflects different push factors in the two waves of migration, with those of cross-cultural backgrounds leaving in the earlier wave compared with the more recent wave. This may be related to the more recent increased acceptance of inter-ethnic relationships. But in both cases, the population composition reflects who has the means and the incentive to migrate and who is able to gain access to New Zealand. The outcome is that three times more Indians than Fijians migrate from Fiji to New Zealand, and the timing of migrations indicates that there is a strong relationship between the politics of Fiji and the loss of Indian migrants, with a history that stretches back decades (Mamak, 1974; Mamak & Bedford, 1978). Of those born in Fiji and still in New Zealand at the time of the 2013 Census, year of arrival data show increased flows for both the 1987–1990 and 2002–2010 periods.

Section 4: The Asian Population in New Zealand

As mentioned earlier, people of Indian ethnicities are grouped within the broad Asian classification rather than among Pacific ethnicities (unless, of course, they also have an ethnicity in the Pacific grouping). They also constitute one of the largest groups within the Asian classification. In all, there were 155,178 people of Indian ethnicities living in New Zealand at the time of the 2013 Census, of whom 44 per cent were born in Asia and 23 per cent were born in New Zealand. The majority of the Asia-born were born in India. However, included in the New Zealand Indian group are people born in other Asian countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and Bangladesh, as well as further afield in Africa (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Botswana), the Middle East (the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) and Europe (England, Scotland). All people of Indian ethnicities are part of the highly diverse Asian grouping of ethnicities.

Among the Asian population, people of Indian ethnicities along with those of Chinese ethnicities are by far the largest components, together accounting for 69 per cent of the group of people usually referred to as 'Asian' in New Zealand (Table 6). There are differences, though, in both the age composition and the sex ratios, with more males among the south Asian groups and more females among the east and south-east Asian groups. In part, this is driven by strongly gendered migration processes.

Table 5: Sex ratios (males per 100 females) among people of selected Asian ethnicities, by birthplace, 2013

	Male	Female	Total	NZ-born sex ratio	OS-born sex ratio	Total sex ratio	Percentage NZ-born
Filipino	17,886	22,461	40,347	101.4	76.6	79.6	14.1
Cambodian	4,131	4,470	8,601	105.0	87.1	92.4	30.8
Vietnamese	3,105	3,555	6,660	98.1	84.0	87.3	23.9
Burmese	1,080	1,110	2,190	95.2	98.7	97.3	16.9
Indonesian	1,839	2,298	4,137	103.2	73.3	80.0	23.4
Malay	2,181	2,613	4,797	93.6	80.8	83.5	21.1
Thai	2,880	5,172	8,052	107.7	46.6	55.7	19.4
Chinese	80,541	90,873	171,411	103.9	83.6	88.6	26.6
Indian	80,778	74,397	155,178	102.8	110.5	108.6	23.5
Sri Lankan	5,766	5,508	11,271	101.1	105.2	104.7	14.9
Japanese	5,235	8,883	14,118	96.8	47.8	58.9	28.1
Korean	14,241	15,933	30,171	101.5	87.8	89.4	11.0
Afghani	1,740	1,677	3,417	110.1	101.9	103.8	25.8
Pakistani	1,731	1,530	3,261	109.0	114.6	113.1	26.1
Other Asian nei	6,603	7,227	13,833	99.0	89.7	91.4	21.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>227,049</i>	<i>244,662</i>	<i>471,711</i>	<i>103.0</i>	<i>90.0</i>	<i>92.8</i>	<i>22.7</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.


Note: nei = not elsewhere included.

In general, the recent inflows of migrants have resulted in a low proportion being New Zealand-born, even for major groups with long histories in New Zealand such as Chinese (Ip, 2009) and Indians (Leckie, 2007). The newest flows, such as the Burmese who are predominantly refugees, and those associated with recent labour migration, such as Filipino and Koreans, have fewer than 15 per cent born in New Zealand. Older groups with proportionally fewer new migrants and higher local intermarriage rates, such as Cambodians and Japanese, have relatively more New Zealand-born members. The Thai, with nearly 20 per cent New

Zealand-born, and Japanese with 28 per cent born in New Zealand, have very strongly gendered inflows, partly because of labour or education migration and partly because of international partnering.

The age-sex pyramid of the Asian population (Figure 4) illustrates the net effect of these various migration strands. The high impact of students on the age structure remains a key feature of this population. Ongoing inflows of adult skilled migrants and their families contribute to the distinctive shape of the central ages and is typical of a population with recent migration histories. Family migration adds to both the older adult ages of the overseas-born and the younger New Zealand-born cohorts. However, a significant proportion of the New Zealand-born group has New Zealand-born parents, grandparents and great grandparents. These older generations are clearly seen in the age-sex pyramid, although heavily outnumbered by those born overseas.

Figure 4: Age-sex pyramid, number (000) of people of Asian ethnicities by birthplace, 2013




Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

The extent to which the nature of this population has changed can be shown by comparison with the Asian population only two decades earlier, in 1991 (Figure 5). Note, though, that these two pyramids are not to the same scale, with the 2013 population four times bigger than the 1991 population. Those aged around 30 years in 1991 were in their mid-50s in 2013. Similarly, the New Zealand children in 1991 were in the 25–44

year ages in 2013, with much larger cohorts born in New Zealand following through in the 0–24 year ages. This is reminiscent of the demographic changes that accompanied Pacific migration in the 1970s which has resulted, by 2013, in more than 60 per cent being New Zealand-born. One possible implication is that a similar pattern may evolve with the Asian population, though the outcomes will depend on future exchange of people between New Zealand and Asia, and on trans-Tasman flows, as the competition for highly skilled work forces increases globally. Already, Japan is developing strategies to attract people to fill labour shortages, including easing access to citizenship. Other countries in the region, including China, are expected to follow with similar strategies in the future. One certain outcome is that the New Zealand diaspora will diversify dramatically as New Zealanders increasingly choose Asian countries as their homes and increasingly will have connections with more than one diaspora.

Figure 5: Age-sex pyramid, number (000) of people of Asian ethnicities by birthplace, 1991.



Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Section 5: Emerging Transformations

Migrant populations do not live in isolation. The Pacific and Asian diasporas in New Zealand remain connected internationally with their home countries as well as with other segments of their diasporas in other parts of the world. Similarly there are growing interconnections between

these diasporas that link them not only to each other but also to the New Zealand diaspora abroad (Didham, 2009; Gamlen, 2011; Ho, Ip, & Lewin 2010). Equally important for the well-being of migrant communities and their New Zealand-born descendants is the maintenance of both cultural and family connections. Health-related beliefs, education and social integration processes are inextricably linked as diasporas increasingly straddle geographies and cultures (Kao & Huang, 2015). For this reason, family bonds and access to cultural institutions, both nationally and internationally, are vital. However, these links are transforming in nature and function with both globalisation and the changing relationship between the immigrant and native-born sectors of the ethnic communities. In this arena, the role of extended families and intergenerational relevance of religious traditions plays a significant part.

Extended families

Family migration often involves parents and siblings of migrants following the principal migrants. Because of the requirement to assure accommodation, this often results in people living in extended family situations. Nearly half of the 100,605 extended families counted in the 2013 Census had at least one member who was of either Pacific or Asian ethnicity (see Table 6). In the context of census data, an extended family comprises either two related families or a family living with other related people in the same household on census night. In each case, two-thirds of these were three or more generation extended families. Many of these will have evolved through the stages of initial migration, having children and then arranging for parents to join the family. This also provides a range of options for sharing labour in family businesses and sharing childcare. It is also worth noting that the Pacific population has about the same number of extended families as the Asian population, but the Asian population is 60 per cent larger than the Pacific. The Pacific population has had a longer settlement history and a high proportion born in New Zealand, which suggests that filial obligations and cultural values are being maintained. The Asian migration process is much newer and the population more diverse, so it is probable that over time, the number of Asian extended families will increase. Inter-ethnic partnering trends may also modify the Asian patterns over time, perhaps in ways that differ from Pacific patterns.

Table 6: Extended families by number of generations for extended families with at least one Pacific member (= Pacific) or Asian member (= Asian), 2013.

	One-generation extended family	Two-generation extended family	Three- or more generation extended family	Extended family not classifiable	Total
Pacific	639	8,058	15,459	36	24,186
Asian	1,110	8,100	15,075	24	24,306
<i>Total</i>	<i>5,409</i>	<i>36,558</i>	<i>58,527</i>	<i>111</i>	<i>100,605</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Religious affiliation

Religious affiliation is one aspect of cultural connectivity where there is a clear shift away from the home island values for Pacific communities (Taule'ale'ausumai, 2000) towards the local New Zealand pattern (although this is not necessarily at the expense of the maintenance of other cultural components, as can be seen in the growing interest in cultural histories, music, language and oral traditions (Mackley-Crump, 2012)). Christian-based religions remain a strong, and to some extent indigenised, component of cultural identity across the Pacific (Morton, 1996). The interactions between birthplace, ethnicity and religious identities are, for Pacific people, an intrinsic process in identity formation (Brown, 1989; Thaman, 1994, 2003).

It is striking that less than 5 per cent of the overseas-born Pacific population reported no religious affiliation at the last census, whereas more than a quarter of the younger New Zealand-born component of the population did. Similarly 41 per cent of the Asian population born in New Zealand professed no religion, alongside 28 per cent of those born overseas. This compares with almost a half for the total New Zealand-born population and a third for the total overseas-born population. There is also a contrast among those who affiliate with one or more other religions – overseas-born Pacific people predominantly with Hinduism, and to a lesser extent, Islam. The New Zealand-born in the same category has almost equal adherence to Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. See Table 7 for further details.

Table 7: Religious affiliation by birthplace, Pacific and Asian, 2013 (%).

	No Religion	Christian	Buddhist	Hindu	Muslim	Other
New Zealand-born						
Pacific	26.3	71.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	2.6
Asian	41.1	27.3	5.9	15.8	6.7	4.9
<i>Total</i>	<i>49.2</i>	<i>48.3</i>	<i>0.4</i>	<i>0.1</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>3.0</i>
Overseas-born						
Pacific	4.8	92.5	0.1	1.4	0.9	0.9
Asian	28.1	30.8	11.1	19.9	6.3	5.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>39.8</i>	<i>56.2</i>	<i>0.7</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>2.3</i>	<i>1.7</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand.

Countering population decline

New Zealand is likely to soon enter a period of population decline (Jackson, 2011, 2014), at least outside the major urban centres. This will entail changes in age structures and labour resources (Pool, Wong, & Vilquin, 2006). Short of an increase in local fertility (unlikely since this has remained stable for some decades now) or a rise in the upper end of workforce ages (again, unlikely to extend much beyond 80 years in the foreseeable future), New Zealand will be competing for people in an already very competitive global market. Once more, a comparison of the migration histories of Pacific and Asian settlers is instructive here.

The Pacific population is still a young population, with a median age of 22.1 years overall and, for the New Zealand-born component, just 14.6 years (Table 8). Because of the more recent history of substantial migration, the New Zealand-born component of the Asian population is younger, at just on 10 years. In the discussion that follows about birth numbers by birthplace, the relative median ages are important. Because of gendered migration, there is a difference between males and females. Even for the largest groups with longer periods of settlement, such as Samoan and Cook Island Māori, the females in childbearing ages are fewer than half of the total New Zealand-born female population within the group. It is also significant that more than half of the overseas-born component have completed their childbearing.

The Pacific population, with a large New Zealand-born majority, makes up 7.4 per cent of the population. The Asian population, with a minority New Zealand-born, now account for 11.8 per cent of the New Zealand population. However, each contributes around 16 per cent of all

births in New Zealand (Figure 6). Between 2000 and 2014, the proportion of births that were Asian babies more than doubled, from 8 to 18 per cent, whereas the proportion of births that were Pacific babies remained stable at around 15 per cent.


Table 8: Median ages, selected Pacific and Asian ethnicities, by birthplace, 2013

	NZ-born	OS-born	Total
Samoan	14.4	42.3	21.5
Cook Islands Māori	15.8	48.1	20.0
Tongan	11.7	40.3	19.4
Niuean	15.7	50.7	20.4
Tokelauan	14.5	48.2	19.2
Fijian	12.4	35.6	26.3
Kiribati	7.6	28.2	20.6
Nauruan	6.5	27.5	18.5
Papua New Guinean	11.7	27.8	22.1
Rotuman	11.8	39.9	26.6
Tahitian	17.5	36.7	21.8
Solomon Islander	10.0	29.8	22.9
Tuvaluan	8.9	35.5	19.2
ni-Vanuatu	9.5	32.1	27.8
Other Pacific nei	21.6	33.2	29.4
<i>Total Pacific</i>	<i>14.6</i>	<i>42.1</i>	<i>22.1</i>
Filipino	6.5	34.5	30.8
Cambodian	8.6	36.3	29.1
Vietnamese	9.7	32.5	27.1
Burmese	4.6	29.9	26.4
Indonesian	8.2	36.0	30.2
Malay	13.3	31.5	27.1
Thai	9.2	36.4	31.4
Chinese	12.3	37.0	31.3
Indian	9.5	34.3	30.1
Sri Lankan	7.9	37.5	33.3
Japanese	7.9	36.5	29.4
Korean	8.0	35.1	31.2
Afghani	4.7	27.1	22.1
Pakistani	5.6	31.6	25.8
Other Asian nei	8.8	34.4	29.3
<i>Total Asian</i>	<i>10.0</i>	<i>35.1</i>	<i>30.6</i>

Source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings*.

Note: nei = not elsewhere included.

Figure 6: Number of births by ethnicity of child, for total Asian and total Pacific, 1998–2014




Source: Statistics New Zealand, birth registrations.

The change of tempo in migration from the Pacific to New Zealand affects the proportion of mothers of Pacific ethnicities who are born in New Zealand. That the percentage is high is unsurprising given that the majority of the Pacific population in New Zealand is born in New Zealand. However, the effect of the change of tempo and age-sex structure of migration over the last 30 years is that, over the period 1998 to 2013 (Figure 7), there has been a steady rise for Niuean, Tokelauan and Cook Island Māori mothers from around 60 per cent to more than 80 per cent New Zealand-born.

Migrants from different parts of the Pacific are subject to different migration constraints and timing of inflows. Samoans and Tongans show a similar trend but at a lower proportion, rising from around 40 per cent for Samoans and 20 per cent for Tongans to more than 50 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively. Migration from Fiji, by contrast, increased later than from eastern Polynesia, with the majority arriving from the late 1980s. Ongoing migration from Fiji has contributed to the declining proportion of New Zealand-born among mothers of Fijian ethnicity over this period. There is a close connection between Fijian migration patterns and Fijian Indian migration patterns. The similarity of the Fijian and Indian patterns is striking.

Figure 7: Percentage of mothers born in New Zealand by selected Pacific ethnicities, 1998 to 2013 calendar years




Source: Statistics New Zealand, birth registrations.

The proportion of Asian mothers born in New Zealand, by contrast, is declining because the number of new migrants who are having babies in New Zealand is increasing, while those born in New Zealand are either moving towards the end of their childbearing, in the case of offspring of earlier migrants, or are children of relatively recent migrants and only just beginning to enter their childbearing years. Those in the prime childbearing years are more likely to have been born overseas and migrated as children or as young adults.

It might be expected that as the migration streams from Asia mature, the ratio of New Zealand-born to overseas-born mothers will also change in a way that will mirror the changes seen among women of Pacific ethnicities. This expectation is perhaps also reinforced by the contrast between the trend for Chinese and Indian mothers alongside the trend for mothers of South-East Asian ethnicities (Figure 8). The latter group have historical migration arrival timing similar to Pacific inflows. This group is dominated by migrants from Vietnam in the late 1970s and from Cambodia during the 1980s.

Figure 8: Percentage of mothers born in New Zealand by selected Asian ethnicities, 1998 to 2013 calendar years



Source: Statistics New Zealand, birth registrations.

One aspect that affects future population size is not only the number of children women have on average, but the ratio of women who become mothers to those who do not. Pacific women, on average, have more children than do Asian women. The 2013 Census included a question on children ever born and remains our only comprehensive source on number of children born live and on childlessness. These data include children born overseas and reflects historical childbearing as well as contemporary childbirth patterns, whereas birth registrations include only births occurring in New Zealand. While the census data shows that similar proportions of Asian and Pacific women were, at that time, childless (40.4 and 37.8 per cent, respectively), Pacific women who had at least one child had, on average, given birth to 3.2 children. Asian mothers who had at least one child, by contrast, had on average 2.1 children. To give some perspective to these figures, 31 per cent of New Zealand women were childless and mothers had had on average 2.6 children.

Section 5: Back to the Future

Two key elements that contribute to the maintenance and future development of cultural identity, and the way in which this contributes to the diversification of the host society, relate to the continuance of trilateral contact between the settlers, their local communities and their source countries. The first element is ongoing access between host and source country for further migration and return migration. The second element, which is critical for the establishment of roots and migrant retention, is family formation and family maintenance. This includes providing access for family reunification migration, international partnering and local partnering. These processes are within the orbit of migration policy.

The proportion of New Zealand-born among both Asian and Pacific communities indicates that the integration of migrant communities within the network of communities that make up the wider New Zealand society, at the same time as maintaining links internationally, has worked over recent decades, although, in many cases, the initial migration was under skilled migration provisions with family reunification and partnering a secondary consequence. Family migration ensures that the new migrant has existing support networks on arrival. For partnering, the sequence of arrival on visitor visas followed by extensions and then onshore approvals for permanent residence is designed to enable effective settlement.

What is often less well integrated is access to health and education services for new arrivals, and for people on the middle part of this path. One of the lost opportunities is for immediate and early upskilling. A constraint on physical and mental health services, unless the migrant's partner is a permanent resident or New Zealand citizen, is affordable access. For young adults, for example, this includes pregnancy services.

A central theme in migration literature is the retention of migrants (Lodigiani, Marchiori, & Shen, 2015), especially in the light of the social and fiscal costs to both the migrant and the economy of settlement and skill development. Migrants who can easily bring families with them and are then able to access the services needed to create new families have greater incentives to stay, and have more satisfactory outcomes in the longer term. It is acknowledged, however, that the boundary between people on temporary visas intending to stay, for whom the provision of free services would seem equitable, and others using New Zealand for 'medical

tourism', who should pay the full cost of care, is a blurred one that may be difficult to administer.

When we look more closely beyond migration policies to other policies that provide differential access to services, we find a set of policy fields that operate under an entirely different and often incompatible paradigm. A commonplace approach in some policy fields such as health and education distinguish people according to ethnicity, whereas many other social service policies are based on factors such as residence status and, for overseas-born, the length of residence in New Zealand. Analysis of, for example, Asian and Pacific educational or health outcomes contributes to the funding provided to health or education providers according to established needs on the basis of ethnicity of the target population. Much of this analysis focuses on the characteristics of people aggregated into groupings of ethnicities without regard to associated aspects of their lived realities that will materially affect their well-being, such as birthplace and, for overseas-born, migration histories.

This becomes more important when policies address concerns relevant at the time the policies were formulated, without regard to shifting patterns of demographic, social and economic change that affect the efficacy of the policy by the time it is implemented. Hence, it is important to remeasure the population and evaluate policy effectiveness.

Policy constraints and challenges

Over the last few decades there has been an emphasis on 'evidence-based' policy formulation (Gluckman, 2011; Head, 2009; Nutley, Davies, & Walter, 2003). This continues to be espoused, but the policymaking process itself remains fragmented, and essentially monocular and unidirectional.

Policy formulation is not context free. The selection of data collected is premised on the validity of consultations about what is understood to be going to be needed but is constrained by such mundane but important factors as budget and questionnaire size. There is always the tension between the desire for historical comparability and the demands of emerging or mutating topics of interest. Thus the set of data delivered as evidence is already a subset of the data that may be needed and each policy field selects from what is available. Policies also tend to interact with other sets of policies but largely only within one silo of interest. For example, health policies have a particular interest in the

control of disease transmission, health of the individuals, and delivery of health care efficiently and effectively within the budget and infrastructure available. Currently, a new direction in the health arena is emerging: a focus on wellness and the delivery of services that will prevent health problems and promote wellness rather than as a treatment service after the problems arise, especially in the public health area (Chuah, 2014). Policies of this type form part of the health policy field and at least in part grew out of the awareness that something was amiss with the previous pathways of health delivery. Similarly, the education policy field and the immigration policy field form largely independent webs of policies in their respective ambits.

The difficulty arises when these policy fields, operating as well structured but discrete processes, fail to converse with each other. Each field should ideally be using the same evidential base or at least a comparable alternative base. Each field draws conclusions and policies that appear to have clear objectives and logical outcomes. In many cases, the problem may indeed be not just the lack of evidence (Scobie, 2009) but the lack of awareness that this is so. If those objectives are not nuanced by the objectives of other intersecting policy fields, people may be affected adversely. The type of effect that may occur can be symbolised stereotypically by new immigrant surgeons driving taxis because the skills-based immigration policies had not sufficiently interconnected with health policies relating to registration issues. This is not saying that either policy was in itself wrong; it is simply saying that the policy fields failed to talk to each other and failed to provide one of a number of very simple modifications that would have prevented the creation of a very dissatisfied migrant with skills that New Zealand is in great need of; furthermore, there is the real risk that the migrant will use the taxi-driving job to improve language skills, which in turn will open the door for re-migration and registration in a third country that does allow partial registration or other mechanisms to retain the migrant. That third country then gains not only a highly valuable resource but potentially further skilled migrants through increased family migration opportunities.

As Trlin and Watts (2004) noted, there is a dislocation between immigration policy and the processes related to immigration settlement, which largely sit within other policy fields. The management of intersecting policy fields represents a major opportunity for improving the

well-being of both individuals and nation states if the policies could be better coordinated. The silo approach to policy has been shown to have failed in many situations, especially with respect to the demography of the Pacific and Asian populations in New Zealand, hence the focus here on people of ethnicities that are grouped, respectively, as Pacific and Asian, and based primarily on data from the recent 2013 Census data.

Similarly, it is important not to treat the present in isolation of either the past or emerging futures, or quantitative data in isolation of qualitative data. Nor should we overlook the continuing international exchange of people. The flows are in several directions, both between multiple countries and along internal migration pathways within countries, so that the geographies of diaspora are mutating and this has important international implications well beyond geographical polities.

Conclusion

As has been shown in this paper, not only are the Pacific and Asian populations in New Zealand diverse, they are following paths that have both similarities and differences. The same, of course, is true of people of other ethnicities, but one of the features shared by both the Pacific and Asian groupings is that for those born overseas, and increasingly those born in New Zealand, their networks and daily lives are global. Many of these 'multi-local' people live and work in more than one country (Bedford, Ho, & Lidgard, 2001; Ho, 2010), contributing in material ways to each country. This has been facilitated by the greater ease of travel and is adding a new layer of complexity to remittance-based processes (Bertram & Watters, 1986). The geographies underlying these two models intersect, but wealth flows and skill exchanges are changing because the flows are neither symmetrical nor equal.

A relevant theme not explored in this paper, but one that is emerging in importance, especially in the Pacific context, are the benefits of bilateral development (Gibson & McKenzie, 2009). There is a reciprocal responsibility in ensuring that the well-being of the source countries is not compromised in the migration process. Plundering countries for the best and brightest has already been noted as a strategy that is detrimental to source countries (Hagopian, et al., 2004; Mills et al., 2011) although the emphasis is usually on the brain drain and emigration of locally trained

rather than those who migrate for training and do not return. Less is said about other important aspects such as local skills shortages that arise and continue independent of migration processes (Connell, 2011).

This affects Pacific countries more than most Asian countries primarily because the facilities for local training within the Pacific are under-resourced or non-existent. Mechanisms to ensure fair sharing of skills across areas such as the Pacific are urgently needed. Particularly relevant in this context are the examples of initiatives such as the Recognised Seasonal Employment (RSE) Work Policy which enables temporary labour migration to benefit both receiving and sending countries (C. Bedford, 2013; C. Bedford, R. Bedford & Ho, 2010; Spoonley & Bedford, 2008). The success of this policy suggests that an extension to include other countries around the Pacific, including countries in the western Pacific, and across both archipelago and mainland South-East Asia, would benefit the wider Asia-Pacific region, especially in the case of less-developed countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. An extension to include a wider range of industries together with additional specialist educational development programmes might also prove useful.

Why is it urgent to find a method of developing integrated policy systems? The parochial nature of many policy fields is unavoidable for both practical and political reasons, but other fields are emerging that will require holistic inter-agency and international solutions, such as climate change and refugee resettlement. A poignant but relevant context of this paper is that it was drafted against a counterpoint of reports of severe flooding and earthquakes in the Solomon Islands, an area so thoroughly embedded in much of the early work of Richard Bedford (Bedford, 1971, 1973; Bedford & Shlomowitz, 1988) and increasingly in his recent work (Craig et al., 2014). Also current was the news of the displacement of the entire population of the Carteret Islanders and encroachments in coastal Bangladesh and Chennai as a result of global climate change. An ongoing concern about the effects of sea-level rise with implications for New Zealand is a major political issue in Kiribati and Tuvalu, countries central to much of the Pacific work of Richard Bedford (Bedford, McDonald & Munro, 1980; C. Bedford, R. Bedford & Ho, 2010; R. Bedford & C. Bedford, 2010).

This merely serves to underline how centrally linked the Pacific and New Zealand are. The growing geo-political importance of the Pacific

basin to Asia and of Asia within the Pacific basin suggests that both region-wide and inter-regional understandings are required. If we consider trans-Tasman flows as a discrete element within the Asia-Pacific migration system, there is a case to integrate policy discussions at least at an Australasian level relevant to the growing Pacific and Asian populations in Australia. A significant proportion of these populations are New Zealand citizens with close family in both New Zealand and other parts of the Pacific. Perhaps this may entail revisiting the historical relationship between federal Australia and Pacific nation states (Scobie, 2009) in connection with regional responsibility and a new bilateral and equitable respect on the part of former colonial entities for sovereignty and freedom of movement throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

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Circular Migration, Remittances and Inequality in Vanuatu

JOHN GIBSON *

Abstract

Many migration arrangements can be described as circular, repeat, seasonal or temporary, and these typically interact with other settlement-based migration opportunities. The impact of circular migration on participants is difficult to ascertain since it involves both a temporary source of new income and a temporary change in household composition and the location of household economic activities (the household becomes a transnational unit with members in two or more countries). The overall impact on the source country is even more difficult to determine because of the complex way that circular migration may interact with settlement migration. The recent opportunity for circular migration from Vanuatu under the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Work Policy provides an opportunity to better understand these issues, since this scheme was introduced into a setting with very few settlement migration opportunities. This paper describes the effect of RSE participation, and the resulting increase in remitted and repatriated earnings on inter-household inequality in Vanuatu.

Professor Richard Bedford has been closely associated with the study of migration in Melanesia for more than four decades, starting with his PhD thesis, *Mobility in transition: an analysis of population movement in the New Hebrides* (Bedford, 1971). His research has included a particular emphasis on circular migration, including among New Hebrideans (now referred to as ni-Vanuatu), as noted in a study from 1974:

A strategy of maximum participation in a range of economic activities consistent with minimum risk goes far to explain the existence of circular migration. Islanders have a number of alternative avenues open for deriving a livelihood – subsistence gardening, cash cropping, wage employment, entrepreneurial activities, and sundry forms of investment. Instead of concentrating their time and labour on one or other of these

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activities, most Islanders participate in a range of them. Circular migration facilitates this (Bedford, 1974, p. 146)

This notion that individuals and households participate in a portfolio of activities, balancing the risks and returns, predated the 'new economics of labour migration' approach of Stark and Bloom (1985) by more than a decade. A key insight of this literature is that labour mobility serves to mitigate the impact that lack of insurance options and other market imperfections have on 'sending' households. Such imperfections are features of the Melanesian countries, where generally low population density, difficult topography, lack of economic specialisation, and considerable cultural and linguistic diversity has historically dampened the development of a wide range of markets. It is therefore of interest to examine the effects of adding a new option to the portfolio of activities in which households might choose to participate. In this paper I examine some effects on inter-household inequality in Vanuatu of a new mobility opportunity that has enabled a subsequent increase in remitted and repatriated earnings.

In the era that Richard Bedford (1974) described, options for the circular migration of Melanesians to also include international mobility by working in high-wage labour markets in Australia, New Zealand or the United States were severely limited. But more recent opportunities, under New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Work Policy and Australia's Seasonal Worker Program scheme,¹ have reduced the long-standing imbalance of Polynesians having more international mobility options than Melanesians. Indeed, Vanuatu has become the largest supplier of seasonal labour to New Zealand under the RSE scheme (Gibson & McKenzie, 2014a). Vanuatu provides a good opportunity to better understand the impacts of adding an option to the portfolio of household activities, since these circular migration schemes were introduced into a setting with very few settlement migration opportunities and only a very small existing diaspora. In contrast, it would be more difficult to examine the effects in countries with long-established settlement migration options such as Samoa and Tonga, because of the potentially complex ways that circular migration may interact with settlement migration through both family reunification channels and concessional schemes.

Coinciding with these migration developments in the Pacific, there have been renewed calls, globally, for opening up low-skill migration

channels through circular or seasonal migration programmes (Pritchett, 2006). For example, this was a prominent theme of the 2009 *Human Development Report* of the United Nations Development Program “Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development” (UNDP, 2009). Seasonal worker programmes have historically been one of the few opportunities for low-skilled workers from poor countries to benefit from higher incomes that can be earned abroad, and are often seen as a more politically feasible way of doing this than through permanent migration (Luthria, 2008). Indeed, it has been claimed that circular migration programmes can deliver a ‘triple win’ – for migrants, their sending countries and the host country – (Ramasamy et al., 2008), although there is debate about whether this is possible (see, for example, Wickramasekara, 2011).

Corresponding to this renewed interest in circular migration, a number of studies describe various circular migration programmes and processes. Recent reviews of this literature include Constant, Nottmeyer, and Zimmermann (2012), who discuss the advantages and disadvantages of circular migration and describe some characteristics of circular migrants. Reviews with a particular focus on Asia and the Pacific are provided by Hugo (2009) and Gibson, McKenzie, and Rohorua (2014). While many migration arrangements can be described as circular, repeat, seasonal or temporary, the description by Skeldon (2012) of circular migration as “a regular and repetitive series of outward and return movements between an origin and a destination” (p. 47) is sufficient for our current purposes. Specific details on the RSE scheme are provided by Gibson and McKenzie (2014a), while C. Bedford (2013) provides a comprehensive review of existing evidence on the multiple effects of the RSE scheme on employers, workers and their home communities.

In the next section of this paper the relevant literature is briefly summarised before the empirical evidence is introduced in Section 3. This evidence relies upon a subset of the data used by Gibson and McKenzie (2014b) to examine development impacts of the RSE in Tonga and Vanuatu. Interested readers can refer to that paper to find full details on the survey data that are used here. These data provide information on patterns of inequality, and can be used to contrast RSE earnings (whether remitted or repatriated) with other remittances, wage income, agricultural income, and the value of subsistence production that is consumed. These

other non-remittance income sources are roughly the same as those that were listed by Bedford (1974) 40 years ago when describing the portfolio of activities available to households in Vanuatu.

Literature Review

The effects of migration on the level of welfare in source communities are, a priori, unclear, and the distribution of any benefits is even less clear. Migrant-sending households and their communities can benefit from remitted and repatriated earnings, but the local incomes and other household inputs that migrants would have generated locally are lost. It is therefore an empirical matter as to whether the opportunity costs are outweighed by the new income from abroad. Given the enormous wage gains possible from moving to a high-wage labour market such as Australia or New Zealand, it would be expected that for the household as a whole (including the migrant), these opportunity costs should be less than the gain. But if the duration of migration is short and there are high transactions costs required in order to access the high-wage labour market, then there is the possibility of little or no net gain. Moreover, how these gains are distributed depends on the types of households selected into migration and the variation in the opportunity costs and transactions costs that they face (Gibson, McKenzie, & Rohorua, 2014).

The impacts of circular migration are particularly complex to measure, since circularity involves both a temporary source of new income and a temporary change in household composition and the location of household economic activities (the household becomes a transnational unit with members in two countries). There are large literatures on the effects of temporary income shocks on households and also on the effects of changes in household composition on well-being. But the joint effects of these two changes, as occurs with the temporary migration of a household member to an overseas labour market, and then the undoing of these changes upon the worker's return, is rarely studied (Clemens and Tiongson, 2012).

The level and distribution of benefits from circular migration depends on which households are selected to supply workers. For New Zealand's RSE programme, which recruits workers from multiple countries, the existing literature finds that workers from Tonga were

drawn from the poorer parts of the income distribution, so any positive household-level impacts were predicted to be 'pro-poor' (Gibson, McKenzie, & Rohorua, 2008). In contrast, RSE workers from Vanuatu were from richer-than-average households (McKenzie, Martinez, & Winters, 2008). This difference in selectivity may have reflected greater familiarity with international migration in Tonga whereas in Vanuatu households lacked information about the programme in the first year (Gibson, Rohorua, McKenzie, & Stillman, 2010) and the poorest likely also lacked resources to finance the costs of the travel process.² Moreover, average levels of education are considerably higher in Tonga, so if employers looked for similarly educated workers from both countries (for example, if they needed certain levels of basic English competency), such workers are found higher up the skills and income distribution in Vanuatu than in Tonga.

This existing literature on whether effects of the RSE were likely to be pro-poor or not is based on surveys that were carried out in countries supplying RSE workers within the first year of the programme being established. It is possible that over the longer term there may be some change in the income groups that are especially likely to benefit from this circular migration opportunity and in the effect on inequality of the earnings from circular migration. One may expect that, as time progresses, the relationship between remittances and inequality displays an inverted U-shaped curve (Stark, Taylor, & Yitzhaki, 1986), increasing at first as more-wealthy households supply migrants, but eventually declining as poorer households are able to overcome financing constraints so that they, too, can add circular migration to their portfolio of economic activities. For example, in Mexico remittances have tended to have a more equalising effect over time as the prevalence of international migration increases (Taylor et al., 2005), which is consistent with this diffusion pattern.

In addition to possible heterogeneity in remittance effects over time, another theme in the existing literature is that the apparent effects on inequality of earnings from migration depend on modelling assumptions. In particular, results may vary if remittance income is treated as an exogenous transfer leaving other sources of household income unchanged (e.g. Stark, Taylor, & Yitzhaki, 1986) compared with modelling the counterfactual income of the household in the (unseen) situation where the migrant(s) would have stayed at home (Barham & Boucher, 1998). The typical approach for studies of the effects of remittance income on

inequality in the Pacific has been to treat remittances as an exogenous source of income (Brown & Ahlburg, 1999). In other regions of the world, modelling approaches have been used to construct a counterfactual, which typically depend on finding some variable that influences the likelihood of migration but does not influence incomes or inequality, except via the induced effect on migration. In the absence of explicit randomisation, such as would emerge from a visa lottery (e.g. the Pacific Access Category and the Samoan Quota) the plausibility of such identifying variables is often debateable (McKenzie, 2012).

Therefore, in the current study a simpler approach is used, that includes describing patterns of inter-household inequality associated with different income sources, and patterns of inequality for groups of households that either engage in or do not engage in circular migration. One limitation of the analysis, based on the nature of the data available, is that no intra-household analysis is possible. Notwithstanding an inability to analyse this type of effect, it is very likely that opening up circular migration opportunities that are predominantly taken up by males will alter the outcomes of household processes that result from gender bargaining. It would require a more qualitative analysis to fully understand these effects which would be expected to be quite strong in Melanesia due to the gendered nature of much household production.

Empirical Analysis

The data used here come from a survey that was used to evaluate the impacts of the RSE on households in Tonga and Vanuatu (Gibson & McKenzie, 2014b).³ This entailed a baseline survey of approximately 450 households in each country, made up of households that had members who were (or who wanted to be) participating in the RSE, along with non-participating households. These groups of households from the baseline survey were then tracked over time (albeit with some attrition). In Tonga the surveys had near national coverage, including Tongatapu, Vava'u and 'Eua (these three islands provided 92 per cent of Tongan RSE workers in the first year of the scheme). Vanuatu's rugged geography and high transportation costs made it infeasible to survey in too many islands, so the evaluation survey was limited to three islands from which it was believed there was a high chance of workers coming (based in part on the islands where workers in a pilot project in Central Otago had come from).

These were Efate (population 50,000), containing the capital city, Port Vila, Ambrym (population 10,000) and Tanna (population 20,000). Three rounds of follow-up surveys were conducted after the baseline survey. The first follow-up took place between April and July 2008, approximately six months after the baseline survey. This was intended to be a time when RSE workers were still in the midst of their seven-month stint abroad, but in practice many contracts were for shorter than seven months and one-fifth of ni-Vanuatu RSE workers in the sample had returned by the time of this survey.⁴ The second follow-up survey took place between October 2008 and February 2009, approximately one year after the baseline, while the final follow-up survey (and the fourth survey, overall) took place between October 2009 and March 2010, two years after baseline. It is the data from this fourth survey that are used here, since these data give the opportunity to examine the effects of circular migration on inequality after the scheme has been operating for some time.

The survey measured seven components of household incomes: wage earnings (based on individual reports for the previous week); net remittances of both money and goods from RSE workers (based on household reports on the previous six months and also taking account of any outbound remittance flows from households in Vanuatu to RSE workers); net remittances from other sources, which is divided into international and domestic origin; the lump sum of repatriated earnings from returned RSE workers (based on a report by the returned worker); net returns from sales of crops, livestock, fish, forestry products and other primary sector earnings (based on household reports on an average month); the value of own-produced or own-captured food consumed by the household (based on household reports for the previous week); and other income from investments, pensions, rentals, etc. (based on household reports for the previous fortnight). Some of these income sources are either a lump sum or may come in only part of the year (e.g. repatriated earnings from returning RSE workers) so when total household income is calculated I do not annualise the components since that may wrongly imply a more continuous, and higher, income from some of these one-off sources. Instead values are reported on a semi-annual basis, which corresponds to the period for which RSE related income might accrue, given that there is a seven-month restriction on time spent in New Zealand under the RSE work visa.

A summary of the value of net remittances from RSE workers (whether they are family members or not) and the repatriated net earnings upon the return home of these workers is given in Table 1. On average, across the whole sample, the net returns from circular migration are 50,000 vatu (approximately NZ\$600) per household. However, these returns accrue to just over one-fifth of the households, so conditional on receiving any returns the mean is much higher, at 230,600 vatu (almost NZ\$2900).

Table 1: Income components from circular migration under the RSE scheme

	Net RSE remittances	Repatriated net earnings	Total
Unconditional mean (vatu)	5,200	45,200	50,400
% of households receiving	15.0%	13.2%	21.8%
Conditional on receiving:			
25th percentile (vatu)	15,500	190,000	23,000
Median (vatu)	25,500	350,000	100,000
75th percentile (vatu)	41,800	500,000	408,500
Mean (vatu)	34,600	341,800	230,600

Notes: 1. The values are for the 12 months prior to the round 4 survey, which took place in late 2009 and early 2010.

2. At the time of the survey, 100 vatu = NZ\$1.24.

3. $n = 348$.

The net returns from the RSE scheme are quite unevenly distributed for the households who receive some RSE income, with the median being 100,000 vatu, while the mean is more than twice as high. In part, this pattern reflects the fact that some households benefit a little from the RSE scheme by receiving remittances, even though they do not supply workers (e.g. a worker may remit money to their parent, brother or cousin who lives in a different household and this incoming remittance is captured by the survey). Perhaps a truer reflection of the inequality in returns to RSE participation comes from looking just at the repatriated net earnings, which is the dominant channel for the New Zealand incomes of RSE workers to reach Vanuatu because of the high cost of sending remittances and the limited financial infrastructure outside of Port Vila. While the mean and median of repatriated net earnings, conditional on receiving any, are just over NZ\$4000 (about 350,000 vatu) the inter-quartile range is just as high as the mean, with the 25th percentile of

repatriated earnings being 190,000 vatu while the 75th percentile is 500,000 vatu.

The net earnings from circular migration are unequally distributed amongst households, as Table 1 makes clear. So too, however, are many other forms of income included in the portfolio of activities that households in Vanuatu may engage in. Hence, what matters to the present study is how much incomes from circular migration add to inequality compared with what other income sources add (and also compared with each source's overall importance in contributing to total household incomes). To examine this question, a decomposition technique developed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) is used, which shows the contribution of each income source to inequality in total incomes. In this decomposition, each source's contribution to the Gini coefficient for total income is the product of its own inequality (G), its share of total income (S), and its correlation with the rank of total income (R).⁵ These calculations are carried out for the semi-annual income of households in the Vanuatu sample, with the effects of net RSE income (which captures both what is received by the household as remittances and what is repatriated by the worker on their return from New Zealand) compared with other net remittances from overseas sources and from domestic sources, wage and salary income, entrepreneurial business income (which includes sales of agricultural, fishing and forestry products), and the non-market income that accrues to households who consume their subsistence production.

The most important source of income, in the aggregate, for households in the sample is wages and salaries, followed by subsistence income and entrepreneurial income from businesses and agricultural sales (see the column marked 'S' in Table 2). It is important to emphasise that this is a 'plutocratic' calculation, in the sense that these are shares of the aggregate household income, where households with higher incomes have more weight in determining the estimates (that is, it is a 'one vote per vatu' calculation rather than 'one vote per person'). One can also calculate 'democratic' shares, which look at the shares that each component has in the income of each household, with the average then calculated across households who are each given the same weight. The ranking of income components under democratic shares would be subsistence (52 per cent), wages (24 per cent), and entrepreneurial income (18 per cent). The switch in the share of wage income compared with subsistence income reflects the

fact that wage income is important to richer households while subsistence income is important to poorer households, and the shares in Table 2 give more weight to the rich, since the rich households account for the majority of aggregate income. Interestingly, the net incomes from RSE are six per cent, whether a democratic or plutocratic average share is calculated.

Table 2: Decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income source

Source	Share of total income (S)	Gini coefficient by source (G)	Correla- tion with rank of total income (R)	Share of income inequality (I)	Relative income inequality (I/S)
Net RSE income (remitted or repatriated)	0.059	0.910	0.595	0.056	0.951
Other net remittances (international)	0.001	0.990	0.557	0.001	0.857
Domestic net remittances (non-RSE)	0.002	0.753	-0.005	0.000	-0.063
Wage and salary income	0.539	0.833	0.948	0.748	1.387
Business income (incl. agricultural sales)	0.148	0.809	0.555	0.116	0.788
Subsistence income	0.252	0.379	0.471	0.079	0.314
Sum		0.569		1.000	

The second column of Table 2 (Gini coefficient by source) shows how unequally distributed a particular type of income is. The highest inequality is for income sources that very few households receive (such as net remittances from overseas non-RSE sources). The most equally distributed income component is subsistence income, because almost every household has some of this and also because this income component is the most important to the poor. This importance to the poor is shown by the lowest correlation with the rank of total income (column R) being for subsistence income, while wage income has the highest correlation. The remittances and repatriated earnings from circular migration are similar to business income and other international remittance income, in terms of a moderate correlation with the rank of total income. The only income component that would tend to be inequality reducing, by having a negative correlation with the rank of total income, is domestic remittances but in aggregate these are unimportant because they involve redistribution amongst the household sector so many of the transfers cancel out.

The product of the income share for a particular income component, the Gini index for that component and its correlation with the rank of total income is shown in column I, headed 'share of income inequality'. The sum of each of these products adds up to the overall Gini index for total household income, of 0.569, but to make it convenient to interpret the results in column I, these are rescaled to sum to 1.0 and are interpreted as shares of total inequality. The largest contributor to overall income inequality is wage and salary income, followed by business income, subsistence income and then net income from the RSE circular migration.

An income component can make a large contribution to inequality either because it is unequally distributed or because it makes a large contribution to total income. So in the final column, the ratio of the share of income inequality to the share of total income (I/S) is reported for each income component. This measure of relative inequality shows that wage income is the only component that makes a larger contribution to inequality than it makes to average incomes (by almost 40 per cent). For every other income component, including net income from RSE circular migration, the contribution to inequality is lower than the contribution to the total level of household income. In other words, adding circular migration to the portfolio of activities available to households in Vanuatu does increase total inequality, but it raises the total level of household income by (slightly) more.

Another way to examine effects of circular migration on inequality is to compare households that had ever participated in the RSE by the time of the survey (that is, within the first three years of the programme) with non-participant households. By the time of the final wave of the survey there were 108 of the participant households remaining in the sample and 240 non-participants. The results of this comparison are reported in Table 3, for per capita income and per capita consumption. The consumption variable uses the household's report on spending in the last month, three months and six months (with recall length depending on the type of good or service being recalled), and also the value of subsistence production that is consumed.

It is apparent that there are no statistically significant differences in inequality between the two groups of households. While the Gini coefficients for both income and consumption are slightly higher for the households ever participating in the RSE, the overlap of the 95%

confidence intervals is such that the differences are not statistically significant. Thus, there is no evidence here that amongst the RSE participants there is any greater level of inequality than there is amongst all households. The introduction of a new activity into the household portfolio – circular migration to New Zealand orchards and vineyards – does not seem to be associated with higher inequality amongst the participating households. It is also apparent that income is much more unevenly distributed than is consumption for these households.

Table 3: Gini coefficient measures of inequality by household's ever-RSE status

	Per capita income	Per capita consumption
Non-RSE households	0.542 [0.507 – 0.565]	0.380 [0.346 – 0.412]
RSE households	0.559 [0.524 – 0.618]	0.405 [0.355 – 0.452]
All households	0.551 [0.524 – 0.575]	0.391 [0.363 – 0.419]

Notes: 1. The values in [] are the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals, based on 100 repetitions.

2. $n = 108$ for RSE households and $n = 240$ for non-RSE households.

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper has examined the introduction of a new economic activity into the portfolio of opportunities available to households in Vanuatu. Four decades ago, Bedford (1974) noted that a household-level strategy of maximum participation in a range of activities consistent with minimum risk could explain the existence of circular migration in the then New Hebrides (present-day Vanuatu). At that stage in history, the circularity did not involve international destinations but recent developments in Australia and New Zealand have opened the way for some Melanesian households to add another activity to their household portfolio, which is temporary but repeated access to high-wage labour markets.

The analysis reported here shows that this new activity has added to the average incomes available to households without being associated with any notable rise in inequality. Indeed, if the effects on inequality from seasonal work in New Zealand are compared with the effects from wage labour in Vanuatu, for a given share of income there is less inequality

coming from the returns of international circular migration. As such, this new opportunity should be seen as a largely positive development, which expands the income possibilities for Melanesian households without bringing about any undue increase in risk.

The current results focus at the household level and just consider inequality, but a broader evaluation of the development impacts of the RSE in Vanuatu (and also in Tonga) is also largely positive (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014b). In addition to households benefitting from RSE earnings, returning workers also made community contributions that typically averaged about NZ\$150 for things such as scholarship funds, community halls and water supply. In Tonga there were some concerns about withdrawal of labour from the community having an effect on church and community projects but this was less apparent in Vanuatu. More broadly, this less-binding labour supply constraint may reflect the fact that Melanesian villagers have not had the settlement migration opportunities that are available to Polynesians, and also have a more youthful and faster growing population. As such, the addition of international circular migration to the portfolio of available activities for Melanesian households may provide an especially valuable option for the future.

Notes

- 1 The New Zealand Recognised Seasonal Employers Work Policy was designed in 2007 for the purpose of helping with seasonal labour shortages in the horticulture and viticulture industries. The RSE category has up to 8000 places available to overseas workers per year (year ending 30 June).
- 2 The RSE scheme involves employers covering half the cost of the international airfare and a guaranteed minimum remuneration, so workers can expect to be able to recoup the costs of travel. But for workers without access to start-up funds, the costs of visas and other clearances, internal travel and their share of the international airfare still pose a substantial barrier to participation. Loan schemes were eventually introduced in some of the countries supplying RSE labour to help overcome this barrier.
- 3 The survey data for Tonga are used to examine inequality effects by Mason-Mackay (2014).
- 4 An analysis of the effects of the RSE on households at this stage is

reported by Rohorua, Gibson, McKenzie, and Martinez (2009).

- 5 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality which ranges from 0 (perfect equality where all have the same income) to 1 (complete inequality where one person has all the income and everyone else has none).

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A Political Economy of Labour Migration of New Zealand

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Abstract

This paper offers a relatively orthodox review of New Zealand immigration history in terms of recent phases: from a colonial/settler approach, through to recruitment from the Pacific to meet Fordist labour requirements and on to the most recent phase with its focus on ‘economic migrants’. What is intriguing through New Zealand’s recent history is the development of a ‘soft’ approach to immigration status and citizenship that accompanies a relatively narrow focus on the selection of economic migrants. This reflects neo-liberal imperatives, which also have an influence on the ‘light touch’ approach to settlement support post arrival. Poor labour market outcomes among immigrants often compromise the benefits that should accrue from such a highly selective approach to immigrant recruitment. In addition, the settlement of immigrants is further complicated by the distinctive cultural politics of New Zealand.

Introduction

Where the process of capital accumulation is obstructed by a shortage of labour power within the nation state, the state is faced with the possibility of permitting or organising the recruitment of labour from outside the nation state in order to effect its central role as the guarantor of the conditions for the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. (Miles, 1989, p. 117)

Bob Miles’s description above introduced a conceptual approach to migration – namely, the political economy of labour migration, that stressed the imperatives of both local capitalism (labour requirements and an insertion of that labour into the mode of production) and the increasing importance of the international circulation of labour power. This approach has been tested on New Zealand (Miles & Spoonley, 1985; Spoonley, 2004) although the focus on the mid-20th century

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recruitment of semi- and unskilled labour to supply Fordist production requirements in a capitalist core reflected a particular phase of economic development in Western economies. The dominance of Fordist production in these economies has significantly declined since the mid-20th century, while new geo-political imperatives have influenced the location and nature of production. As a consequence, migrant flows have changed, as well as the consequent politics of representation and acceptance. The neo-Marxism of the 1980s appears a less compelling explanatory framework although the need to ensure labour supply and the ongoing role of the state in ensuring that supply continues. The contemporary focus in New Zealand is on skilled labour recruitment to meet the needs of an economy and labour market that is dominated by service employment and commodity exports, and which is now internationalised (ownership, labour supply and capital/people mobility) in a way that is quite different to the pre-1980s.

This paper summarises the major changes to immigration policy and flows as a reaction to a range of internal and external geo-political changes, including a reorientation away from Europe towards Asia by successive New Zealand governments, an opening up of immigration selection so that new source countries are reflected in flow numbers, and an emphasis on the economic benefits of immigrants and immigration.

From a 'Racial' to an 'Economic' Focused Immigration System

The periodisation of immigration, the role of the state, and the exigencies of capitalism in New Zealand share similarities with other settler societies – notably Canada and Australia – yet there are also differences. One key difference between New Zealand and the other two was the degree of migrant homogeneity (Pool, 2010) during the period of settler colonisation (1840–1950s). At that time, there was a demand for migrants to help construct a racially defined nation state and capitalism based on primary production.

This pattern of British (typically English) immigration was destabilised by economic imperatives, specifically in relation to the demands of a growing Fordism in the post-war period of urban industrial expansion and the need for semi- and unskilled labour. The 1950s in New Zealand saw the recruitment of semi-skilled and unskilled workers from the Polynesian Pacific (Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau)

and from Fiji. This diversification of migrant flows, and the subsequent 'racialisation' of certain migrant workers in the 1970s (i.e. a preference for some while others are defined as problematic) paralleled the trajectory and characteristics of other industrial countries. The political economy of labour migration (Miles, 1989) focused attention on the labour demands of Fordist production of the period, on the allocation of migrant workers to particular (proletarian) positions in capitalist relations of production, and the problematisation (racialisation) of migrants.

If the first stage of destabilising a colonial model of racialised immigration occurred as a result of a mid-20th century political economy of labour migration, the next stage was driven by the imperatives of a globally orientated neo-liberalism. The internationalisation of labour took a different turn in the late 1980s as the New Zealand Labour Government introduced a very different regime of immigrant recruitment and selection in a radical departure from the previous policy (although in practice, it had been changing for some time). Capitalist production was increasingly focused on service functions and employment as Fordist production migrated to low-cost centres in the non-developed or developing world. Migrant labour recruitment for some countries, including New Zealand, shifted to focus on skilled labour and those with mobile capital.

The state played a key role in managing this shift. After removing a deliberate source-country preference in 1986, New Zealand adopted the points system of Canada and Australia in 1990. This system of attracting and approving permanent residents was further refined after 2000 by other policy changes, including a more deliberate focus on 'economic migrants' (meeting very specific labour market skill demand), a growing reliance on temporary workers to fill both short-term labour demand (flexible labour supply or just-in-time migrants) and as a pool of immigrants who could be selected as permanent residents, and the continuance of a soft regime of immigrant incorporation (e.g. few expectations that immigrants should become citizens).

Through the 1990s, immigration flows diversified in terms of the origin of immigrants but also in relation to migrant ethnic composition. This diversification increased significantly after 2000. By the 2013 Census, a quarter of New Zealand residents had been born in another country, while the proportion for Auckland, as the gateway city, was almost 40 per cent. This has resulted in high levels of 'superdiversity'. New Zealand has

significantly altered the management and focus of immigration selection and settlement schemes (see Spoonley & Bedford, 2012), primarily to align immigrant (labour) supply to specific industry and firm demand.

From Colonial Homogeneity to Contemporary Diversity, From Recruiting Settlers to Recruiting Labour

This section provides an overview of the major periods of immigration policy and politics, beginning with a colonial approach that embodied ambitions for a racialised nation in the South Pacific, through a phase when New Zealand – through immigration flows – established stronger connections to other parts of the Pacific, and on to contemporary immigration which is driven by explicit economic goals.

(a) Settler colonisation and racialisation (1840–1950s)

For most of New Zealand’s colonial history (1840 to the mid-20th century), immigration recruitment was focused primarily on migrants from Britain and Ireland, as local administrators and politicians sought to recreate a “Britain in the south seas” (Belich, 2001).

The colonisation of New Zealand involved two elements: the first was to “convert or conquer the indigenous Māori”, while secondly, the New Zealand administrators “sought to reproduce their own [British] culture” (Belich, 2001, p. 6). The result was a racialised immigration framework that had emerged by the 1880s and which lasted through to the mid-20th century, that targeted a small number of preferred source countries and sought to exclude (or limit) others, especially non-Europeans (see Table 1). Therefore, British and Irish immigrants, many of whom moved to Australia and then on to New Zealand, dominate for most of this period.

The immigrants who arrived in New Zealand were homogenous in origin, ethnicity and religion, as well as occupation (Phillips & Hearn, 2008; Pool, 2010). This homogeneity was reinforced by several factors: the nature of settler recruitment, what happened post-arrival through marriage, the adoption (or maintenance) of certain customs, a standardised education system, internal mobility, and a shared pro-British jingoism (Pool, 2010, p. 156). This homogeneity was different in degree and emphasis to similar settler societies, such as Canada and Australia, and

was reinforced by the exclusionary measures taken against those who were deemed a 'racial threat' (Spoonley & Bedford, 2012).

Table 1: Birthplaces of New Zealand's overseas-born population, 1886–1966 (%)

Birthplace	Census Year			
	1886	1906	1945	1966
<u>Europe/Nth America</u>				
UK and Ireland	84.2	74.0	72.3	61.0
Other Europe	4.8	5.2	5.8	10.4
North America	1.1	1.3	1.5	2.7
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>90.0</i>	<i>80.4</i>	<i>79.7</i>	<i>74.1</i>
<u>Oceania</u>				
Australia	6.2	16.8	13.5	10.6
Pacific Islands	0.0	0.2	2.0	7.4
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>6.2</i>	<i>16.9</i>	<i>15.5</i>	<i>18.0</i>
<u>Asia</u>				
China ¹	1.6	0.9	1.2	1.1
India	0.2	0.4	0.8	1.3
Other Asia	0.2	0.1	1.1	2.0
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>2.1</i>	<i>1.4</i>	<i>3.1</i>	<i>4.5</i>
<u>Other birthplaces</u>				
South Africa	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.8
Other Africa	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.4
Middle East	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2
Latin Am/Caribbean	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.5
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>0.6</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>1.9</i>
nec ²	1.2	0.6	0.6	1.6
Total overseas-born	277,806	282,331	266,510	418,462
New Zealand-born	300,190	606,247	1,672,962	2,444,169
% overseas-born	48.1	31.8	13.7	14.6
All birthplaces	577,996	888,578	1,939,472	2,862,631

Data source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings* (various years). This table, and others in this article, are reproduced here with the permission of Richard Bedford.

Notes: ¹ People's Republic of China and Hong Kong (not including Taiwan).

² Not elsewhere classified.

The racialisation of immigrants in this period of settler colonialism has been well rehearsed (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999). The largest non-European group to arrive from the 1860s, the Chinese, were the target of

extensive measures by the state to either exclude them altogether or to restrict the numbers entering New Zealand. Moreover, once they were in New Zealand, they were subject to discriminatory legislation and policy and were not eligible for welfare provisions or citizenship until the first Labour Government in terms of the first (welfare) and the 1950s in the second (citizenship) (Spoonley & Bedford 2012).

(b) Recruiting and racialising Pacific labour (1950s–1980s)

As migration recruitment changed in the late 20th century, two further phases of labour recruitment and the subsequent racialisation of immigrants occurred. The first significant contemporary non-British flows involved the labour migration of immigrants from the Polynesian Pacific (other than New Zealand) from the late 1950s. These flows produced a period of intense public racism and discrimination during the 1970s. The changes to immigration policy in 1986/87 as part of a neo-liberal project to internationalise ownership and production of New Zealand led to further non-European migration, largely (but not exclusively) from Asian countries. Again, these flows produced a second ‘moral panic’ although the period of intense racism during the mid-1990s was now aimed at Asian immigrants (Spoonley & Bedford, 2012, pp. 110–113).

The disassembling of a colonial immigration framework involved more than a new focus on source regions in order to meet labour demand. Between a short-lived recession in 1967 and an immigration policy review in 1986, there was considerable ambivalence in New Zealand, especially by politicians and agencies of the state, about the levels of immigration and emigration, as well as the composition of immigrant flows. The decision by the British Government in 1962 to join the European Economic Community by the early 1970s prompted a major change in New Zealand’s immigration policy in 1974, that saw British citizens required (for the first time) to apply for permits if they wished to work or reside in New Zealand. They retained a privileged visa-waiver provision as visitors.

However, as Table 1 shows, the proportion of overseas-born immigrants who were British and Irish declined between 1945 and 1966, from 72.3 per cent to 61.0 per cent. If this was the first indication that the colonial privileging of British immigrants was undergoing a reassessment, there was another aspect of New Zealand migration that was to reflect contemporary flows and churn – the growth of emigration, both temporary

and permanent. The 'big OE' (see Bedford & Lidgard, 1998, for a further discussion) evolved from the 1960s, and reached a point by the first decade of the 21st century when New Zealand had one of the largest per capita diasporas in the OECD, with around 16 per cent of all New Zealanders living overseas (Gamlan, 2010).

The internationalisation of the New Zealand economy from the 1980s extended to the circulation of labour and people, both in terms of inflows and outflows. These flows are obvious in Table 2 (note, however, that the table includes only permanent migration). The net loss of New Zealand citizens between 1953 and 2012 is significant and represents a figure that is almost 75 per cent of the net gain of other citizens.

Table 2: Permanent and long-term migration (PLT), 1953–2012 (March years)

PLT migration	Period			Summary 1953–2012
	1953–1972	1973–1992	1993–2012	
<u>NZ citizens</u>				
Arrivals	145,434	424,962	471,227	104,1623
Departures	214,354	812,357	927,776	195,4487
<i>Net gains/losses</i>	<i>-68,920</i>	<i>-387,395</i>	<i>-456,549</i>	<i>-91,2864</i>
<u>Other citizens</u>				
Arrivals	439,174	515,848	1,046,785	200,1807
Departures	137,726	273,449	361,061	77,2236
<i>Net gains/losses</i>	<i>301,448</i>	<i>242,399</i>	<i>685,724</i>	<i>122,9571</i>
<u>Total PLT migration</u>				
Arrivals	584,608	940,810	1,518,012	304,3430
Departures	352,080	1,085,806	1,288,837	272,6723
<i>Net gains/losses</i>	<i>232,528</i>	<i>-144,996</i>	<i>229,175</i>	<i>31,6707</i>

Data source: Statistics New Zealand, annual international migration data.

If the late 1960s saw growing numbers of New Zealanders departing for temporary or permanent residence overseas, this was also the decade that saw accelerating growth in the numbers of non-European migrants arriving in New Zealand which continued into the next period (refer to the 1973–1992 period in Table 2). Post-war labour shortages in the manufacturing sector meant that new sources of unskilled and semi-skilled labour were required. Supply of labour from traditional sources – the United Kingdom and internal migrants, often Māori – were proving to be inadequate, and so labour migrants were sought from the Pacific. In some cases, they were part of the relocation of populations. States in the

Pacific that were administered by New Zealand, such as the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, were targeted, both as part of post-war labour migration and as a result of encouragement by the New Zealand state in the belief that there was a limited future in island economies (Spoonley & Bedford, 2012, p. 127). Over a period of some 40 years, the population centre for all these territories changed dramatically so that by the end of the 20th century, 70 per cent or more of the total (i.e. global) population of these three territories was New Zealand-based (including New Zealand-born descendants). It was a huge translocation that reflected labour-demand imperatives and a patronising approach to micro-state (colonial) development.

The second migration flow from the Pacific came from Samoa, Tonga and Fiji. This was employer-initiated and managed, and reflected significant labour shortages in urban-based manufacturing. To return to the opening comment by Miles, "...capital accumulation [was] obstructed by a shortage of labour power... [and the state was] faced with the possibility of permitting or organising the recruitment of labour from outside the nation state" (1989, p. 117).

In the early stages of the recruitment of Pacific labour, the state adopted a benign stance; however, this was to change markedly after 1973. The arrival of large numbers of Pacific migrants represented a major disjuncture in New Zealand's immigration trajectory. Pacific migration represented the first major wave of non-European migration, and was quite different in size to the earlier arrival of Chinese and Indian migrants.

The economic crisis of the early 1970s triggered state intervention into the management of migration from the Pacific, and a punitive approach to those Pacific communities now resident in New Zealand. Again, as Miles (1989, p. 126) argues, the racialisation of these communities was a product of significant and negative group characterisation. The racialisation of 'Pacific Islanders' in the mid-1970s and the underscoring of a racialised labour market (urban labour markets were already racialised as Māori had discovered) generated new structural constraints as state and popular opinion united to define Pacific Islanders as simultaneously unwelcome and a threat (Macdonald, 1986). The state adopted a very heavy-handed regulatory role which was not to dissipate

until the 1980s – and even then, migration from the Pacific was to be significantly curtailed.

Early settler colonialism had produced a particular form of migrant racialisation focused on exclusionary policies towards Chinese arrivals. This second major phase of migrant racialisation reflected the ongoing anxieties of a narrowly (or exclusively) defined colonial nationalism as it encountered the imperatives of post-war capitalist production and labour recruitment from the Pacific. As is discussed below, a very different phase involving new labour imperatives – and racialisation – occurred in the 1980s and 1990s as neo-liberal policies contributed to an altered role for the state, a privileging of market interests, and a new approach to international labour recruitment.

c) Recalibrating immigration policy, redefining New Zealand (1980s to present)

In the 1980s, the reforming New Zealand Labour Government significantly changed the nature of labour recruitment, although it continued to involve periods of intense racialisation. The new imperatives were defined by neo-liberal ambitions to internationalise the economy, to shift the nature of labour recruitment to skilled, relatively well-funded migrants to meet an expanding service economy, and to establish new geo-political linkages with the Asian economics of the Pacific Rim.

The abandonment of a deliberate source-country preference in immigration policy in August 1986 and the adoption of a points selection system (targeting skilled migrants) in 1991 transformed New Zealand's immigration system and external labour recruitment. Belatedly, New Zealand joined Canada, the United States and Australia in removing a discriminatory immigration policy based on the country of origin. The changes of 1986/87 finally ended a long period of colonial immigration policies and introduced several new features: a growing reliance on skilled migrants, a major change in where immigrants came from, and significant inflows (as well as outflows) as immigration dominated both planned and informal mobility and settlement patterns. Despite the persistence of a cyclical pattern of net migration gains followed by losses towards the end of decades in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the period between 1987 and 2010 was characterised by a return to net migration gains (in most years), but now from a much more diverse set of source countries.¹ Between April

1986 and March 2010, there was an overall net gain from permanent and long-term migration of 186,400, notwithstanding an accumulated net loss of people to Australia of around 460,000 over the same period (Spoonley & Bedford, 2012, p. 58).

Since the late 1980s, the number of immigrants arriving from a diverse array of source countries has more than kept pace with the outflow of New Zealanders, essentially comprising a process of replacement and circular migration (Table 3). However, it has not necessarily been replacement migration in terms of the age and skill composition of the population. Departing New Zealanders have included large numbers in their twenties and early thirties, while the new immigrants who intend to stay in the country (as distinct from temporary immigrants, especially international students) tend to be somewhat older and often with young families. Immigrants who are approved for residence under the points system are generally more highly skilled than those New Zealanders who are leaving, especially those heading to Australia who, because of the unregulated trans-Tasman flow of citizens, tend to mirror the spectrum of skill levels found in New Zealand's total population. Labour recruitment has been relatively tightly managed by the state since the late 1990s to try and ensure that there is a close alliance between local demand and migrant labour approvals – but emigration is not amenable to state control, especially given the labour exchange that occurs with Australia.

Table 3: 'Replacement' migration, 1987–2011

March years	Permanent and long-term net migration		
	NZ citizens	Other citizens	Total
1987–1991	-113,466	66,462	-47,004
1992–1996	-52,022	130,276	78,254
1997–2001	-145,828	137,700	-8,128
2002–2006	-95,091	210,048	114,957
2007–2011	-132,487	184,255	51,768
1987–2011	-538,894	728,741	189,847

Data source: Statistics New Zealand, annual international migration data.

In contrast with the colonial settler period, the more recent period of skilled labour recruitment has reversed the acceptability of migrants from Asia. Between 1986 and 2006, the numbers of residents born in countries in Asia increased by 235,900, the equivalent of 46 per cent of the

total growth in the overseas-born population (see Table 4). The China-born population (including those born in Hong Kong) increased by 1205 per cent while the India-born population increased by 359 per cent. (This has changed again recently as the proportion from India has grown, along with a significant increase in those arriving from the Philippines). The increase in the numbers of residents born in the traditional source countries between 1986 and 2006 was modest – just 43 per cent overall compared with the 104 per cent increase in the total number of overseas-born. But the major sources of immigrants between 1986 and 2006 were *not* the near neighbours (Australia and the Pacific) or the distant ‘family and friends’ (UK and Ireland); they were from Asia and most were from countries whose citizens had been effectively denied entry to New Zealand for more than a century (see Spoonley & Bedford, 2012, p. 93).

Table 4: Traditional and non-traditional source countries of overseas-born residents, 1986–2006

Birthplace	Numbers			% increase 1986–2006
	1986	1996	2006	
<i>Asia</i>	<i>32,715</i>	<i>117,918</i>	<i>268,602</i>	<i>721.0</i>
China (incl. Hong Kong)	6825	31,278	89,073	1205.1
India	6570	12,807	43,396	560.5
Other Asia	19,320	73,833	136,133	604.6
<i>Africa/Middle East</i>	<i>9555</i>	<i>24,690</i>	<i>79,011</i>	<i>726.9</i>
South Africa	4320	11,334	43,305	902.4
Other Africa	3564	6111	17,937	403.3
Middle East	1671	7245	17,769	963.4
<i>Other non-traditional</i>	<i>9504</i>	<i>13,881</i>	<i>23,934</i>	<i>151.8</i>
South and East Europe	7080	10,488	14,670	107.2
Latin America/Caribbean	2424	3393	9264	282.2
Total non-traditional	51,774	156,489	371547	617.6
<i>Europe/Nth America</i>	<i>317,631</i>	<i>305,034</i>	<i>413,022</i>	<i>30.0</i>
UK/Ireland	255,762	230,049	282,171	10.3
North and West Europe	47,784	55,752	89,202	86.7
North America	14,085	19,233	41,649	195.7
<i>Oceania</i>	<i>120,162</i>	<i>153,984</i>	<i>212,790</i>	<i>77.1</i>
Australia	47,331	54,711	74,352	57.1
Pacific Islands	72,831	99,273	138,438	90.1
Total traditional	437,793	459,018	625,812	42.9

Data source: Statistics New Zealand, *Census of Population and Dwellings* (various years); Spoonley and Bedford, 2012, p. 85.

In contrast to the post-war recruitment focus on semi- and unskilled labour as part of Fordist expansion, the more recent phase has reflected the contemporary focus on skilled and entrepreneurial migrants from a broad international talent pool. Between July 2001 and June 2011, 466,056 new residents were approved in the three major streams (skilled, family sponsorship, humanitarian) in New Zealand's Residence Programme (Table 5). The 60/30/10 split (economic/family/humanitarian) was effectively achieved for the total number of approvals but the share of approvals in the three streams varied quite markedly by the immigrants' country of citizenship. There were seven major source countries for approvals: the UK was clearly the major single country source, accounting for just less than 21 per cent of the 466,056 approvals during the period, followed by China (13.6 per cent), India (9.5 per cent) and South Africa (8.4 per cent). There were some important variations by stream in the ranking of the leading sources.

The colonial settler model of racialised immigrant recruitment had transitioned to a model that attracted the largest groups of permanent arrivals from the very countries that had previously been racialised and excluded. The focus on skilled, entrepreneurial migrants reflected neo-liberal imperatives to internationalise the New Zealand economy and labour supply, with a particular emphasis on recruitment rather than settlement. Immigrant agency was privileged within the parameters set by the state and employers.

Table 5: Residence approvals by stream, 2002–2011 (June years)

Stream/nationality	Residence approvals (%)			% change 2002/06– 2007/11
	2002–06	2007–11	2002–11	
<i>Skilled/business</i>	148,611	135,608	284,219	-8.7
Great Britain	39,092	34,440	73,532	-11.9
China	22,032	15,315	37,347	-30.5
India	19,037	9883	28,920	-48.1
South Africa	14,314	19,256	33,570	34.5
Other countries	54,136	56,714	110,850	4.8
<i>Family sponsorship</i>	70,555	72,783	143,338	3.2
Great Britain	11,752	10,501	22,253	-10.6
China	10,840	14,215	25,055	31.1
India	6459	8404	14,863	30.1
Other countries	41,504	39,663	81,167	-4.4
<i>International</i>	21,296	17,203	38,499	-19.2
Samoa	6258	5283	11,541	-15.6
Fiji	5574	8694	14,268	56.0
Other countries	9464	3226	12,690	-65.9
Total residence approvals	240,462	225,594	466,056	-6.2

Data source: Business Information Services, Department of Labour.

Economic Immigrants, Economic Agents

Miles's characterisation at the start of this paper that migration is significantly determined by the state as it organises the recruitment of labour remains true in the case of New Zealand. But the nature of that recruitment has changed considerably, in terms of focus, the mechanisms used, and the composition (birthplace and skills mix) of flows. The focus is now on recruiting 'economic migrants', those immigrants who have skills that are seen by the state and employers as needed for the New Zealand economy and that reinforce new geo-political interests and connections. This is achieved by the mechanism of allocating points to those characteristics that are needed to achieve a particular skills mix in migrant labour supply and that are explicitly aligned to employer and state-defined labour demand. The diversification of immigrant source countries is a product of new migrant labour recruitment systems to prioritise economic (skilled, business) migration, notably in Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Hawthorne, 2008, p. 3). As Hawthorne (2008) goes on to note, a more recent phase has involved a two-step process, with

more permanent residents being selected from a significantly expanded temporary migrant labour force. It produces 'high yield, low cost immigrants' (Fleras, 2010, p. 24) who meet nationally defined skill, capital and entrepreneurial requirements but without the need for major education and training investments. If there are additional investments required, they are typically paid for by the immigrants themselves.

The influence of neo-liberalism in New Zealand's migrant recruitment can also be seen in the privileging of immigrant agency in terms of modest investments by the state or employers in their settlement, specifically with regard to integration into the labour market. If recruitment and selection mechanisms favour the skilled and entrepreneurial, then it is assumed that successful settlement outcomes will follow as immigrants exercise market agency in their own self-interest. The reality is, however, that there are significant barriers to integration into the labour market as well as into New Zealand society.

The research literature indicates that immigrants face a range of difficulties as they seek to obtain appropriate employment in a New Zealand labour market (Boyd, 2003; Department of Labour, 2006; Spoonley & Bedford, 2012, surveys this evidence). The lack of local knowledge, especially of the business and regulatory environment, and limited personal and professional networks, is often compounded by language issues and labour market barriers including what Bauder (2006, p. 90) refers to as 'institutionalized labour devaluation' (the overseas experience and qualifications of immigrants are devalued by employers and the regulatory bodies of particular industries or occupations). Access to appropriate employment has been made difficult by the reluctance of local employers or other gatekeepers, such as recruitment agencies, to recognise the qualifications and overseas experience of the immigrant applicants. Equally, there is evidence that immigrants from Asia encounter both crude racism and discrimination and a discounting of overseas qualifications and experience (see Phillips, Poot & Roskrug, 2011; Spoonley & Bedford, 2012). The results of these various influences are reflected in the relatively poor labour force participation of many immigrant groups, the labour market outcomes given the qualifications and experience of immigrants, and the earnings deficit of immigrants compared with those born in New Zealand.

Some of the poor labour market outcomes for Asians can be attributed to the age profile of specific Asian communities which was apparent by the 2006 Census (Poot & Stillman, 2010). In that year, half of the Asian working-age population were aged between 15 and 34 years compared to a third for the total population (Department of Labour, 2010, p. 26). The lower employment rates can also be partially explained by delayed labour market entry as young Asian cohorts continue to study at post-compulsory educational institutions. But having attained a tertiary qualification (28.4 per cent of Asians compared with 15.4 per cent of the total population), what is concerning is that the proportion of Asians working in semi-skilled and elementary employment was three times higher than for the total population (33.1 per cent of Asians compared with 10.7 per cent of all workers), suggesting that “many Asians are over-qualified for the types of jobs they are employed in and may not be fully utilising their skills” (Department of Labour, 2010, p. 29). There is evidence of downward occupational mobility post migration. This is confirmed by surveys of Chinese and Korean immigrants (Meares, Ho, Peace & Spoonley, 2010a, 2010b).

Assumptions about immigrant agency and their ability to maximise labour market outcomes are compromised by the devaluation of education and the demand for local experience (Bauder, 2006) combined with an ever-present racialisation. Bauder (2006) argues (in relation to Canada) that this deskilling creates a “flexible yet highly educated and skilled labour force of immigrants” (p. 100) who are often forced into other occupations or industries to avoid labour market barriers.

The political economy of labour migration needs to account for the shift in contemporary New Zealand towards an explicit focus on economic immigrants who meet state-defined labour demand accompanied by a significant emphasis on immigrant agency, modest levels of investment in settlement support, and the racialisation of immigrant labour by some employers and organisations. To use Miles’s description (1989, p. 126), immigrants continue to be excluded by negative characterisations. But the de-racialisation of immigrant selection has meant that traditional source countries have now been replaced by non-traditional ones, and neo-liberal influences mean that there is an emphasis on skilled entrepreneurial migrants and their insertion into a service-based, market-led economy, and

a tendency to see them as primarily economic actors who provide both a flexible labour supply and new sources of capital and economic connections.

Economic Immigrants, Flexible Citizens

In the 1980s, it was axiomatic that the racialisation of immigrants was a reflection of the ideology of nationalism, typically a narrow and exclusive nationalism. The “coherence of the ‘nation’ ... was subverted by the presence of a population of migrant origin which was actively reproducing its distinctiveness of both culture and ‘race’” (Miles, 1989, p. 120). There was, and still is, a tension between labour requirements and the need to grant permission to reside in a territory and what rights ought to be associated with work or residence, both in the short term or permanently. In the case of many countries, both settler and former emigrant countries that are now immigrant destinations, the arrival of the culturally different other is seen as a direct threat to the homogeneity of an imagined national community. New Zealand has adopted a slightly different approach to citizenship rights and nationality.

Contributors such as Ong (1999) have tended to regard flexible citizenship as a strategic response by immigrants, especially skilled cosmopolitan migrants who seek to maximise transnational opportunities for familial or individual benefit. This author has argued previously (Spoonley & Bedford, 2012) that New Zealand can be regarded as offering flexible conditions of settlement, essentially as it operates a soft citizenship regime. That is, permanent residence granted to immigrants to New Zealand conveys nearly all the same privileges (voting is one example) as those of a citizen. This is confirmed by the extent of dual citizenship or visa waiver options (that are significantly greater than those offered by Australia, for example) and few official expectations that immigrants should become New Zealand citizens. Citizenship does not play quite the same role as it does in other countries, namely as a legal mechanism of recognition and assigning arrivals to a “hierarchy of status categories” (Bauder, 2006, p. 26).

The official approach to citizenship and the rights of immigrants does not displace or replace populist anxieties about immigrants, especially those that represent a cultural and visibly different ‘other’. Asia New Zealand Foundation reports indicate that public opinion towards Asian

immigrants include concerns that ‘immigrants stick together’ or they ‘threaten’ New Zealand values (Gendall, Spoonley & Butcher, 2013). Moreover, there is ongoing political cynicism from New Zealand First towards ‘non-traditional’ immigrants and their ‘negative’ effects on New Zealand and New Zealanders (Liu & Mills, 2006). But in terms of official policy and the inclusionary nature of citizenship, New Zealand has a relatively liberal approach that, at least implicitly, assumes divided loyalties and ongoing mobility. And while it has been assumed for some time (since the 1960s) that immigrants would not become citizens, there has been a significant degree of bipartisan political support for maintaining this relaxed approach and a series of legislative and policy changes that have further embedded this soft regime even further.

This flexibility concerning location, rights and citizenship has a range of benefits for immigrant attraction, including:

- It provides an opportunity for skilled transnational migrants to maintain households/businesses in two or more locations.
- It underplays the strong nationalism that is apparent in other immigrant receiving countries – and creates a sense of welcome and recognition that immigrants appreciate. Of course, the reality is that there are everyday and relatively commonplace occurrences that contradict this.
- It recognises (albeit perhaps unintentionally) the circular and ongoing nature of contemporary mobility.

The coincidence of a soft citizenship regime and the economic imperatives of migration has been further emphasised by the post-2000 shift towards an emphasis on temporary visa categories to meet particular labour market requirements (e.g. seasonal, short-term labour needs), to test suitability (the business visas that require that the immigrant make a business case/establish a business before permanent residency is granted), and to provide an onshore pool of candidates for permanent residency. The size of this temporary immigrant workforce is considerable and ranges from holiday work schemes, to the Recognised Seasonal Employer Work Policy involving workers from elsewhere in the Pacific, to international students who are able to undertake work or apply for a work search visa. This has significantly added to the flexibility of workforce supply and provided a new dimension to immigrant recruitment. It coincides with the flexibility of visa categories and immigrant access to New Zealand.

However, there are also more restrictive elements including the increasing control of family reunification. Skilled and business immigrants struggle to get approval for extended family members to enter New Zealand, especially under the recently established two-tier system which favours wealthy immigrants.

The other component is that New Zealand has a rather different approach and trajectory in terms of indigenous or ethnic group differentiated rights. Both Australia and Canada adopted official policies of multiculturalism in the 1970s as part of the management of diversity by the state, while New Zealand has tended to focus attention on biculturalism in the same period. As Moore (2011) notes, all three countries have explored a “pluralist governing discourse” (p. 425) that seeks to “mitigate the inequities of the colonial period and enhance indigenous peoples’ capacity to engage as citizens” (p. 426). This has resulted in a de-hyphenating of nation-state discourses and has reconfigured tangata whenua-state relations to a degree in New Zealand that is different to Australia or Canada. In turn, this has resulted in a “post-colonial social contract” in New Zealand (Fleras, 2011, p. 11) in which a minority of the population dominates the recognition of group rights. While this has had some interesting outcomes – creating new spaces or opportunities for Māori (although constrained and inadequate in many ways) – it has also meant that New Zealand has yet to develop a multicultural policy framework to the same degree that Canada and Australia have. It is still unclear how majority-minority relations – or state-minority, or tangata whenua-minority relations – will evolve as immigrant-related diversity increases, or what could be done to recognise and resource minority-immigrant/ethnic communities.

Conclusion

Systems for managing immigration have changed significantly since the 1950s and 1960s when labour migrants were required in many developed societies to fill semi- and unskilled positions in Fordist production. New Zealand was no exception, and the low-skilled labour migration of Pacific peoples from the late 1950s signalled a new stage of immigrant recruitment, the insertion of this labour into production, and post-arrival racialisation. However, the 1970s and 1980s were transition decades, during which new regimes of immigrant management began to evolve.

Australia and Canada developed a new model in the 1970s, along with official policies of multiculturalism as part of a strategy of immigrant incorporation and recognition. By the late 1980s, New Zealand had adopted a similar immigrant-selection process, and by the end of the 1990s, all three countries targeted economic immigrants using a particular recruitment and selection process.

New Zealand's immigration policies, as far as recruitment and selection are concerned, have been modified recently (the development of the 'Expressions of Interest' approach) but the core elements – a focus on economic immigrants, the careful allocation of points to certain desirable characteristics of applicants, the alignment of approvals to the demands of the New Zealand labour market – remain. More recent developments have included the use of temporary visa categories as a pathway to permanent residence. The result is that 60 per cent of immigrants (including their immediate families) approved for permanent settlement have been chosen because of clearly defined economic criteria such as current labour needs (the Occupational Shortages List) or the ability to obtain employment as part of an approval and selection process.

Neo-liberal imperatives and the need to recruit external labour for a post-Fordist economy have resulted in a very different phase of both immigrant recruitment and integration (or exclusion). This suggests a different framing of the political economy of labour migration to address the altered nature of immigration to New Zealand. In many ways, New Zealand has been innovative (Bedford & Spoonley, 2014) as economic imperatives and ideologies have required the state to adjust its management of immigration. But the core elements – a neo-liberal inspired approach to immigrant recruitment, diverse labour sources, a focus on economic relevance, the privileging of migrant agency post arrival – remain, thereby requiring an altered political economy of labour migration as an explanatory framework.

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Notes

- 1 The arrival of the Global Financial Crises had an impact on immigration and emigration. The numbers of permanent and long-term arrivals had declined to 83,000 by 2012 and resulted in net migration losses, especially given a considerable increase in the outflow to Australia, which peaked at 53,800 in 2012. By 2014, the total permanent and long-term migrant arrivals had increased to 98,000 for a 12-month period, but that included about 26,724 returning New Zealanders who made up a quarter of this figure.

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