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New Zealand Population Review

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E G Jacoby: A Brief Historiography of New Zealand Demography

IAN POOL*

Dr "Peter" Jacoby can legitimately be seen as the "founding father" of modern New Zealand demography. It was for this reason that the Population Association of New Zealand, with his widow's permission, have used his name for its student prize. Parenthetically, it can be noted here that the Goethe Society independently set up a Jacoby Prize -- I only learnt about this a year or so ago. In sum then, two professional bodies have recognised the contribution of Dr Jacoby to New Zealand Scholarship. Beyond this, representatives of the state library in the Landt where he had studied -- Schelswig -- came to New Zealand to collect the papers of this notable "native son" for their archives.

There might have been other contenders. One could cite a number of the chapters in New Zealand's first "history" (*The Story of New Zealand*, 2 vols) by the Victorian polymath Dr A S Thomson (he also wrote on "The Customs and Diseases of New Zealanders", *British and Foreign Medical-Chirurgical Review* 1854, and may have been the Anonymous writing in the *Edinburgh Review* 1850); or the fascinating paper by Dr Newman "Is New Zealand a Healthy Country?" (*Transactions and Proceedings of the New Zealand Institute*, later *The Royal Society of New Zealand*). A strong candidate would be the great medical practitioner and anthropologist, Dr Te Rangihiroa (Sir Peter Buck) who wrote New Zealand's first piece of modern epidemiology ("The Smallpox Epidemic Amongst Maoris in the Northern District", *Australian Medical Congress*, published 1914), whose "Coming of the Maori" has much of demographic interest, and who gave us the first attempt to measure intermarriage. His contribution to social science is

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marked by the Te Rangihiroa Prize of the Royal Society of New Zealand. And of course statisticians such as E P Neale, who in the inter-war years evaluated the quality of official statistics, von Dadelszen (a remarkable Registrar General late in the 19th Century, *New Zealand Dictionary of National Biography*) should not be ignored.

But it is the singular contribution of Jacoby that dictates that he must be accorded first place. He arrived as a refugee fleeing Hitler's Germany, and was drafted into the Education Department, working most of his career in the old "Wooden" building that now houses Victoria University's Law School. These were exciting days for education in New Zealand when the great Dr Beeby, who was later to play a major role in UNESCO, launched innovative programmes running from the "playway to education", that so incensed conservatives of the day, to special projects for the then Pacific Island Territories, the template for which was exported to UNESCO for newly independent countries. He gathered around him intellectually distinguished New Zealanders to make the department more a "think tank" than a classical bureaucracy.

Peter Jacoby's particular contribution to this think tank was his work on school projections. He was so successful with this methodology that UNESCO published it and distributed it worldwide as a model. In fact, one year he was too accurate, forecasting correctly down to the last digit and making it into Jack Ripley's internationally syndicated "Believe it or Not" newspaper column. Unfortunately, after his retirement the memory bank of the rigour the department had pursued through him seems to have been lost, and by the late 1970s/early 1980s projections that were wildly wrong were published using inappropriate mathematical techniques, that sparked an agonised response by Nick Pole and me in the *New Zealand Review of Educational Studies* (1984). A salutary lesson is that it was the bad projections that were the bases for policies (radically cutting Teachers' College intakes to cater for a projected intake of about only 15,000 first year primary pupils by 1990), not forecasts that followed Jacoby's methods.

As a side-product, Jacoby became interested in the fertility behaviour of New Zealand Pakeha birth cohorts, who would produce the children who would become the primary school entrants. Making a pilgrimage to Princeton in the early 1950s, he worked alongside people like Ansley Coale. This resulted in a major paper published in *Population Studies* (UK) (1956) -- one of the more fundamental pieces of research on cohort trends in a period

in which these analyses were only getting underway. In a sense, therefore, we can see this New Zealander as a contributor to pioneer research in what was to be a very important development for demography as a field. A companion paper published in the *Economic Record* drew attention to New Zealand's longstanding Pakeha patterns of ex-nuptial conception followed by marital birth.

When he retired Jacoby turned back to his real intellectual love -- social philosophy. He carried out research on the Schelswig sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies, author of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, key concepts that guided earlier generations of sociology students. Jacoby felt that Tonnies' contribution had been neglected, and set out to strengthen the record.

Jacoby, then, was an urbane, sophisticated scholar and a gentleman in the true sense of that word, who also made a major contribution technically and substantively. Any student of New Zealand demography must recognise their debt to the contribution of this distinguished progenitor of our discipline.

Seeking an Ethnic Identity: Is “New Zealander” a Valid Ethnic Category?

PAUL CALLISTER*

Abstract

In the 1986 Census of Population and Dwellings just over 20,000 individuals classified themselves as “New Zealanders” in response to the ethnic origin question. By 2001, over 89,000 individuals recorded a “New Zealander” response to the ethnic group question. However, despite actively choosing not to tick the census form category “New Zealand European”, in the last three censuses these people were subsequently regrouped by Statistics New Zealand into the higher-level category “New Zealand Europeans” and, ultimately, at the 1-digit level “Europeans”. Statistics New Zealand is now proposing to abandon this practice. In doing so it will create a new level four ethnic category for New Zealander type responses. It will also create a new “Other Ethnicity” level one ethnic group into which such responses can be aggregated. In this paper I explore why some respondents have been choosing to call themselves “New Zealanders”. I also examine the arguments of those opposing the official recognition of the “New Zealander” response.

A small, but increasing, number of respondents to official surveys, including the Census of Population and Dwellings, have been writing down “New Zealander” in response to questions about ethnicity. These data have been recorded in Statistics New Zealand’s databases. However, in high-level ethnic classification from the 1991, 1996 and 2001 censuses, these people were subsequently re-grouped by Statistics New Zealand initially as “New Zealand Europeans” and, ultimately, as “Europeans” in official reports.¹ The Statistics New Zealand Review of the Measurement of Ethnicity (RME), released in mid-2004, recommended that this practice be abandoned. Instead it recommended that a new level four New Zealander ethnic group be created to capture these responses. In addition, it recommended that these responses be then aggregated into a new level one ethnic group called “Miscellaneous”. Thus, at the highest level

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of classification it was proposed there would be six ethnic groups. These were European, Maori, Pacific Peoples, Asians, MELAA² and Miscellaneous. However, in its RME, Statistics New Zealand did not go as far as saying the term New Zealander could be seen as an ethnic group, it simply accepts that such responses should be recorded and published. Subsequently, Statistics New Zealand (2005) decided to use the name “Other Ethnicity” instead of “Miscellaneous”.

The acceptance of a New Zealander ethnic response has been the subject of much debate. While there has been a long and ongoing discussion as to how to classify Maori, particularly when Maori is just one of the recorded ethnic groups (eg. Kukutai 2003; O’Regan 2001; Pool 1991), in recent years there has been parallel discussion as to whether New Zealander is a valid ethnic group. Some of this discussion has centred on the emerging ethnic identity of those New Zealanders with primarily European ancestry. But the discussion has also been influenced by the long history of intermarriage between non-Maori and Maori as well as recent migration from non-traditional sources. While it is not entirely possible to address these issues in isolation from discussions about the term “Pakeha”, in this paper I focus primarily on these recent debates as to whether New Zealander responses comprise a valid ethnic category.

The construction of ethnicity for individuals is a complex process and there is much debate about how this process takes place (eg. Didham 2004; Kukutai 2003; Pearson 1990; Statistics New Zealand 2004). Statistics New Zealand, in its RME, sets out a number of factors that may contribute to, or influence, a person’s ethnicity, also noting that many of these are interrelated. This list is: name;³ ancestry; culture; where a person lives and the social context; race; country of birth and/or nationality; citizenship; and religion and language:

“New Zealander” as an Ethnic Category

In New Zealand it is now generally accepted that ethnicity is culturally constructed, even if ancestry influences many peoples’ choice of ethnic group(s) (Allan 2001; Statistics New Zealand 2004). For example, in a paper setting out Maori perspectives for Statistics New Zealand’s RME, Robson and Reid (2001: 24) note “[i]t is our right to name our own identity and to have our ethnicity recorded as we wish.”⁴ However, in New Zealand there has been an ongoing debate as to whether people should be able to construct

their ethnicity on the basis of what some people perceive as being solely a New Zealand nationality.⁵ For example, in a book chapter on racism, Spoonley (1993:16) argues that nationality does not replace a specific ethnicity. Negating the ability to determine one's own ethnic group, Robson and Reid (2001:13), citing an earlier Department of Statistics review of ethnicity statistics, also question whether "New Zealander" can be an ethnic group:

...currently a small proportion of the New Zealand population disagrees with the ethnicity question and writes "New Zealander" in the space labeled "other". However, strictly speaking, New Zealander is a nationality not an ethnicity.

An examination of the questions in recent New Zealand censuses shows that there has been some confusion as to whether nationality comprises a valid ethnic group. In the 2001 census, respondents could tick eight possible ethnic groups and/or record their own.^{6, 7} The choices (in order) were: New Zealand European;⁸ Maori; Samoan; Cook Island Maori; Tongan; Niuean; Chinese; and Indian

A final tick box was "other" and the respondent was asked to "please state". Three examples, Dutch, Japanese and Tokelauan were provided. While the census "help notes" informed respondents that ethnicity is not nationality, some examples given in the form comprise both ethnic groups and countries. In published three-digit level data from the 2001 census, ethnic groups include Australians, Germans, Poles and Dutch.^{9,10}

The 1996 census question exhibited some similarities to the 1991 and 2001 censuses, but also some important differences. The New Zealand Maori ethnic group was at the top of the list of categories. The second choice, "New Zealand European", also had the alternative label "*or* Pakeha".¹¹ After this choice there was also an extra category "Other European".

If the respondent ticked this "Other European" box, they were then directed to another set of tick boxes that included English, Dutch, and Australian. This separation of "New Zealand European" and "Other European" provided some sense that "New Zealand Europeans" were "native" New Zealanders. The term "Pakeha" reinforced this idea. Finally, amongst the main ethnic choices there was also a tick box entitled "Other". Examples given were Fijian or Korean. Again, respondents to this "Other" tick box were directed to print their own ethnic group(s). Like the 1991 and

2001 censuses, the 1996 census had examples of groups that could be considered as countries and/or as ethnic groups.

Thus, in all three censuses, instead of, or in combination with, ticking a box for a predetermined ethnic group, respondents could write in their own ethnic group. Responses included: “New Zealander”, “Kiwi” or “Pakeha”.¹² The number of respondents claiming to be one of these groups is not insignificant. According to Allan (2001), in 1986 20,313 people recorded “New Zealander” in response to the then ethnic origin question in the census. Overall, the group recording a “New Zealander” type response rose from just under 45,000 in 1996 to over 89,000 in 2001 (Potter *et al.* 2003). In 2001, this group represented just over two per cent of the total population that gave an ethnic response.

Researchers, policy makers and statistical agencies recognise a need to reduce the complexity of large-scale data collections so they commonly regroup the many possible responses into a much smaller number of categories. Five ethnic groupings have been commonly used in New Zealand social science and policy making. These have been “European”, “Maori”, “Pacific Peoples”, “Asian”, and “Other”.^{13, 14} In order to fit everyone into one of these categories, Statistics New Zealand previously made the decision to firstly reallocate all “New Zealander”, “Kiwi” and “Pakeha” responses to the “New Zealand European” subgroup. This group then became part of the wider “European” group. Therefore, while a respondent made an active choice not to tick the box “New Zealand European”, they were nevertheless allocated to this category and ultimately were counted as “Europeans”. While other ethnic groups are recoded to higher level groupings that they did not choose for themselves (for example Samoan to “Pacific Peoples”, or Chinese to “Asian”), it would have been very rare for someone other than a “New Zealander” to be allocated to an ethnic group that they had actively chosen to avoid.

This allocation decision by Statistics New Zealand for the 1991, 1996 and 2001 censuses appears to have been based on the presumption that people noting “New Zealander” were from majority groups known variously as “New Zealand Europeans” or “Pakeha”. While in the early days of colonisation Maori were often classified as “New Zealanders”, it is now generally assumed it is only non-Maori who are choosing this label.¹⁵

While based on a different set of questions to the census, this assumption was lent some support by research undertaken by Dupuis *et al.*

(1999). In their Smithfield project, a large-scale education study, the combined group of “Kiwi” and “New Zealander” made up a fifth of responses to an open ended question about ethnicity.¹⁶ In order to further investigate the backgrounds of those claiming to be “Kiwis” or “New Zealanders”, the researchers followed up on a geographically-based, sub-sample of the original group. They report that 96 per cent of those contacted gave responses that indicated that they were “Pakeha” (p.45).¹⁷ A further two per cent were “Maori/Pakeha”, while a further two per cent identified as “Pacific People/Pakeha”. However, even based on this research by Dupuis *et al.*, the decision by Statistics New Zealand to code all “New Zealanders” as “New Zealand European” meant that over 3,000 people were misgrouped in reports from the 2001 census.

Other research undermines the assumption that almost all “Kiwis” or “New Zealanders” are from the “New Zealand European” ethnic group. Te Hoe Nuku Roa (1999:Appendix 5) reports that when individuals of the Maori-descended adults in the baseline survey had to choose *one* option that best described themselves, 11 per cent chose “Kiwi” and 15 per cent “New Zealander”.¹⁸ Therefore, one in every four Maori-descended people in this survey defined their ethnicity primarily as “Kiwi” or “New Zealander”. This 26 per cent figure does not additionally identify those people who wished to identify first as Maori but also as “New Zealander/Kiwi”. However, given that this group had already stated their Maoriness to be part of the survey, this additional response may have reflected a further willingness to be seen as belonging to a number of overlapping groups.

Again, while this survey cannot be directly compared with the census, data from a national sample of just over 2,000 individuals also suggest some diversity amongst the “New Zealander” group (Webster 2001:95). Respondents were first asked to record a single ethnic affiliation. This produced a sample in which 14 per cent were classified as “New Zealand Maori”; 72 per cent “New Zealand European/Pakeha”; 14 per cent “Other European”; two per cent “Pacific Islander”; one per cent “Chinese”; one per cent “Indian”; and one per cent “Other non-European”. These people were then asked to tick one box which best described their *ethnic national identity*. Included on the list was “Above all, I am a ‘New Zealander’ first, and a member of some ethnic group second” (p.95). Overall, 46 per cent of respondents ticked the “New Zealander” box. This included half of those who identified themselves as from the Maori ethnic group based on the

initial question. As a group, these “New Zealanders” tended to be younger than average and to have some advantage in terms of occupation, income and social class (p.98).

Allan (2001:11) reports on the findings of an ACNielsen report commissioned by Statistics New Zealand to evaluate changes to the 1991 and 1996 census ethnicity questions. She notes “that 21 per cent of non-Maori and five per cent of Maori preferred the term ‘New Zealander’” as a response to the ethnicity question.

A better data source to test these ideas is, however, the census itself. As part of its RME, Statistics New Zealand prepared a report on the characteristics of people recording a “New Zealander” type response in the 2001 census (Potter *et al.* 2003).¹⁹ The study found that the majority of “New Zealander” responses were single ethnicity responses made by people who were born in New Zealand. The small number born overseas tended to have lived in New Zealand for a long time.

The researchers investigated Maori descent responses for this group and found that the “New Zealand European” and “sole New Zealanders” groups were equally likely to be of Maori descent (12 per cent of sole “New Zealander” reported Maori descent compared to 12 per cent of “New Zealand Europeans”). In total there were 8,796 sole New Zealanders who recorded Maori ancestry. However, as a group, “New Zealanders” had an unusually high rate of “don’t know” responses to the Maori descent question compared to other “New Zealand Europeans” (7,192 responses). Because only Maori ancestry is collected in the census, it is not known how many people recording New Zealander as their ethnic group had other non-European, non-Maori ancestry.

In addition, some “New Zealander” respondents also recorded this group in combination with other ethnic groups. In 2001, four per cent of “New Zealanders” said they also had Maori ethnicity.

The 2001 data show that “New Zealander” was generally a term reported by people in the 20-49 age bracket. However, the small group for whom this response was combined with “Maori”, “Asian”, “Pacific People” or “Other” ethnicity was predominantly made up of younger people. In terms of gender, 55 per cent of “New Zealander” responses came from men.

At the April 2003 *Connecting Policy, Research and Practice* conference, Statistics New Zealand announced that it no longer proposed to recode the “New Zealander” and “Kiwi” census ethnic responses (Statistics New

Zealand 2003a). It also announced its intention to report these responses under a new category “New Zealander” at a one-digit level. This would have meant there would be six main ethnic groups in New Zealand – “Maori”, “European”, “Asian”, “Pacific Peoples”, “Other” and “New Zealander”. Subsequently, in mid 2003, Statistics New Zealand called for submissions on the topics to be included in the 2006 Census of Population and Dwellings. While several suggested changes to the ethnicity topic were raised during consultation, 12 out of 29 submissions suggested that respondents should be able to identify themselves as “New Zealanders”. In its final report on content for 2006, Statistics New Zealand (2003b:12) noted that respondents are already able to write down a “New Zealander” response. However, they went on to suggest that if the draft recommendations of the Review of the Measurement of Ethnicity were to be adopted, these responses will be coded and reported as “New Zealander” for 2006 rather than be recoded as “New Zealand European”. However, Statistics New Zealand stated that the ethnicity question would not be changed to include “New Zealander” as a mark-box option because of the strong desire of most users to maintain time series continuity for this topic. Subsequently, Statistics New Zealand faced opposition to the preliminary proposal to include New Zealander as a category at the highest level of the ethnicity classification. Its final decision to recommend the recognition of a level four New Zealander ethnic group, but not a specific level one New Zealander group, represented a compromise position after much debate.

Why the Rejection of the European Ethnic Group?

Even assuming that many people wishing to be recorded as “New Zealanders” do, in fact, have European ancestry there are a number of reasons why they might not want to be classified as Europeans.

Based on Canadian research into possible census questions, Pryor *et al.* (1992) suggest that as colonial societies mature and evolve there is an increasing tendency for settler-descended populations to see themselves as “indigenous” to the societies which they inhabit. This includes the example of Canada, where there is an increasing tendency among some of the population to view the response “Canadian” as an evolving indigenous ethnic category. For example, some descendents of immigrants can trace their history in Canada back 300 years.

In New Zealand, historian Michael King has put forward a similar idea (Butcher 2003:44).

Maori came to New Zealand from Eastern Polynesia. We don't know how long it took to actually turn their backs on their culture of origin and decide they were Maori, but it was probably only three or four generations. The point at which it happened was when they stopped looking over their shoulder to the home culture and just got on with being the people they were in a new country. My view is that Pakeha have been here long enough now to have done the same thing and are "a second indigenous culture". And I don't think that's a particularly provocative thing to say. Like most Pakeha, I've been to Europe and felt that sense of affinity – but I am not European.

With an increasing national and international emphasis on indigenous rights, this is a provocative point of view, despite King's assertion to the contrary.²⁰ However, the idea that "New Zealanders of European descent are no longer part of a "European" ethnic group is less provocative. For many people, the term "European" is not an ethnic group but simply a collection of nations. It is also a collection that, for many people, often excludes the United Kingdom and Ireland.²¹ The United Kingdom and Ireland are the stepping off point for one or more ancestors of most New Zealanders, both for Maori via inter-marriage over the last 200 years and for non-Maori via both migration and inter-marriage.

In New Zealand, a person may be a fourth-generation descendant of European settlers or, perhaps, a third generation descendant of Chinese immigrants, but no longer feel a strong affiliation with Europe or China respectively. Examples of this can be found in New Zealand literature. Wells (2001), in his memoir book *Long Loop Home*, describes how, as a fifth generation descendant of European settlers, he feels no connection with Europe.

The long history of intermarriage between Maori and non-Maori, as well as more recent intermarriage between various settler groups, is likely to be weakening ethnic boundaries for some New Zealanders. For some census respondents, the choice of the term "New Zealander" may simply represent a way to create a new ethnic group that amalgamates a complex range of ancestral and cultural backgrounds. As census data already show, this includes some people with Maori ancestry (Potter *et al.* 2003). Finally, others may choose terms such as "New Zealander" simply because they do not feel influenced by ancestry and do not relate to the various response options.

Is the Ethnic Category “New Zealander” Problematic?

While some submissions to Statistics New Zealand’s Review of Ethnicity Statistics supported the idea of creating a new ethnic group called “New Zealander”, there was also some opposition to this move. Over recent decades, Spoonley has been particularly critical of the idea that New Zealander should be an accepted ethnic group, instead maintaining that it is a nationality. He sees an appeal to the idea “we are all New Zealanders” as a way of denying ethnicity, adding “this particular form of nationalism is often contradicted by the racism of its adherents” (Spoonley 1993:16).²² There are a number of problems in relation to the viewpoint that a New Zealand nationality cannot also be an ethnic group. First, as already demonstrated, some other nationalities are accepted as ethnic groups. Second, it assumes that non-Maori, particularly those who can trace ancestral links to Europe, need to be classified in relation to where their ancestors originally came from beyond New Zealand. This is in contrast to Maori where ancestry prior to migration to New Zealand is not considered. Using the logic that groups should be classified according to where they originated from, Maori could be re-classified as Pacific Peoples as this is from where Maori are believed to have migrated to New Zealand (King 2003). Taking this logic to the extreme, and going back far enough, the entire New Zealand population could be re-classified as African.²³

In terms of submission to RME, particular resistance to the acceptance of a New Zealander category came from those classified as Maori interest groups or individuals (Statistics New Zealand 2004). This resistance revolves around four key issues:

- i. It creates potential problems for Maori/non-Maori comparisons.
- ii. It does not sit easily with concepts of Treaty partnership between two distinct peoples.
- iii. It is seen as a first step in the creation of a second indigenous group and this undermines Maori as the indigenous group within New Zealand.
- iv. It is seen as a way of denying the existence of ethnicity.

In their 1999 research, Dupuis *et al* argue that the use of the term “New Zealander” “while not recognised as an act of political positioning by the claimants themselves, must nevertheless be seen as a position that denies recognition of other ethnic groups” (p.56). Yet, those people who have a very strong, non-national, ethnic identity naturally retain the right to

choose only a non-New Zealand national ethnic group or to note this in combination with the “New Zealander” category. An individual, or groups of individuals, choosing “New Zealander” as their ethnic group is quite different from the claim that “we are all New Zealanders”. The creation of a “New Zealander” ethnic group does not deny choices for others.

The idea that identifying as a “New Zealander” is particularly problematic in regards to the position of Maori in New Zealand society, is also somewhat challenged by “values” research undertaken by Webster (2001:113). When comparing attitudes of “Pakeha” and “New Zealanders” to Maori rights, Webster notes that the views of those classifying themselves as “Pakeha” were more negative than those of people who defined themselves as “New Zealanders”.²⁴

The view that allowing settlers to identify with their country of residence will automatically undermine indigenous rights is also potentially challenged by an article based on the Australian experience. Moran (2002) explores the idea that “indigenizing settler nationalism” has the potential for supporting rather than resisting the extension of indigenous rights and claims.^{25, 26}

In official data collections, particularly those with an ancestry as well as an ethnicity question, even if many respondents do eventually affiliate with the “New Zealander” ethnic group, Maori and non-Maori populations can still be created for comparative purposes. There are three ways of doing this. First, the ethnicity data could be ignored and the analysis could be simply based on ancestry data. Second, all people who recorded only “New Zealander” ethnicity could be allocated to the non-Maori group. These respondents are clearly choosing not to be in the Maori ethnic group, even if some have Maori ancestry. However, if they ticked the Maori ethnic response as well as writing in “New Zealander”, then they could be allocated to the Maori group.

Third, if researchers want to add more complexity to coding choices, they could reallocate those “New Zealanders” who stated Maori descent to those who declared Maori ethnicity. Those “New Zealanders” who did not have any Maori ancestry would be part of the non-Maori group. However, this option would not be possible in many data collections. A question on ancestry could be relatively easily incorporated into some research, although it would be more difficult in some standard areas – in particular administrative data collections in the health and education sectors.

In terms of undermining concepts of Treaty partnership between two distinct peoples, the idea of the existence of two completely separate ethnic and ancestral groups is already undermined by historical and current intermarriage (Callister 2004). Of all those people who recorded Maori as one of their ethnic groups in the 2001 census, only 56 per cent recorded *only* Maori. For Maori, intermarriage has resulted in a complex interaction between ethnicity and ancestry data. Table 1 shows that a significant number of respondents record Maori ancestry but not ethnicity, while a small number say they have no ancestry but claim ethnicity. The “New Zealander” ethnicity simply adds another layer to an already complex and fluid construction of ethnic groups in New Zealand.

Table 1 also shows a relatively high non-response to both the descent and ethnicity questions. If people’s ethnic responses, such as New Zealander, continued to be unacknowledged by Statistics New Zealand, then there was the potential for some of these individuals not to record any ethnic response in future surveys. A high non-response rate also undermines Maori/non-Maori comparisons.

It is possible some of the opposition to allowing respondents to record New Zealander in their answer to the census ethnicity question might diminish if there was also a wider ancestry question, not just one that asked about Maori ancestry. It is possible that many individuals claiming to be “New Zealanders” would be happy to acknowledge their ancestry, whether it is “European”, “Chinese”, “Tongan”, some other group, or a combination of ancestral links. This would allow researchers to make comparisons based on ancestry in combination, at times, with the ethnicity data. This is the format of the Canadian census.

Table 1: Response to Maori descent question compared with responses to the ethnic group question, 2001

Maori ethnic group	Maori Descent				Total
	Yes	No	Don't know	Not elsewhere included*	
Yes	487,317	5,322	6,846	26,796	526,281
No	112,665	2,655,516	58,974	233,295	3,060,450
Not elsewhere included*	4,125	16,671	1,791	127,956	150,546
Total	604,110	2,677,506	67,608	388,050	3,737,277

* Includes response unidentifiable, response outside scope and not stated.

Source: Statistics New Zealand

In face of the opposition to its draft recommendations on the creation of a level one New Zealand ethnic group, Statistics New Zealand developed a compromise position. As already discussed, this is that the response “New Zealander” and like responses, be coded to a separate category in the new “Miscellaneous” group, subsequently renamed “Other Ethnicity”, at level four of the ethnicity classification. In addition, respondents will have to make an active choice to write in New Zealander as this will not be a tick box. In reality the new “Other Ethnicity” group will be a de facto “New Zealander” group. The suggestions put forward by Statistics New Zealand in both the RME and the review of questions for the 2006 census are a sensible compromise that will allow researchers to better understand the evolving nature of ethnicity in New Zealand. If the number of people putting New Zealander type responses increases in size over subsequent censuses the name of the group and whether it should have its own tick box can then be revisited.

Conclusion

Strauss (1959:15) stresses the importance of language on identity, noting “[a]ny name is a container; poured into it are the conscious or unwitting evaluations of the namer”. Furthermore, altering names is “a rite of passage”, enabling the evolution of a “new self image” (Strauss 1959:16,17). If ethnicity is seen to be both culturally constructed and reflective of individual choice, as generally agreed in New Zealand, the historical practice of allocating “New Zealander” type responses firstly to the “New Zealand European” group and, ultimately, to the “European” ethnic group, has been conceptually incorrect. Denying individuals their choice of ethnic classification put Statistics New Zealand in a position of making a political decision rather than an ethnically-neutral, statistical decision. Statistics New Zealand has recognised this and has now created a new ethnic category for New Zealander responses. While Statistics New Zealand has not gone as far as creating a specific high level New Zealander ethnic group, and nor has it recommended creating a separate New Zealander tick box on census forms, from 2006 onwards researchers will easily be able to separate out and analyse the New Zealander responses.

Despite the general acceptance that individuals should be able to choose their own ethnic group, this paper has demonstrated that there has been concern amongst some individuals and organisations that allowing a group

of people to label themselves as New Zealanders would undermine the identity and rights of Maori. I have argued that these concerns have been greatly overstated. For example, accepting “New Zealander” as a high level, ethnic group does not prevent Maori/non-Maori comparisons.

There is clearly a group of New Zealanders, many who have no connection or feel no connection to Europe, who do not wish to be recorded as “Europeans” in official surveys. Yet, they have been counted as “Europeans” in recent years. A lack of connection to Europe may have been created through having: complex mixed ancestry perhaps including Maori ancestry; Asian or another non-European background; or European ancestry but having lived in New Zealand for a number of generations. As has occurred in Canada, there may be an increasing tendency for long-term New Zealand settler populations, other than the original Maori settlers, to see themselves as “indigenous”. However, as always, the future is uncertain. It is possible there will be further growth in the number of “New Zealander” type responses in official surveys but, equally, the peak may have already been reached in this type of response and its popularity may wane.

Finally, in the longer term, it is likely that the use of the name “European” for the main New Zealand ethnic group will also continue to be questioned, a fact recognised by Statistics New Zealand. Further research and debate is needed on the measurement of many aspects of ethnicity and this is one of the recommendations of the Review of the Measurement of Ethnicity. Such research and debate is an important aspect of the ongoing construction of both personal and national identity.

Notes

Simon Chapple and I prepared a private submission to the Statistics New Zealand Review of Ethnicity Statistics and, in early 2003, a further submission on their draft report. These submissions provided the initial building blocks for a paper presented at the 2003 Ministry of Social Development conference *Connecting Policy, Research and Practice*. A number of other people read either early drafts of the conference paper or later revisions and provided insightful comments including the anonymous referees who commented on this paper. However, while I have been influenced in my thinking by a range of people, I take full responsibility for the ideas expressed in this paper.

- 1 In 2001, 78,111 recorded “New Zealander”, 8,886 “Kiwi”, and 2,230 “Kiwi and New Zealander”. In addition, 8,128 recorded “Pakeha”, 203 “Native” and 806 “White”. All these responses were classified as “New Zealand Europeans”.

- 2 MELAA itself is a new group. It replaces the “Other” ethnic group and is designed to more clearly identify the Middle Eastern, Latin American and African ethnic groups it contains. A small number of groups that are not Middle Eastern, Latin American and African ethnic groups will join the new “Other Ethnicity” category.
- 3 Statistics New Zealand (2004:7) notes that a “name” is “a common proper name that collectively describes a group of individuals and authenticates the characteristics and the history of its members”.
- 4 Statistics New Zealand (2004:25) notes that “The right of Māori as tangata whenua to determine Māori individual and collective identities is enshrined in the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1993).”
- 5 Place makes a difference to whether someone is accepted as a “New Zealander”. For example, if living in the US a person can record “New Zealander” as an ethnic group and this will be identified in detailed census output. However, when high-level output is presented, they will be placed in the group “white” (Bhopal 2002).
- 6 The 1991 and 2001 census questions were very similar. The one difference was that, in 2001 the words “New Zealand” were removed from the category “New Zealand Maori” (Lang 2002).
- 7 In their submission to the 2001 Review of Ethnicity Statistics, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) questions why some groups have the term “New Zealand” attached and others do not, e.g. “New Zealand” European but not “New Zealand” Samoan or “New Zealand” Tongan. The HRC expressed concern that people other than Pakeha were unable to indicate a “New Zealand” aspect to their ethnicity (Barnard 2001). Statistics New Zealand (2004) also noted that in submissions to its RME many ethnic groups, other than “NZ European” and “Maori”, expressed a wish to affiliate with “New Zealand” in the ethnicity question, for example to be able to record “NZ Chinese” rather than simply “Chinese”.
- 8 The 1991 census was the first one to add “New Zealand” in front of the word European in the set of ethnic choices.
- 9 Australians are then classified at the one-digit level as “Europeans”. However, there is also a separate category for Australian aboriginals (Allan 2001:11).
- 10 Collins (2001a) notes that country-based ethnicities such as Italian are themselves recent constructs often based on a regrouping following migration. In the US, Italians are comprised of people whose original homeland identities would have included Sicilians, Calabrians, Neapolitans, and Genoans. Collins also notes that even these regional subgroups are the result of assimilation of previously fragmented villages or clans.

- 11 “Pakeha” is a term that has not been universally accepted in New Zealand (for discussions of this issue see Bedggood 1997; Pearson and Sissons 1997; Spoonley 1993). For instance, in a submission to the 2001 Review of Ethnicity Statistics, the Human Rights Commission records that one of the most common complaints to the former Race Relations Office was from people objecting to being labelled “Pakeha” (Barnard 2001). Uncertainty about the status of the term Pakeha can be observed in the book *Tauīwi*. The publishers, citing “generally accepted usage and the rule of the New Zealand Government Printing Office Style Book”, decided that the term “Pakeha” should not be capitalized (Spoonley *et al.*1984:5).
- 12 In each census, there are responses that are even more difficult to classify, such as Martian.
- 13 Statistics New Zealand notes that, technically, aside from Maori, all the one-digit ethnic groups are not individual ethnic groups but collections of groups (Allan 2001). However, the general public would not be aware of this important distinction. While New Zealand European is a box that can be “ticked”, the higher-level groups of “European”, “Pacific Peoples”, and “Asian” are not groups that can be “ticked” in census responses. These latter groups are “ethnic categories” not “ethnic groups” or “ethnic communities” (Pearson 1990).
- 14 However, there is a further group that is important. This is the combined “no response” or “not defined” group. Respondents may be categorised as being in this group for a number of reasons. One is that an individual simply fails to fully complete the census form. Another is that, for whatever reason, a respondent does not want to record their ethnic groups(s). In 2001, just under 4 per cent of respondents did not state their ethnic group.
- 15 Maori in the geographic area that is now New Zealand were defined by early British explorers, colonists, and official data collectors as “Indians”, “Aborigines”, “Natives” or “New Zealanders”, as well as “Maori” (Allan 2001).
- 16 The open-ended question asked “How would you describe your cultural background?” (p. 38). However, this question was preceded by a paragraph providing examples of single and mixed ethnic groups. These groups did not include “Kiwi” or “New Zealander”. The researchers note that with such an open-ended question the respondents often provided complex answers involving factors such as language, place of birth, church membership, type of family and family connections in constructing their ethnicity.
- 17 While Dupuis *et al.* (1999:47) describe “Kiwi” and “New Zealanders” as being mostly from the “Pakeha” group, later in the paper they go further and label this group as “white”.
- 18 Only just over half of Maori descended people in the Te Hoe Nuku Roa project chose Maori as the single identity that best described themselves.
- 19 This excluded those who recorded “Pakeha”, “native” or “white”.

- 20 However, King is not the only person to question who is part of the indigenous group. For example, Royal has suggested “the concept of “tangata whenua” should no longer be exclusive to Maori but be part of a new language to include all those who share and are committed to a spiritual relationship with the natural environment” (Gurunathan 2003:1). The Treaty Minister of the Labour government, Trevor Mallard (2004), also claimed in 2004 to be an indigenous New Zealander.
- 21 A dictionary definition of “Europe” and “European” provides further confusion. One definition of Europe is “a continent in the Western part of the land mass lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans separated from Asia by the Ural Mountains on the East and the Caucasus Mountains the Black and Caspian seas on the South East”. The dictionary goes on to note that in British usage the term Europe is sometimes used to contrast with England. A European can be seen as either a “native or inhabitant of Europe, or a person of European descent” or “a white person in a country with largely a non-white population” (Anon 1997). This assumes the concept of Europe itself as a collectivity, which is a relatively recent conception.
- 22 This is a view shared by Ansley (2003:19) when discussing reactions to debates about ownership of the seabed and foreshore. He argues that the notion “we are all New Zealanders” stands for intolerance”. By contrast, the campaign asserting that we are “all New Zealanders”, supported by the Human Right Commission, aims not to deny ethnicity, but instead is designed to challenge “racial stereotypes” and encourage “a greater understanding of the many different groups that make up New Zealand society” (Human Rights Commission 2003:1).
- 23 Human Genome researcher Francis Collins (2001b) suggests that everyone in the world is descended from a common ancestral pool of about 10,000 individuals who lived in Africa about 100,000 years ago.
- 24 In parallel, Pearson and Sissons (1997:79) have explored whether New Zealanders of primarily European ancestry who choose to call themselves “Pakeha” are more supportive of biculturalism and Maori rights than those who do not use this term. They found only a very weak link between being “Pakeha” and being bicultural. The authors found that the majority of both those who identified as “Pakeha” and those who never did were unsupportive of biculturalism and tino rangatiratanga.
- 25 A possible example of alignment of primarily settler descendent interests with those of indigenous peoples is Federated Farmers (2003) announcement that it had serious concerns about the government's foreshore and seabed framework, which itself was announced in late 2003, suggesting that it “appears to be confiscation by stealth”.
- 26 There are parallel and on-going debates about how indigeniety can be defined (eg. Durie 2000; Waldron 2002)

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Future Immigration Policy Development in Australia and New Zealand

GRAEME HUGO*

Abstract

Australia and New Zealand have had shared values with respect to international migration and enjoyed a special bilateral international migration relationship for a long period although it has become more restrictive in the last few years. This paper examines developments in the relationship over the last few years together with some impacts. It speculates about some possible future scenarios of competition and collaboration between the two countries in the immigration area in the context of a rapidly changing global economic, political and security situation. One scenario given particular attention is that of greater harmonization of policy and joint co-operative efforts in recognition of Australia and New Zealand in many respects constituting a single labour market and having many similar immigration goals. Such groupings of nations are emerging over the world, albeit slowly and with difficulty. There is a trend toward development of free trade areas (NAFTA), common labour markets (EU) and groups of countries with special migration arrangements. It may be that national goals of both New Zealand and Australia may be best met through a co-operative rather than the competitive model.


Migration between New Zealand and Australia

While in recent years the main discussion of Trans-Tasman migration has been on the exodus of New Zealanders to Australia (Carmichael 1993; Birrell and Rapson 2001) it is interesting to note that the New Zealand-born counted at the 2001 census in Australia (355,765) represent a similar proportion (1.9 per cent) of the national population as do Australia-born residents (56,259 persons) in New Zealand (1.5 per cent). This reflects the high degree of integration of the Australian and New Zealand labour markets and the lack of restrictions¹ on the flow of people between the two countries.

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
Considering, first of all, the flow from New Zealand to Australia, Figures 1a and 1b show the permanent² movement of the New Zealand-born into Australia both in numerical and proportional terms. There are three peaks of in-movement around 1980, 1990 and 2000. However, it will be noted that there has been a decline in recent years.

Figure 1a: New Zealand-born immigrants in Australia, 1960-2002



Source: DIMIA, *Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update*, various issues; ABS, *Migration Australia*, various issues

Figure 1b: New Zealand-born immigrants as a percentage of total immigrants, 1960-2002



Source: DIMIA, *Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update*, various issues; ABS *Migration Australia*, various issues

It has been suggested (Hugo 2003) that this may be associated with a change of regulations in Australia relating to New Zealand immigration in 2001. There were a series of restrictions introduced beginning in the 1980s to limit New Zealander access to services (Birrell and Rapson 2001). This culminated in the February 2001 announcement of new arrangements whereby New Zealand citizens are required to obtain permanent Australian residence if they wish to access certain social security payments (subject to a two year eligibility waiting period for most payments), obtain Australian citizenship or sponsor their family members for permanent residence. Nevertheless, there is still no limit on the number of New Zealanders who are able to come to Australia or on their ability to come to Australia and to work in Australia.

Table 1: Settler arrivals in Australia of the New Zealand-born and New Zealand citizens

Year	New Zealand-Born		New Zealand Citizens
	Number	Per cent	Number
2001-02	15,663	72.4	21,644
2000-01	25,137	59.5	42,254
1999-2000	21,889	69.2	31,615
1998-99	15,667	63.5	24,686
1997-98	14,723	75.9	19,397
1996-97	13,072	74.7	17,508
1995-96	12,265	75.5	16,238

Source: DIMIA; Birrell and Rapson 2001:63.

However, it is important to point out that the inflow of the New Zealand-born is only part of the Trans-Tasman inflow of settlers into Australia. Table 1 shows that a substantial element in the Trans-Tasman flow is non-New Zealand-born former settlers to New Zealand. This type of relay migration is not a new phenomenon in Trans-Tasman movement. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s there was some evidence of government sponsored immigrants from the United Kingdom to Australia moving on to New Zealand soon after arrival in Australia (Price 1979).

The fact that Australia has had a substantial indirect gain of other immigrants through New Zealand is evident in Table 2 which presents estimates of the number of New Zealand citizens in Australia between 1999

and 2002. It will be noticed that there was virtually no increase in the number of New Zealand citizens between 2001 and 2002, while they increased by 30,000 between 1995 and 2000, and 26,000 between 2000 and 2001. Clearly, the restrictions on New Zealanders introduced in February 2001 seem to have had an impact. Indeed, the number of non-New Zealand-born New Zealand citizens in Australia decreased between 2001 and 2002. Birrell and Rapson (2001:61) argue that while the Australian government's stated motivation was to reduce Australia's responsibilities for paying social security benefits, they also desired to limit the influx of people who would not meet the standards set by the Australian official immigration program which applied to non-New Zealanders.


Table 2: New Zealand citizens in Australia by country of birth, 1999-2002

Year	New Zealand Citizens	New Zealand-Born	Other Country of Birth
30/6/2002	460,788	341,783	119,005
30/6/2001	460,142	340,355	119,787
30/6/2000	434,679	324,559	110,120
30/6/1999	404,750	303,695	101,055
Percent Change 1999-2002	13.9	12.5	17.8

Source: DIMA (2000); DIMIA (2002).

The birthplace of the non-New Zealand-born New Zealand citizens in Australia in mid-2002 are depicted in Figure 2. Of the 119,005 non-New Zealand-born, New Zealand citizens, the largest group, are the 18,382 Australia-born who are the children born to New Zealand-born parents in Australia whose parents decided to get them New Zealand citizenship. However, there were almost as many born in the United Kingdom (17,746). There are also a substantial number from other parts of the Pacific, especially Western Samoa (12,791), Cook Islands (3,696), Tonga (3,556), Fiji (2,919) and Niue (678).

Figure 2: New Zealand Citizens Present in Australia by Country of Birth, 2002



Source: DIMIA (2002).


Only 16,405 (3.6 per cent of all New Zealand citizens in Australia) were born in Asia with the largest group being from Northern Asia, especially China (3,561), Taiwan (1,457) and Hong Kong (951). Also important were India (2,218), Philippines (1,059) and Vietnam (1,716). Other significant groups were from South Africa (2,120) and the Netherlands (1,120) (Figure 2).

Australia has long had an emphasis on attracting permanent settlers to the country and a strongly expressed opposition to programs of inmovement of temporary and contract workers. During the labour shortage years of the 1950s and 1960s Australia's migration solution to the problem contrasted sharply with that of European nations like Germany and France when it explicitly opted to concentrate on attracting permanent migrants to meet worker shortages rather than contract workers. This thinking has changed dramatically since the mid 1990s with the introduction of new visa types involving temporary migration for work (Birrell and Healy 1997). These often cut across the DIMIA long-term and short-term categories of movement in and out of the country. Hence there has been a shift in worker migration to Australia which has seen an increase in non-permanent moves. There has been a recognition that in the context of globalised labour markets it is essential to have mechanisms to allow non-permanent entry of workers at least in certain groups. Nevertheless, this form of entry has not been extended to unskilled and low-skilled areas and has been open to people with particular skills and entrepreneurs. Hence there has been an increase in people coming to Australia as short-term or long-term entrants and being able to work in the country. Since New Zealand citizens are not required to obtain a visa to gain entry to Australia, these categories are not relevant to them, however it is interesting to look at the trends in the numbers entering Australia on a long-term basis. Figure 3 shows that these flows have increased in recent years, although again the possible effect of the 2001 changes to the welfare eligibility criteria is in evidence.

Thus far, the data we have examined are flow information collected by Australia's Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA). The Australian Bureau of Statistics takes the data on both permanent and long-term arrivals and departures to calculate net migration to Australia from New Zealand. Figure 4 shows the trends in net migration gain between 1993 and 2000 and indicates that the net gain increased from

2,205 to 25,156 over this period. The latter being made up of 44,838 permanent and long-term arrivals and 19,682 departures. Unfortunately, we do not have the data for the last two years due to data processing problems but it is almost sure that the most recent year will have shown a downturn.

Figure 3: New Zealanders coming to Australia on a long-term basis, 1982-83 to 2001-02




Source: DIMIA, *Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Population Flows: Immigration Aspects*, various issues; DIMIA (2003).

Note: Data prior to 1992-93 comprise long-term New Zealand-born arrivals. Data after this date comprise long-term arrivals of New Zealand citizens.

Bedford *et al.* (2003:11) have examined quarterly departure data from the New Zealand end and shown that “while the policy changes certainly reduced the influx of New Zealand citizens into Australia, especially those born in Asia, they may have had less overall impact on the volume of migration across the Tasman than the aggregated data might suggest”. They point out that the high levels in 2000 in fact represent a response to the advanced warning of the policy changes and a subsequent return to more normal levels, as well as the fact that there was a general decline in outmovement of New Zealanders to all countries and that to Australia, was no more than to other countries. However, Bedford *et al.* (2003:14) point out what clearly changed “... was the share of citizens born in reducing the influx of people born in countries other than Asia who might not have met the requirements of Australia’s immigration program”.

Figure 4: Permanent and long-term movement to and from New Zealand, 1993-94 to 1999-2000



Source: ABS, *Migration Australia*, various issues

It is important to point out that New Zealanders in Australia are the overseas-born group which is most similar to the Australia-born population. Indeed, if one standardises for age, virtually all of the differences in economic, social and other demographic characteristics disappear (Hugo 2003; ABS 2002).

Migration between Australia and New Zealand

While Australia is generally seen as emphatically an immigration nation, it in fact has a substantial level of emigration (Hugo 1994; Hugo *et al.* 2001; Hugo *et al.* 2003). Moreover, New Zealand has been in recent years the largest single destination of these emigrants (Figures 5a and 5b). It will be noticed that the outflow reached its highest level around 1990-91 and in 2002 – one or two years after the peaks in the flow into Australia shown in Figure 1. There are two elements in this emigration (Hugo 1994):


- A substantial return flow of New Zealanders who formerly settled in Australia.
- Movement of Australia-born citizens to New Zealand. This is often migration within a single labour market.

In 2001-02 New Zealand was the largest single destination of permanent departures leaving Australia with 10,024 or 20.8 per cent of the total outflow. There is some evidence that the backflow of New Zealanders has


increased since the introduction of the new regulations but the increase is relatively small. Bedford *et al.* (2003) argue that, while there has been an increase in the volume of return migration to New Zealand since the new legislation, there has also been an increase in the backflow from other countries as well. Table 3 shows that in 2001-02 the emigration to New Zealand from Australia was larger than at any stage in the last decade. Moreover, the New Zealand-born part of that flow has increased substantially.

Focusing first on the New Zealanders returning home, Table 4 shows that a fifth had been in Australia less than two years, and four-fifths between two and nine years and their median length of residence was 5.1 years. An emigration rate of 13 per 1,000 applied in 1999-2000³ and only Hong Kong among major origin countries had a greater level of settler loss. Using the same methodology, the emigration rate would be 17.3 per 1,000 indicating that the new legislation may not only have had an impact in preventing new New Zealand migration to Australia but increased the rate at which New Zealanders were returning home from Australia.

Turning to the emigration of the Australia-born, Table 3 shows that there has been an increase in the outflow up to 2000 but it has stabilised since then. In Table 5 the Australia-born emigration is combined with the long-term outflow of the Australia-born. It will be noted that in each year it has accounted for less than a tenth of all such out movement and there are slightly more females than males involved in the flow, although this has declined in recent years. In fact, some 28.2 per cent of this Australia-born outflow are aged 0-9 years, reflecting the fact that about a third of the flow are the Australia-born children of returning New Zealand-born parents. Some 59.7 per cent of those who are employed in this flow are in managerial, administrative, professional or para-professional occupations. Another piece of evidence that New Zealanders were adapting to the new regulations regarding restrictions of access to welfare and other benefits is found in Table 6 which shows that there has been a substantial increase in the number of New Zealanders taking out Australian citizenship since 2001 when the new legislation was introduced.

Figure 5a: Emigration to New Zealand from Australia, 1988-2002

Source: DIMIA, *Immigration Update*, various issues; ABS, *Migration Australia*, various issues

Figure 5b: Emigrants to New Zealand from Australia as a percentage of total emigrants

Source: DIMIA, *Immigration Update*, various issues; ABS, *Migration Australia*, various issues

Table 3: Permanent departures from Australia to New Zealand, 1991-2002

Year	Australia-Born	New Zealand-Born*	Total
2001-02	3,859	6,165	10,024
2000-01	3,979	4,256	8,235
1999-2000	3,852	5,109	8,961
1998-99	3,281	4,187	7,468
1997-98	2,945	6,262	9,207
1996-97	4,245	4,929	9,174
1995-96	5,352	4,462	9,814
1994-95	5,239	4,214	9,453
1993-94	5,062	4,442	9,504
1992-93			8,714
1991-92			8,828

Source: DIMIA, *Immigration Update*, various issues; ABS, *Migration Australia*, various issues

* In 1993-94, 1994-95, 1995-96 and 2001-02 this figure is all overseas-born and not just the New Zealand-born.

Table 4: Length of Australian residency of overseas-born emigrants in 1999-2000

Country of birth(a)	Years resident in Australia					Total '000	Median length of residence	Emigration rate
	<2	2-4	5-9	10+	Total		Years	Rate(b)
New Zealand	19.0	23.4	57.3	0.3	100.0	4.5	5.1	13
United Kingdom	21.1	24.6	53.5	0.8	100.0	4.0	4.6	3
China*	32.0	25.9	41.8	0.4	100.0	1.8	3.8	11
Hong Kong (SAR of China)	21.6	26.3	52.1	0.1	100.0	1.6	4.2	31
Taiwan	34.8	32.6	32.3	0.3	100.0	0.7	1.9	n.a.
United States of America	24.3	26.7	49.0	--	100.0	0.6	3.9	10
Viet Nam	14.8	22.7	61.8	0.7	100.0	0.5	5.3	3
Indonesia	43.8	27.2	28.8	0.2	100.0	0.4	1.4	7
Total Overseas Born	22.5	23.5	53.5	0.5	100.0	20.8	4.6	5

Source: ABS (2002).

* excludes SARs and Taiwan Province.

a Listed countries of birth are those with the most emigrants during 1999-2000.

b Permanent departures 1999-2000 per 1,000 preliminary estimated population of the same country of birth resident in Australia on 30 June 1999.

Table 5: Permanent and long-term out movement of the Australia-born who went to New Zealand, 1994-2002

Year	Total	Sex Ratio	Per cent
1994-95	4,838	86.3	9.3
1995-96	5,408	89.1	10.0
1996-97	5,159	98.5	8.9
1997-98	5,125	97.0	8.2
1998-99	6,072	90.3	8.3
1999-2000	7,074	93.8	8.8
2000-01	7,426	92.6	8.3
2001-02	7,317	94.0	8.1

Source: Hugo, Rudd and Harris (2001).

It is interesting to note that while the New Zealand population in Australia is similar in its characteristics to that of the Australia-born when age is standardised. However, this is not the case for the Australia-born in New Zealand. Ho and Muntz (2003) have demonstrated with respect to data from the 2001 New Zealand population census that the Australia-born are quite a selective group in terms of income, education and occupation. Hence the New Zealand to Australia migration has much less of a 'brain drain' character than the movement from Australia to New Zealand.

Table 6: New Zealanders confirmed with Australian citizenship, 1996-2002

Year	Number	Rank	Per cent of Total
2001-02	17,334	1	20.1
2000-01	11,007	2	15.0
1999-2000	6,676	3	9.4
1998-99	6,320	3	8.3
1997-98	8,764	3	7.8
1996-97	9,982	3	9.2

Source: DIMIA (2002).

Trans-Tasman Migration: A Special Relationship

It is apparent that Trans-Tasman migration looms very large in the international migration profiles of both Australia and New Zealand. It is important to point out, however, that in both countries the Trans-Tasman

flow is quite different to any of their other international movements either country shares with any other origin or destination country. What are the distinctive features of this migration? The first issue is that Trans-Tasman migration, at least from an Australian perspective, in many respects is more similar to internal migration within Australia than it is to other international migrations which influence the country. This similarity relates to the characteristics of the migrants (Hugo 2003a) but also to where New Zealanders settle in Australia. New Zealanders tend to settle in places which are also the main destinations of internal migrants within Australia (Bell and Hugo 2000; Hugo 2003b). However, perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Trans-Tasman movement is its circularity. While the data which are available make it difficult to detect it there is, as is the case with internal migration, a great deal of circular movement across the Tasman. These circuits vary in periodicity from short periods to, a working holiday of a year, to work assignments of a few years to workers spending their working lives in the destination area and returning home upon retirement.

The circularity involved in the Trans-Tasman flow has not been given sufficient prominence in the overwhelming focus on the New Zealand to Australia movement. It has been shown here that there is a very substantial counterflow to the main movement and that flow is more selective of high skill high income groups than the New Zealand to Australia movement. Bedford *et al.* (2003:19) point out that 'it will behove (New Zealand) policy makers to be more conscious of flows of New Zealanders back into the country, as well as the more frequently discussed flows of citizens overseas and of new immigrants into the country'. The present paper strongly supports this position and suggests that this perspective is important from the Australian end of Trans-Tasman migration as well as at the New Zealand end.

Hence Trans-Tasman migration is largely movement within, rather than between, labour markets. This is partly the result of, and been a causal factor in, the special migration relationship between the country. However, recent developments in Australian migration policy have arguably been directed at bringing Trans-Tasman migration more into line with other immigration to the country. The changes made have predominantly reduced New Zealander access to social security rather than restricted the right of entry to, or to work in, Australia. Australian immigration policy over the

period since 1996 has seen a sharpening of the focus on skilled movement and the selection of settlers on the basis of skills in demand in the Australian labour market. New Zealand citizens coming to Australia initially had immediate access to Australian social security but in 1986 a waiting period of 6 months was introduced and in 2000 this was increased to two years. However, the 2001 changes have meant New Zealanders need to qualify as permanent residents of Australia in order to be eligible for social security. As Birrell and Rapson (2002) point out, this will create two categories of New Zealanders in Australia:

- Those who qualify for permanent residency – i.e. meet the criteria that other economic migrants to Australia have to meet.
- Those who can't meet those criteria and are hence 'indefinite temporary residents'.

The motivations of the Australian government in introducing those initiatives have also been discussed by Birrell and Rapson (2002) who argue that it involves the following:

- An attempt to reduce the numbers of New Zealand citizens receiving social security.
- To prevent immigrants from Third countries who cannot meet Australian immigration criteria gaining a 'back door' entry through New Zealand because it is considered that entry to New Zealand may be easier than that to Australia.
- To bring the whole immigration system more under the control of government immigration policy.

Australia and New Zealand in the Changing Global International Migration Situation

Global international migration systems have undergone a profound change in recent years (Massey *et al.* 1998). Some of the major shifts include the following:

- An increase in the numbers of people moving between countries (United Nations 2002).
- An increase in the flows from so-called 'south' nations to 'north' countries.
- A transformation of much of Europe from being the world's major region of emigration to being one of the world's major immigration destinations. Hence, whereas for most of the postwar period the bulk of

global permanent international migration was directed to the 'traditional' immigration nations of North America and Oceania, all OECD nations are now countries of immigration.⁴

- In the immigration nations there has been a marked bifurcation in immigration policy. Firstly, these nations have become more welcoming to migrants with high levels of human capital in terms of skills and business resources and acumen. For these groups, it has become easier to enter OECD countries as permanent or temporary residents with the right to work. Secondly, however, increasing barriers have been erected by OECD nations to preclude potential immigrants without these characteristics.
- Increased migration, mainly from south to north countries, associated with an expansion of an immigration industry.

As part of the process of globalisation, there is an increasing realisation that to be competitive in the global economy, nations need a high quality labour force. Accordingly, competition for highly skilled workers, especially those associated with innovation and technology transfer, has greatly increased between countries, especially the high, and to some extent, middle income countries (OECD 2001). Whereas previously the competition for such workers as settlers was largely between the four traditional migration countries, the competition is now between more than 20 nations. Australia and New Zealand have been competitors in this market. However, one can ask the question as to whether there would be some advantages in cooperation in this area. In the increasingly strong global competition for skilled workers, there may be some advantages in joint activities to attract such workers and especially in harmonisation of regulations and processes relating to this movement. This is particularly the case since it is likely that there will be a substantial increase in competition for skilled workers (OECD 2001).

One implication of the fact that Australia and New Zealand in many respects constitute a single labour market is that there may be benefits to the two countries harmonising to some extent their labour market strategies. Both countries have experienced massive structural changes which have rendered some skills redundant and shortages of skills in other areas. There may be advantages to cooperating with respect to meeting shortages of skills which are constraints to economic growth. International

migration, permanent and temporary, as one of the strategies available to meet these shortages would be part of this collaboration both in terms of Trans-Tasman exchanges but also in recruitment of skilled workers from elsewhere.

There could also be some advantages in cooperation in the growing area of national relationships with the diaspora of citizens living abroad. New Zealand has perhaps a million citizens living in other nations (Bedford 2001) and Australia has a similar sized diaspora (Hugo, Rudd and Harris 2003). In both cases, the diasporas are highly skilled and can contribute significantly to development of their home country. Of course, the New Zealand diaspora is substantially larger in relation to its total population as Table 7 indicates. However, it could be argued that both countries confront a similar situation in that they are experiencing a substantial emigration of the brightest and the best among their young people. Certainly, in both cases they are being replaced by a skilled immigration intake. Nevertheless, both countries could benefit substantially from developing effective policies which:

- Encourage the diaspora to participate in the development activity in their home countries.
- Encourage return migration among the diaspora.

Table 7: National diasporas in relation to resident national populations

USA	7 million – 2.5 per cent of national population
Australia	900,000 – 4.3 per cent of national population
New Zealand	850,000 – 21.9 per cent of national population

The first type of policies may include (Hugo, Rudd and Harris 2003) such issues as:

- Encouragement of the diaspora to invest in their home country either through remittances or through encouraging investment from citizens overseas or the companies for which they work in foreign countries.
- Utilising the presence of the diaspora in other countries to develop trade, business and other commercial opportunities for the home country.
- Utilising the presence of the diaspora to encourage rapid and effective technology transfers.

With respect to return migration, there is an increasing focus on “reverse brain drain” as a significant process which can contribute to the

economic development of origin nations (Lucas 2001). Research in Australia suggests that there is a high level of propensity among expatriates in the diaspora to return to their homeland, although there are a number of constraints which militate to prevent these desires to be operationalised in many cases (Hugo, Rudd and Harris 2003). In New Zealand it is already apparent that there has been a significant degree of return migration in the case of the Australian arm of the diaspora (Bedford *et al.* 2003). In both cases, the propensity to return seems to be greatest in the family formation stage of the life cycle so that they are still in the economically active ages. Indeed, returnees can be doubly of value to the economy in that they not only cancel out the loss of human capital that their emigration caused but also they return with greater experience and skill and a network of international connections and networks which can be of value to the national economy.

However, there is a dearth of empirical knowledge and understanding with respect to return migration, especially as it relates to contemporary diasporas. Moreover, there are few examples available of policies developed by origin countries which have been successful in encouraging return migration. Most examples have been in Asian countries and have met with limited success (Hugo, Rudd and Harris 2003). There is considerable similarity between Australia and New Zealand in this respect and there could be considerable value in a joint initiative which is designed to develop a component of existing immigration policy which focuses on bringing back expatriates, especially those with skills and experience which are perceived to be of utility to national development. In the increasing global competition for such skills who better to recruit into the incoming flow of settlers than former citizens who are initially attracted to the home country and who can readily adapt to the situation in their home country? There is no competitive advantage of Australia or New Zealand because effective policies will attract back expatriates from their respective diasporas.

A final area of possible cooperation between Australia and New Zealand relates to the controversial area of border protection. There is a growing realisation from such initiatives as the 2003 'Bali Process' that the whole issue of people smuggling and trafficking is best approached through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. There would seem to be potential for joint activity, harmonisation of regulations etc. in this area.

Conclusion

Australia and New Zealand have many shared values and interests in international migration. They have enjoyed a special bilateral international migration relationship for a long period and indeed movement between the two nations is in many ways more like internal, than international, migration. Globally, international migration policies of nations tend to be governed almost entirely by perceived national interests and national sovereignty issues, with the partial exception of the international refugee migration regime. However, development in NAFTA and the European Union have pointed toward the benefits of thinking more regionally in the development of migration policy. In such a context, one has to ask whether there would be advantages to both Australia and New Zealand through examining the possibility of working together in the development of some aspects of international migration policy. Undoubtedly, cooperation between states with respect to migration can be beneficial to both states. This paper has suggested that there are several areas where Australia and New Zealand face similar issues and problems in the changing global international migration situation. At least sharing research and experience will be of advantage to both countries and it is likely that both can benefit from some joint activities and harmonisation of policies in some of these areas.

Notes

- 1 Via a Special Category Visa entry system.
- 2 DIMIA definition of permanent, long-term and short-term movements:
 Permanent Movement – persons migrating to Australia and residents departing permanently.
 Long-Term Movement – temporary visa holders arriving and residents departing temporarily with the intention to stay in Australia or abroad for twelve months or more, and the departure of temporary visa holders and the return of residents who had stayed in Australia or abroad for twelve months or more.
 Short-Term Movement – travellers whose intended or actual stay in Australia or abroad is less than twelve months.
- 3 That is: Permanent departures during 1999-2000 per 1,000 New Zealanders in Australia in 1999.
- 4 Along with a number of fast growing economies such as Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand (Hugo 2003c).

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The End of World Population Growth in the 21st Century: Implications for Sustainable Communities

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Abstract

The dramatic growth of the world's population in the 20th Century will be replaced by much slower population growth in the 21st Century. The world's population will likely peak this century and for some countries the peak may have already passed with growing concerns of how to organize "down-sizing" societies. New Zealand will almost certainly peak in size in about 40 years.

The implications for our cities, communities, and neighborhoods are not obvious, but we know that changes in population composition will change living arrangements and by extension, transportation use. There will likely be fewer work trips, relatively, compared to non-work trips. We would not expect the dependence on the automobile to change but a graying population will likely be more dependent on public transportation. The way in which the city is organized will change only slowly but smaller families, more single, and especially women elderly will require a different kind of housing stock and a different transportation service than currently exists.

There is substantial evidence that the two-century long period of continuing population growth is coming to an end. It may be another half century before growth slows and eventually reverses in the developing world, but in our children's life times we will most likely be worrying about too few people rather than too many people. There is already evidence that economic growth in New Zealand is constrained by the slow demographic growth.

The data overall suggests that New Zealand's population will peak in the fourth decade of the century and then, as in much of the developed world

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we will be faced with an aging population with little likelihood of substantial replacement. Immigration will be the driver that changes total population in the developed world but even immigration at high levels will not change the fundamental equation – fewer young households and a growing elderly population. While the implications are not always obvious we can suggest that there will be more concern with transportation to health clinics than to the workplace. We can only speculate on the actual outcomes, but we can be sure that planning for the changed population growth will at the very least need to invoke a different and more flexible set of strategies than are currently on offer.

We who are living at the beginning of the 21st Century are entering “demographic terra incognita” – a world which will be even more different for those who live to the second half of the 21st Century. The old world of continuing, and worrying, population growth is ending, to be replaced by declining populations and rapidly changing age structures. We are transitioning from a world with a surfeit of babies to a world with a surfeit of elders. Thirty years ago the world was crowded with babies, now it is crowded, or soon will be, with elders. What does this mean? How will it affect our crowded world and our cities? What are the implications for sustainability and more specifically, for moving around within it?

Now, like all discussions of the future, a caveat or two is in order. Although many of the demographic outcomes I will discuss are based on fairly firm knowledge about population fertility and mortality, the role of migration is much more volatile and may disrupt our best estimates. Indeed, in a small country like New Zealand, the impact of migration may be the most critical factor in future change (Bedford *et al.* 2001). Moreover, predictions in the past have proven both on and off the mark – so keep a wary eye on all predictions including those in this paper.


Our Demographic Past

Demographic changes will give New Zealand a very different look in the next few decades but at the same time, the changes here are not unrelated to the broader world demographic processes. In the past century the world changed from 1.6 billion to 6.1 billion, a change that is easy to remember given the symmetry of the numbers. The very rapid increase in the world’s population, especially in the developing world, led Paul Erlich in 1968 to predict famine, hunger and a population crisis. His book – *The Population*

Bomb, defined thinking about the “the population crisis” for much of the last three decades of the twentieth century. He took his message to the U.N. to the Johnny Carson show and the world population summits in Stockholm and Washington. Undergraduate population textbooks, the media and population think tanks still discuss the coming 12 billion world population even though the U.N. has already scaled back the likely maximum world population. Now current estimates suggest that the world population will peak at about 9.3 billion.

How did the world grow nearly threefold in a hundred years? How did the world grow from 1.6 to 6.1 billion? Let us step back for a moment and review what demographers call the demographic transition. This paradigm describes how in the late 18th and 19th Centuries a rise in living standards and health in general led to declines in mortality which were followed with a time lag by a decline in fertility. That interaction, at different rates and with different formats created a gradual transition from a smaller slowly growing population which had both high fertility and high mortality to a larger rapidly growing population which after the transition had both low fertility and low mortality. Of course, the difference between suddenly much lower death rates and continuing much higher fertility rates led a substantially expanded world population.

Figure 1: Examples of the Demographic Transition



Source: Reprinted from *Transitions in World Population*, Population Bulletin 59, Washington, D.C. Population Reference Bureau, 2004.

Examples from Sweden and Mexico illustrate both the outcomes of the demographic transition and its temporal nature (Figure 1). It has run its course in Sweden but started much later in Mexico and has some time to come to completion. Mexico did not really start the decline in the death rate until the second decade of the 20th century while Sweden as in most European nations the process began around 1800.

Demographers struggle with why fertility rates declined but most demographers do not feel that there was any one cause, rather a combination of social changes, lower infant mortality, women's education, and better methods of contraception are all implicated in the process of fertility decline. It is a process clearly related to modernization and economic change.

The process happened in New Zealand too, though as a country of immigration beginning half way through the 19th Century, there is a slightly different structure to the graphs (Figure 2). However, the change from high to low fertility is unmistakable and the graph also shows that death rates had already declined in the early decades of New Zealand's settlement. It was primarily the young who migrated and in a sense part of the demographic transition had already occurred in England. One might even say that the elderly were left to die in England. The spike in the death rate for the first world war is paralleled in the European countries, as is the baby boom high fertility of the two decades after the end of World War Two.


The outcome of the demographic transition is a greatly enlarged population. While the world grew from 1.6 to 6.1 billion people in the 20th Century, the New Zealand population increased from less than a million in 1900 to 3.8 million in 2000. It is a similar relative growth.

New Zealand had 115,000 people in 1858, when most of the planned settlements were only a decade old, and with continuing immigration reached a million in 1911 and nearly two million in 1950. At the 2000 Census the New Zealand population was a little less than four million people.

Along with population increase, at both the world and NZ scales, there has been a dramatic increase in life expectancy (Figure 3). Only a few decades ago many of us would be long dead, though perhaps not if you were born in New Zealand as you can see from the chart. New Zealand was ahead of the curve in life expectancy. The average life expectancy in 1900 was about 50 in the world as a whole but it was already 57 for men and 60 for


women. There has been a dramatic increase in life expectancy. In 1800, only two centuries ago, life expectancy was about 35 years at birth. Today, life expectancy in the OEEC is approximately 75 years though it is still only 63 years in developing countries. Women in New Zealand as in the world at large live longer and have reached a truly notable 81 years for a girl born in New Zealand in the first decade of the 21st Century in New Zealand.

Figure 2: The Demographic Transition in New Zealand



Source: Statistics New Zealand

Figure 3: Life expectancy, New Zealand and the World



Source: UN Population Division and Statistics New Zealand

The Demographic Future

But what do these changes mean, what can we make of the demographic future, especially in New Zealand? At the same time I must reiterate that we are entering demographic terra incognita and nowhere more so than in the new estimates of world population numbers. Already, the United Nations has lowered their estimates of total world population and the current estimates now envisage a world population of about 9 billion or less – still a growth of nearly 3 billion. Population growth will continue a while in the developing countries, mostly from momentum – the growth that continues even after fertility reaches replacement level- but as we will show later, in China, India, Indonesia, population is going to stop growing this century.

New thoughts on what the world population numbers might be emphasize the evidence of continuing declines in fertility. All the evidence points to continuing declines in fertility. I put to one side the interesting question of whether we are close to maximum life expectancy that will sustain, but not increase population size.

Most current questions are about the speed of fertility decline, how quickly countries will reach, and go below, replacement fertility and what is the path of fertility decline in the future (Singer 1999)? At first demographers expected fertility to decline to replacement level and stop but increasingly the evidence is that fertility declines will not stop at the replacement level of 2.1 (Lopez 2001). Already, New Zealand's fertility rate is at 1.96. The evidence also suggests that fertility will decline well below replacement level as has occurred already in Italy and the Russian Federation. At the same time it is not clear that fertility will stay below replacement level without some social response – say pro-natal policies by governments or deeper value changes in society at large. However, it also seems unlikely that fertility will go up a great deal as a set of social changes has locked lower fertility in place (Bruni 2002). Declining marriage rates, increased cohabitation without children, increasing labor force participation by women and the increasing costs of having and educating children will tend to keep fertility low.

In Italy as a whole the fertility rate was 1.2 and Spain's is even lower. In much of Northern Italy the rates are below 1.0. These rates have not changed much even in the light of extensive child care alternatives and full salaries for a half a year of maternity leave. People are studying longer, thus finding work later, and then marrying later. In addition, prosperity has

altered people's expectations, and those expectations no longer include large or even two child families. The outcome is slowing population growth and a progression towards a population peak sometime this century and for some countries the peak has already approached and past. It is likely that several European countries, for example, Italy, The Netherlands, Germany, if they grow, will only grow with immigration.

What does the World, and the New Zealand population, look like under the scenarios of slowing or declining fertility? There are a number of scenarios which are based on probabilistic simulations. At the world level 90 per cent of the simulations suggest a world population of 5.8-10.2 billion, 70 per cent of the simulations suggest a range of 5.8-8.5 billion and a very large number of simulations suggest a much smaller world population (Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov 2004). The range is a simple measure of the uncertainty. Before the AIDS epidemic many ranges were larger and wider. I do not address the AIDS problem directly but we must recognize that how it is played out in Africa will have major implications for future growth, and sustainability in that region. The estimates of future rates are based on only sketchy surveys and we do not know the long term population losses from AIDS but they may be very large.

We do not yet have probabilistic measures for New Zealand's population peak. Even so it is reasonable to suggest that New Zealand's population will also peak in the next half century. Even with the assumption by Statistics New Zealand of a fertility decline to only 2.1, that is that the fertility decline does not continue past replacement level, NZ Statistics predicts a peak in New Zealand's population about 2045- around 40 years from now. The peak is not in question, the issue is the timing of the peak.

Now, there is at least one complication in predicting population peaks, not so much at a world scale, but at local scales such as in New Zealand. International migration is volatile and fluctuating and only partially under the political control of governments (Bedford and Ho, 1998). Perhaps the control is more extensive in New Zealand but nonetheless there are questions of how many immigrants to admit and in what interval. To return to volatility, the issue is well illustrated with a consideration of Australian immigration. It was about 112,000 per year in the early 1970s, much lower at about 54,000 in the late 1970s but more than 100, 000 annually in the 1980s. There is no reason to believe that future flows to Australia and New

Zealand will be any less volatile. Just how that will affect the decline in fertility is currently unknown.

New Zealand's immigration has indeed been quite variable on a year to year basis but overall it shows a steady increase since the change in immigration policy in the 1970s. It is a small part of the population growth in New Zealand simply because departures often exceed arrivals and there are many years in which the net migration, the balance of arrivals and departures, is negative.


Even with the uncertainties created by international migration I must emphasize that shrinking populations are not something of the distant future – they are here now, if not yet in New Zealand, certainly in Europe. Indeed there is at least a reasonable probability that the population in the Pacific OECD as a whole (influenced by the rapidly slowing population growth in Japan) will peak sometime prior to 2025.

Clearly doomsday prophecies of global overpopulation are stressed at the expense of a slowing and aging population. They distract attention from the issues of improving the quality of life for all people. They also distract attention from the societal changes that will be needed to adapt to smaller workforces, fewer children in schools and a larger elderly population needing clinics, medical facilities and social services more generally.

Demographic Implications

Population growth will continue, much of it from population momentum (births to the large number of third world women 15-45) which will continue to expand the world population mostly in the developing world before it peaks late this century. In the developed world the slowing in growth and fewer births will fundamentally change the population composition in Europe, the OECD and New Zealand. In turn there will be a surfeit of elders not of babies. Even in developing nations the elderly population will grow significantly.

The numbers of older persons are already large in some countries and will grow dramatically in the next several decades. One hundred years ago New Zealand was a country of young people. Even a decade ago, only about 10 percent of New Zealand's population was aged 65+. But by about 2025 in just two decades, 20 per cent of the New Zealand population will be over 65 and that proportion will continue to increase.

Figure 4: The aging population in New Zealand

Source: Statistics New Zealand

Just as in the discussions of population growth in the 1960s there is a crisis approach to aging. A new review of the aging phenomenon - “Gray Dawn” - argues that the challenge of global aging is like a massive iceberg lurking beneath the waves with associated wrenching economic and social costs that will bankrupt even the greatest powers (Peterson 1999). In the “Gray Dawn” scenario, existing pension and health programs are unsustainable (p.66) and will require fundamental adjustments in our pension and health care programs.

The literature on the growing aging population examines a number of policy implications including working longer, (or increasing the age of qualification) targeting pensioner need, mandated saving programs and reducing overall pensions. These discussions are not central to my major concerns in this paper but there is no doubt that the number of the elderly and the dependency ratio is increasing and there will need to be changes in how we deal with this growing aging population.

The world dependency ratio (those who are retired to those of working age -65+/ 15-64) and New Zealand’s dependency ratio is increasing. For much of the 20th Century the dependency ratio hovered around 10 to 15 and changed only slowly. Beginning about 1990 the ratio began to increase rapidly and is already 25 in Italy but still only about 15 or 17 in New

Zealand. However, it will grow to about 70 in Japan by the middle of this century and to about 41 or 42 in New Zealand. That is, many fewer working people to people not in the workforce. While the rate is not nearly close to Japan or Italy it is still a significant change from the past (Bongaarts 2004).

Implications of the Demographic Story

The implications of the demographic story revolve around questions of population numbers and composition and larger issues of social and urban changes that in turn affect the structure of communities and transportation within them. Populations in developed societies are aging and the current evidence is that immigration cannot be sustained at sufficient levels to offset the rapid changes in fertility and the growing elderly population. The alternative, to change fertility levels, requires a well-developed population policy and strategy.

Studies of the problem in the European Union, which has a similar overall problem have concluded that the numbers required to offset aging would be unacceptable in the current socio-political climate (Grant et al, 2004). The increase in low skill, low education immigrants raises the question of social exclusion and the creation of an immigrant underclass. While it is a topic of extreme sensitivity in New Zealand the continuing flow of some Pacific Island groups may be tending to just this issue. Fertility is increased but so is social exclusion and underclass behavior. If immigration provides only a slowing of the process what other alternatives exist in developed nation states. Clearly, government policies can return to the process of encouraging family formation and higher fertility.

However, even where pro-natalist policies have been in place there are mixed stories. Government policies can have an effect on fertility. The pro-natalist policy in East Germany increased total fertility from 1.54 to 1.94 in a five year period in the 1970s, and both Poland and the former German Democratic Republic had declines in fertility after pro-natalist policies were halted. In contrast, in Poland, once economic transformation began in the 1980s and 1990s, fertility decreased rapidly. Clearly, it is related to women's labor force participation and the changing economy. Interestingly, economic growth and prosperity seem to drive down fertility and so decrease growth.

It seems plausible too, that fertility declines may be related less to policy changes and even not susceptible to policy intervention than to the wider social and economic environment. As we noted, in Italy, and Spain, the very

low fertility rates have been explained by high young adult unemployment rates, high housing costs and the tendency for young adults to live at home well into their thirties (Grant *et al.* 2004). While policies may have some impact the evidence is that no one approach will answer the fertility issue. Sweden has reversed fertility declines through policies of parental leave that allowed women to raise children and stay in the workforce. Even so the total fertility rate is still low. France has focused on the birth of the third child, and the former GDR used paid educational leave, monthly family allowances and interest free loans to newly married couples to increase fertility (Grant *et al.* 2004).

However, fertility is not our major concern in the discussion in this paper, though it lurks behind the future of developed world economies. Lack of population growth is not a problem in and of itself, rather it is its large impact on the viability of economic growth and by extension on the ability of economies to provide support for an aging population (The Economist 2004). Still, at the moment our concerns are more immediate, the implications of a slowing population for transportation and sustainable communities.

Implications for Transportation and Sustainable Communities

What does a slow growing and aging population mean for the way we organize our communities and how we move around in them? Discussions of these questions often revolve around sustainable urban form – but what is it and how will we know when we have achieved it? To realize a sustainable community there has to be a concept of what it will look like, how it will function and how it will change over time (Williams, Burton, Jenks, 2000). For now the concept is loosely defined and the best its proponents have done is say that it revolves around the idea that the needs of the present should be met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. How does this apply to how our cities should be organized?

Urban Form and Sustainable Communities

Most people would agree that flourishing communities, however, defined, are an important element of a healthy society. It is in local communities that


the complex issues of housing, business development, public participation and access to services and safety and crime have their immediate impact on individuals and their households. Can we build these sustainable communities, or at least enhance the possibilities for such communities to grow and develop?

Unfortunately, much of the rhetoric focuses on pejorative statements about our hyper-consumptive throwaway economy (www.newdream.org) rather than coming to terms with what it means to construct these new communities. Bartering and volunteerism and the rejection of mega-chain stores are seen as the solution by some, but of course they are only symptoms of a changing society and one which in fact is providing more goods at lower costs than at any time in the past of human development. How do we increase the liveability of cities while at the same time reducing the consumption of material resources? Indeed, should we reduce consumption at all?

It does appear that the processes that guided urban growth in the late 19th and early 20th centuries are under stress as cities enter the 21st century. Yet, many planners and city officials cling to 20th century technology in the 21st century – more public, fixed rail transportation in the face of overwhelming evidence that fixed rail public mass transit works only in some limited physical environments – the metro in Paris and London perhaps. Alternative systems, automated traffic monitoring systems on major highways for example, may be a decade or two away but they are already “planning” possibilities and other technological innovations will change how we use the car rather than making obsolete the most flexible transportation system ever.

Demography shows that the new “urban unit” is the household of one to three members, many are one or two members. We also know that there is going to be a growing share of older people and a growth of non-family lifestyles. The old urban patterns organized around families and children are unlikely to be the format of the future. In addition, telecommuting, contract work, self-employment and more fluid workplace involvement are likely to blur the links between home and work place. So what are the alternative urban forms and what are their likelihoods?

We can simplify that into two scenarios for future urban patterns – the decentralized city and the compact city (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Alternative Urban forms

Source: Clark and Kuijpers-Linde (1994).

One of these urban forms, perhaps typified by the large metropolitan complexes like Los Angeles, has jobs and residences spread across a considerable spatial extent. The compact city in contrast, harks back to the centralized and walled cities of the past. We still have centralized cities and if the “so called” smart growth movement had its way we would have more of them. But in general it appears that decentralization is the current rule. The evidence from Los Angeles to Auckland is that cities are growing in a decentralized manner. The author of edge cities (Garreau 1991) has gone so far as to suggest that all cities that are growing are growing in the manner of Los Angeles. Not necessarily lower density cities but growth around distributed nodes throughout the urban region. Car dependence is inevitable but the decentralized city exponents argue that ongoing decentralization will create dispersed concentrations of jobs, retail activity, and services. The decentralization will in the end reduce commutes and lessen dependence on the automobile. Certainly residents are still voting with their feet for suburban/exurban/rural locales.

In contrast the compact city is based on the European experience that privileges relatively low resource use and intensive public planning and control. Most recently the compact city has been the ruling mode for the Dutch Physical planning agency with strict controls on outward urban expansion, shifts from car to non-car modes and high density infill and city edge development. Even the compact city has been under criticism (Dieleman and Faludi 1998; Priemus 1999) but it is still the major

alternative to the dispersed, multi-nodal city which characterizes much of the United States. Whether the touted transportation savings will materialize in the compact city is still unknown but it is vigorously advanced by planners (Calthorpe and Fulton 1993). Smart growth is really a variant of the compact city which recognizes that growth will occur and the issue is how to manage that growth to reduce car use and increase density. In that sense it is closer to the compact city ideas than to that of the dispersed city.

Rather than debate the values of what are really quite different approaches to 21st Century urbanism we might end this section by suggesting that by focusing on the either or scenarios we are limiting our flexibility with respect to the urban future. Less may be more in terms of planning and infra-structural settings and our access within urban structures. There is no question that the needs of developed nations in the 21st Century differ in at least two fundamental ways from the societal needs of the 20th Century. First, the impact of the economic and social changes brought by globalism and the emergence of the knowledge based economy, created a change from a task based workforce to a knowledge based workforce. Second, the increasing gender participation and equality in the workforce has generated and continues to generate a substantially different workforce than three or four decades ago. In the US women now earn 55 per cent of the BA degrees, and nearly 40 per cent of the doctorates and they own nearly 40 per cent of the small businesses. These demographic changes are at least as likely to drive changes in the organization of urban spaces, as are the philosophical arguments about cars and public transportation. Hence flexible, rather than doctrinaire approaches to urban form are critical to the continuing development and change in cities.

Transportation

Nowhere are the arguments about sustainable communities more contested than in the areas of transportation modes, and the antagonism to the car.

When I was growing up, getting a driver's license and access to the family car meant freedom... some part of me still carries that association. But the larger part associates driving with traffic jams, non-productive time and expense...more and more, we have nowhere to go in our cars. If we surrender our towns, country side and cities to the car, we will also be surrendering many other values ... neighbourhood life, a sense of history and place, a sense of belonging somewhere (Transportation and Urban Design: www.newdream.org/transport).

And the criticism of the car goes on to document the yearly costs to the family budget, oil consumption and air pollution.

The car is often juxtaposed to the bicycle or public transportation or at least to carpool lanes.

Bike paths are springing up in communities across the country. High occupancy vehicle lanes have proven effective at rewarding those who carpool and citizens are returning to cities as downtown areas reclaim their popularity (Cities without cars: www.sustainable.state.fl.us).

And, the anti- car groups are adamant about the coming changes as the following quote suggests.

The current automobile age is coming to a rapid halt within the lifetime of most people under 50 today. Car free cities are not a matter of choice to be debated they are inevitable (www.sustainable.state.fl.us).

Most of the discussion does not provide alternatives beyond walking and bicycling and the discussion never addresses the demographic issue raised in the first part of my discussion – population aging. Even in 20 years the number of New Zealanders over 65 will nearly double. As the number of the elderly increases so too will their mobility needs. The implications for transportation are fairly clear. As people grow older they are less able or less willing to drive which means alternative methods of transportation. Declining health, eyesight or physical and mental abilities will likely limit car use amongst the elderly and it is unlikely that the bicycle will be the alternative.

While there is no doubt that moderate exercise, walking or riding a bicycle can contribute to a healthy life style the issue is how to integrate those needs with the journey to work and commuting. Already, only half of all trips are work trips and the elderly are likely to make many non-work trips.

How can communities be redesigned to cope with both residence work trips and the trips to clinics, health care facilities and recreation centers. Distributed centers are likely to be an important part of the new structure as is some form of flexible transportation to link people and the distributed centers. Rather than fixed rail or central focused hub and spoke systems perhaps a flexible transportation systems of private buses or cars based on those which operate in developing countries (a jitney system) where pick up and drop off along flexible routes may provide better, and cheaper, service than current strategies.

I am not a transportation planner but the demographic data suggests that at the very least future transportation planning will need to provide a wide range of mobility alternatives. Transportation is one part of getting people to places they want to go. Transportation and community and housing development whether in a dispersed or compact environment must maintain flexibility to meet the needs of a demographically changing population. Fewer locked in commitments may be the most flexible way to proceed.

Conclusion

New Zealand's population will continue to grow slowly but within four decades it is likely to peak and stabilize. Future changes in the population will depend on policy responses to already low fertility but it is unlikely that the population will have the growth rates of the 20th Century. Continuing immigration will have some effect on the population size but the current policies of about 5000 entries per year will not fundamentally change the estimates. In this sense the growth of New Zealand's population is very similar to that of the other advanced information/technology societies in the OECD.

The slowing population growth and the related increase in the elderly population will generate a real need to re-think the way in which we construct cities and provide transportation within and between cities. The debates about how to provide transportation are mired in a contest between those who celebrate the freedom of the automobile and those who would have us move to car-free cities. In fact the public/ private debate does not deal with how to provide transportation to the growing elderly population who will be more concerned with getting to their health appointment than to a job. That concern suggests an emphasis on flexibility rather than on a doctrinaire pro or anti-car approach. The central issue is to move to 21st Century responses to 21st Century problems rather than 19th Century answers to 21st Century problems.

There will be fewer work trips, relatively, compared to non-work trips simply because of the changing dependency ratio. Trips to doctors and clinics and for leisure will vie with travel to work. We would not expect the dependence on the automobile to change but a graying population will likely be more dependent on some form of alternative transportation, and they will not be using bicycles and bike paths. Jitneys and non-point to point

transportation systems will be needed to supplement automobiles and public transportation. The way in which the city is organized will change only slowly but smaller families, more single, and especially women elderly will require a different kind of housing stock than the current emphasis on large suburban low density homes.

Demography suggests that we proceed carefully and perhaps with an eye to better transportation pricing but I will leave that discussion to the transportation planners. In a different context some thoughtful writers suggest that in fifty years time we will be running things, not least our cities towns and communities, in different ways (Beito, Gordon and Tabarrok 2004). Just what those ways will be will emerge if we emphasize the embeddedness of demographic change and use flexibility to respond to the changing needs of our changing society.

Notes

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the NZ Transit, Towards Sustainable Land Transport Conference, November, 2004.

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New Zealanders in Australia in 2001

GRAEME HUGO*

Abstract

New Zealand shares a special migration relationship with Australia so that over three per cent of the Australian population were born in New Zealand, have a parent born in New Zealand or are New Zealand citizens. The migration of New Zealanders to Australia in many respects is more like internal migrants within Australia than it is to other international immigrants in the country reflecting both the integration of the labour markets of the two countries and the special category visa for which New Zealanders are eligible. The first part of this paper uses Australian immigration and census data to analyse trends in permanent and non permanent movement from New Zealand to Australia as well as the flow back across the Tasman. The second analyses the characteristics of the migrants. It demonstrates that the flow of New Zealanders into Australia is less selective on the basis of education and occupation than is the flow from Australia to New Zealand. New Zealanders are less concentrated in Australia's major cities than other immigrant groups. They are a relatively young population and have a higher level of labour force participation. However, if age is standardized there are a few differences between the New Zealand-born and the Australia-born populations.

New Zealand shares a special migration relationship with Australia which has seen New Zealanders become the second largest overseas-born group in the nation in 2001. Some 355,765 Australian residents were born in New Zealand and a further 199,988¹ were Australia-born with at least one New Zealand-born parent. Moreover, at the end of 2001, there were an additional 117,018 New Zealand citizens present in Australia who were born in countries other than New Zealand. Population movement between New Zealand and Australia in many respects has been more similar to internal migration within Australia than it is to international migration from other countries. The Special Category Visa (SCV) for which New Zealand citizens are eligible places little restriction on entry of New Zealanders to Australia and traditionally their relatively free

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
access to almost all of the educational and welfare benefits available to permanent residents meant that: "In effect they were granted permanent residence without having to meet standards required of citizens of other nations" (Birrell and Rapson 2001:61).

Moreover, many labour markets have extended across the Tasman to include both New Zealand and Australia so that New Zealanders in Australia resemble the Australian population in their demographic characteristics and behaviour more than any other immigrant group. Over the last two decades, restrictions have been gradually introduced which have mainly been directed at limiting access of New Zealanders to social security. This culminated in the February 2001 announcement of new arrangements whereby New Zealand citizens are required to obtain permanent Australian residence if they wish to access certain social security payments (subject to a two year eligibility waiting period for most payments), obtain Australian citizenship or sponsor their family members for permanent residence (Birrell and Rapson 2001). There has been a great deal of discussion about the impact of these changes on flows from New Zealand to Australia (eg. Bedford, Ho and Hugo 2003). Nevertheless, the fact remains that the constraints on New Zealand movement to Australia are less than for any other group and there is no real limit on the number of New Zealanders who are able to come to Australia. The present paper is an initial analysis of the New Zealand origin population in Australia as indicated in the Australian census. It begins, however, with an examination of recent trends in movement of New Zealanders to Australia.


New Zealand Migration to Australia

New Zealand migration to Australia has been substantial throughout the second half of the post World War II period when as Figure 1 suggests they have become the largest single birthplace group migrating to Australia. Figure 2 shows the annual numbers of settlers and it will be noted that there have been three peaks of in-movement around 1980, 1988, 2000-01 and 2001-02. It also will be noted that there is a substantial decline from 2001 to 2002. The decline was of 37.8 per cent from 25,165 to 15,663. On the surface, this would appear to suggest that the 2001 changes in eligibility for social security have had an impact. However, it is shown elsewhere that other factors have also been influential (Bedford, Ho and Hugo 2003).

Figure 1: Settler arrivals in Australia by region of last residence, 1947-2003




Source: DIMIA, *Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update*, various issues; DIMIA unpublished data; ABS, *Migration Australia*, various issues.

Figure 2: New Zealand-born immigrants in Australia, 1960-2003

Source: DIMIA *Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update*, various issues; DIMIA unpublished data.


Figure 3 shows the trends in New Zealand-born immigrants as a percentage of total immigrants and a similar pattern is in evidence to that for absolute numbers. However, in recent years the New Zealand-born have made up only three quarters of the inflow to Australia from New Zealand. Hence, Figure 4 shows patterns for the total immigration from New Zealand. The levels are somewhat higher than for the New Zealand-born, especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, the fall between 2000-01 and 2001-02 is even greater among the total immigrants than was the case for the New Zealand-born. Figure 5 shows the pattern for this group as a percentage of all immigrants and the same pattern is in evidence.

Figure 3: New Zealand-born immigrants as a percentage of total immigrants, 1960-2003




Source: DIMIA, *Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update*, various issues; DIMIA unpublished data.

Figure 4: Immigrants from New Zealand in Australia, 1960-2003



Source: DIMIA, *Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update*, various issues; DIMIA unpublished data; ABS, *Migration Australia*, various issues.

Figure 5: Immigrants from New Zealand as a percentage of total immigrants, 1960-2003



Source: DIMIA, *Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Immigration Update*, various issues; DIMIA unpublished data; ABS, *Migration Australia*, various issues.

It is interesting to examine the numbers of permanent arrivals of New Zealanders in Australia over recent years and these are presented in Table 1. This indicates that both in terms of New Zealand citizens and the New Zealand-born, there was a build up of numbers in 1999-2001 and a decline in 2001-02 to the numbers prevailing beforehand. Hence, in the two years preceding the 2001 census, there were record inflows of New Zealanders. The extent to which this was a reaction to the impending change in access of New Zealanders to Australian welfare and education benefits (Birrell and Rapson 2001) is difficult to establish. Nevertheless, it may be indicative that the year 2000-01 was not only a record year in terms of the numbers of New Zealand-born and New Zealand citizens settling in Australia, but also in terms of the proportion of New Zealand citizens who were non-New Zealand-born. Hence, to the extent that there may have been a response to the new restrictions that response was greater among former settlers to New Zealand than the New Zealand-born.

It is interesting to focus on the substantial element in the Trans-Tasman flow that is former settlers to New Zealand. This type of relay migration is not a new phenomenon in Trans-Tasman movement. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s there was some evidence of government

sponsored immigrants from the United Kingdom to Australia moving on to New Zealand soon after arrival in Australia (Price 1980).

Table 1: Settler arrivals in Australia of the New Zealand-born and New Zealand citizens

Year	New Zealand-Born		New Zealand Citizens
	Number	%	Number
2002-2003	12,368	75.6	16,364
2001-2002	15,663	72.4	21,644
2000-2001	25,165	59.6	42,254
1999-2000	21,889	69.2	31,615
1998-1999	15,667	63.5	24,686
1997-1998	14,723	75.9	19,397
1996-1997	13,072	74.7	17,508
1995-1996	12,265	75.5	16,238

Source: DIMIA *Immigration Update*, various issues; Birrell and Rapson, (2001:63).

Table 2: New Zealand Citizens in Australia by country of birth, 1999-2002

Year	New Zealand Citizens	New Zealand-Born	Other Country of Birth
31/12/2002	446,482	330,166	116,316
30/6/2002	460,788	341,783	119,005
30/6/2001	460,142	340,355	119,787
30/6/2000	434,679	324,559	110,120
30/6/1999	404,750	303,695	101,055
Percentage Change 1999-2002	10.3	8.7	15.1


Source: DIMA (2000); DIMIA (2002); DIMIA (2003).

The fact that Australia has had a substantial indirect gain of other immigrants through New Zealand is evident in Table 2, which presents estimates of the number of New Zealand citizens in Australia between 1999 and 2002. It will be noticed that there was virtually no increase in the number of New Zealand citizens between 2001 and 2002, while they increased by 30,000 between 1999 and 2000, and 26,000 between 2000 and 2001. Indeed there was a decrease in the last six months of 2002 in both New Zealand-born and in other New Zealand citizens. The restrictions on

New Zealanders introduced in February 2001 seem to have had an impact. Birrell and Rapson (2001:61) argue that while the Australian government's stated motivation was to reduce Australia's responsibilities for paying social security benefits, they also desired to limit the influx of people who would not meet the standards set by the official immigration program and who had used the less stringent entry criteria which applied in New Zealand at that time as a "back door" entry to Australia. If this was an objective of the 2001 changes, they appear to have had some impact. However, Birrell and Rapson (2001:68), suggest that the large number of non New Zealand-born New Zealand citizens coming to Australia around 2000 may have been associated with the "bubble" of a large number of immigrants to New Zealand three years earlier.²

The birthplace of the non-New Zealand-born New Zealand citizens in Australia in mid 2002 are depicted in Figure 6. Of the 119,005 non-New Zealand-born, New Zealand citizens, the largest group, are the 18,382 Australia-born who are the children born to New Zealand-born parents in Australia whose parents decided to get them New Zealand citizenship. However, there were almost as many born in the United Kingdom (17,746). There are also a substantial number from other parts of the Pacific, especially Western Samoa (12,791), Cook Islands (3,696), Tonga (3,556), Fiji (2,919) and Niue (678). Only 16,405 (3.6 per cent of all New Zealand citizens in Australia) were born in Asia with the largest group being from Northern Asia, especially China (3,561), Taiwan (1,457) and Hong Kong (951). Also important were India (2,218), Philippines (1,059) and Vietnam (1,716). Other significant groups were from South Africa (2,120) and the Netherlands (1,120). Rapson (1998:56) has found that except for the United Kingdom born, each main overseas birthplace group is more represented in the outflow from New Zealand to Australia than it is in the New Zealand resident population.

Figure 6: New Zealand citizens present in Australia by country of birth, 2002



Source: DIMIA (2002).

Trends in Non-Permanent Movement

There has been a tendency in Australia for all international migration attention to be focused on movement associated with permanent settlement in Australia. However, non-permanent movements have long been important in Australia (Price 1979). Moreover, they have become of much greater significance in recent years (Hugo 2003).

Australia has long had an emphasis on attracting permanent settlers to the country and a strongly expressed opposition to programs of inmovement of temporary and contract workers. During the labour shortage years of the 1950s and 1960s Australia's migration solution to the problem contrasted sharply with that of European nations like Germany and France when it explicitly opted to concentrate on attracting permanent migrants to meet worker shortages rather than contract workers. This thinking has changed dramatically since the mid 1990s with the introduction of new visa types involving temporary migration for work (Birrell and Healy 1997). These often cut across the long-term and short-term categories. Hence there has been a shift in worker migration to Australia which has seen an increase in non-permanent moves. There has been a recognition that in the context of globalised labour markets it is essential to have mechanisms to allow non-permanent entry of workers at least in certain groups. This form of entry, however, has been restricted to people with particular skills and entrepreneurs. Since New Zealanders have more or less free entry to Australia through the Special Category Visa, they do not need to apply for permanent settlement or temporary residence visas like arrivals from other countries. Nevertheless, they do have to indicate on their arrival and departure cards whether they are permanent, long term or short term movers.³

Table 3 presents data on long term and short term arrivals from New Zealand. The table differentiates between residents and non residents. There has been a substantial upswing in short term movement across the Tasman indicating an increase in circulation associated with tourism, business and other contacts. Since a long term arrival of a New Zealander involves them intending to stay in Australia for longer than a year, they are of particular interest. They are also shown in and this indicates that the flow of New Zealanders to Australia on a long term basis peaked in 1999-2000, the same year of a peak in permanent arrivals. In addition, just as is the case with permanent arrivals, there is a significant decline in each of the three


subsequent years. Hence, again there is a superficial evidence of an impact of the 2001 changes.

Table 3: Long-term and short-term arrivals in Australia from New Zealand

	Long-term Residents Returning	Long-term Visitor Arrivals	Short-term Residents Returning	Short-term Visitor Arrivals
1991-92	2,860	5,118	327,383	459,224
1992-93	2,868	4,632	337,272	450,508
1993-94	2,866	5,177	343,882	487,426
1994-95	3,082	5,248	367,176	501,838
1995-96	3,459	5,634	391,755	612,181
1996-97	3,644	5,911	407,805	675,745
1997-98	4,039	5,952	437,588	695,746
1998-99	2,965	9,406	482,241	718,858
1999-2000	3,224	9,865	na	773,110
2000-01	2,912	9,177	na	828,400
2001-02	2,448	8,178	na	787,700
2002-03	3,301	7,818	614,448	793,082

Source: DIMIA unpublished data.

Figure 7: New Zealanders coming to Australia on a long-term basis, 1982-83 to 2002-03



Source: *Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics and Population Flows: Immigration Aspects*, various issues; DIMIA unpublished data

Note: Data prior to 1992-93 comprise long-term New Zealand-born arrivals. Data after this date comprise long-term arrivals of New Zealand citizens.

Emigration

There is a tendency for Australia to be categorised as a purely immigration country but, in fact, it is also a country of significant emigration. Over recent years, departures on permanent and long-term basis have been very substantial. In 2001-02 permanent departures numbered 48,241 compared with an average of 30,539 over the previous 14 years. This represented a 17.4 per cent increase over 1999-2000 and a 61.6 per cent increase over five years earlier. In 2002-03 there was a further 4.6 per cent increase in the outflow which involved 50,463 persons. Former settlers have been a major part of the emigration from Australia, although in recent times they have fallen to a half of all permanent departures. The return migration effect may be understated by the fact that a number of the Australia-born in the departures may be the Australia-born children of former settlers.

The distinction between the Australia-born and the overseas-born among emigrants is an important one. The latter group are referred to as 'settler loss' and at times this has been an issue of concern to the Australian government who has seen this as an indicator of the success (or lack of success) of the immigration program. In fact, it would seem that around a fifth of all settlers subsequently leave Australia, many returning to the country of birth, although the proportions vary widely between different birthplace groups. In fact, much of the settler loss is not associated with any 'failure' on the part of the settler since many intended for their stay to be temporary in the first place, other moves are triggered by life cycle events such as death of a relative or divorce while a significant number return 'home' to retire after completing their working life in Australia.

Historically, New Zealand has been an important destination of emigrants from Australia. There are three elements in this emigration (Hugo 1994):

- A substantial return flow of New Zealanders who formerly settled in Australia.
- Movement of Australia-born citizens to New Zealand. This is often migration within a single labour market.
- Relay migrants of people who have moved to Australia as settlers and subsequently moved to New Zealand.

Table 4 shows the breakdown of the three groups among permanent departures from Australia to New Zealand. New Zealand is the main single destination of permanent departures leaving Australia with 10,024 or 20.8

per cent of the 2001-02 total outflow. Although a record number of New Zealand-born returned to New Zealand in 2001-02 (6,165 persons) this is only very weak evidence that there was a backflow of New Zealanders associated with the new Australian regulations. It has been argued (Bedford, Ho and Hugo 2003) that this was part of an overall upswing in return migration to New Zealand.

Table 4: Permanent departure from Australia to New Zealand by birthplace, 1991-2003

Year	Australia-born	New Zealand-born	Other Overseas-born	Total
1991-92	1,954	6,131	743	8,828
1992-93	2,237	5,564	913	8,714
1993-94	2,785	5,728	991	9,504
1994-95	2,895	5,581	977	9,453
1995-96	3,158	5,611	1,045	9,814
1996-97	2,907	5,209	1,058	9,174
1997-98	2,905	5,146	1,116	9,207
1998-99	3,281	3,171	1,016	7,468
1999-2000	3,852	3,763	1,346	8,964
2000-01	3,979	4,245	1,422	9,657
2001-02	3,859	4,757	1,408	10,024
2002-03	4,380	5,354	1,599	11,333

Source: DIMIA unpublished data.

In much of the writing on Trans-Tasman migration the emphasis is on the flow of New Zealanders to Australia yet it would seem that circularity in that movement is significant. Table 5 shows that a fifth of the New Zealand-born returnees from Australia had been in Australia less than two years, and four-fifths between two and nine years and their median length of residence was 5.1 years. This was somewhat lower than the average length of stay of overseas-born emigrants suggesting a pattern where many New Zealanders come to Australia to work and live for a substantial period and then return to their homeland. Table 5 shows that the emigration rate of New Zealanders was 13 per 1,000 in 1999-2000. Using the same methodology the rate over the next three years was 16, 18 and 17 per 1,000. Hence, there was a small upswing in the emigration rate of the New Zealand-born indicating that the new legislation may not only have had an impact in preventing new New Zealand migration to Australia but increased the rate at which New Zealanders were returning home from Australia.

Table 5: Length of Australian residency of overseas-born emigrants in 1999-2000

Country of birth (a)	Years resident in Australia					Total	Median Length of residence Years	Emigration rate Rate (b)
	Under 2	2-4	5-9	10 and over	Total			
New Zealand	19.0	23.4	57.3	0.3	100.0	4.5	5.1	13
United Kingdom	21.1	24.6	53.5	0.8	100.0	4.0	4.6	3
China (excludes SARs and Taiwan Province)	32.0	25.9	41.8	0.4	100.0	1.8	3.8	11
Hong Kong (SAR of China)	21.6	26.3	52.1	0.1	100.0	1.6	4.2	31
Taiwan	34.8	32.6	32.3	0.3	100.0	0.7	1.9	na
United States of America	24.3	26.7	49.0	-	100.0	0.6	3.9	10
Viet Nam	14.8	22.7	61.8	0.7	100.0	0.5	5.3	3
Indonesia	43.8	27.2	28.8	0.2	100.0	0.4	1.4	7
Total overseas-born	22.5	23.5	53.5	0.5	100.0	20.8	4.6	5

Source: ABS (2002).

- Listed countries of birth are those with the most emigrants during 1999-2000.
- Permanent departures during 1999-2000 per 1,000 preliminary estimated population of the same country of birth resident in Australia on 30 June 1999.

Turning to the Australia-born moving permanently to New Zealand, Table 5 indicates that there appears to be an increase in recent years. One element in this flow is the Australia-born children of New Zealand-born returnees and in fact 28.2 per cent of this Australia-born outflow are aged 0-9 years indicating the significance of this element. However, with the integration of the Australia and New Zealand labour markets undoubtedly there is a great deal of Trans-Tasman employment transfer.

As with considering arrivals in Australia it is important to examine long term and short term departures as shown in Table 6. This indicates that the long term emigration of both Australian residents and others has increased substantially in recent years reflecting further the high level of circularity in Trans-Tasman movement.

Table 6: Long-term and short-term movements from Australia to New Zealand, 1991-92 to 2002-03


Year	Long-term Resident Departures	Long-term Visitor Departures	Short-term Resident Departures	Short-term Visitor Departures
1991-92	2,681	3,962	329,969	458,417
1992-93	2,658	3,061	345,505	469,966
1993-94	2,806	3,064	350,661	475,033
1994-95	2,925	3,117	361,167	490,113
1995-96	3,259	3,377	396,919	592,411
1996-97	3,295	3,590	409,756	672,022
1997-98	3,249	3,894	429,150	685,942
1998-99	3,302	5,806	477,426	708,660
1999-2000	3,350	7,171	506,652	760,302
2000-01	3,611	7,162	574,500	na
2001-02	3,740	8,212	592,200	na
2002-03	3,406	7,314	615,329	800,721

Source: DIMIA unpublished data.

The Impact of Migration

The significance of New Zealand in Australian immigration is substantial with it being the main origin of permanent immigrants and main destination of permanent emigrants. It is also significant in both long term and short term movements. Indeed one of the major findings of the analysis above is that while there is a substantial gradient toward Australia in the Trans-Tasman migration, one of its most defining characteristics is a high degree of circularity. Figure 8 indicates the extent of this circularity by showing the volume of permanent and long term movement into Australia from New Zealand and out of Australia to New Zealand. The diagram also show the net migration and it can be seen that although the net gain to Australia is important it is relatively small compared to the total movement. Moreover, it will be noted that the net migration increased from a low level in the mid 1990s to reach a peak of over 30,000 in 2000-01. However, in subsequent years both the overall flow and the net migration have decreased. This would give some support to the argument that the new regulations may have had some effect both in terms of increasing the flow prior to their introduction and reducing it after their introduction.

Figure 8: Permanent and long-term movement to and from New Zealand, 1993-94 to 2002-03



Source: ABS *Migration Australia*, various issues; DIMIA unpublished data.

Another interesting piece of evidence relates to the numbers of New Zealanders who are taking out Australian citizenship. Table 7 shows that there was a big increase in both the numbers of New Zealanders taking out Australian citizenship in the years before and after the introduction of the new legislation. Undoubtedly the new regulations which restrict the access of New Zealand citizens to welfare and other benefits has been a factor in persuading more New Zealanders to take up Australian citizenship. It should also be mentioned, however, this was the time at which Australia introduced the option of dual citizenship for the first time (Hugo *et al.* 2003). The estimated number of New Zealand citizens in Australia increased from 404,750 in mid 1999 to reach a peak of 460,788 in mid 2002.

Table 7: New Zealanders confirmed with Australian citizenship, 1996-2002

Year	Number	Rank	Percent of Total
2001-2002	17,334	1	20.1
2000-2001	11,007	2	15.0
1999-2000	6,676	3	9.4
1998-1999	6,320	3	8.3
1997-1998	8,764	3	7.8
1996-1997	9,982	3	9.2

Source: DIMIA (2002).

New Zealanders in Australia in 2001

In mid 2001 there were an estimated 460,142 New Zealand Citizens in Australia of whom 340,355 were born in New Zealand (DIMIA 2002:32). They are the second largest of Australia's overseas-born communities and are by far the most similar to the Australia-born of any overseas-born group. Indeed it has been pointed out that any differences between the New Zealand and Australia-born disappears if age is standardised (ABS 2002). This reflects the fact that the selectivity which applies to all other birthplace groups whereby they must qualify under the skill, family or humanitarian guidelines does not apply to New Zealanders. Indeed Trans-Tasman migration is closer to long distance internal migration in Australia than other international migration in many respects. Indeed one of the major points made here is the lack of selectivity of New Zealand migration to Australia. This contrasts to the Australian migration to New Zealand which is more selective. It has been shown for example that Australia-born migration to New Zealand is highly selective of high income, highly educated young Australians (Hugo, Rudd and Harris 2001).

The 2001 Australian census provides an opportunity to examine the characteristics of the New Zealand community in Australia. One feature of the enumeration was that it was the first since the 1986 enumeration to ask a question on ancestry and the results are depicted in Table 8. It is apparent that many New Zealand-born did not give New Zealand as their ancestry since only 123,314 persons indicated a New Zealand ancestry compared with 355,765 giving New Zealand as their country of birth. However, an additional 72,956 persons indicated they were of Maori ancestry. However, only 1.1 per cent of persons at the census indicated that they spoke Maori at home.

The growth of the New Zealand-born population in Australia is shown in Figure 9. It indicates that the New Zealand-born increased relatively slowly up to 1966. Thereafter, there have been substantial increases, especially between the 1976 and 1981 censuses and also between the 1996 and 2001 censuses. The population increased by 22.1 per cent between 1996 and 2001, compared with 10.3 per cent between 1991 and 1996. As Figure 10 shows, New Zealanders are now the second largest birthplace group in the nation to the United Kingdom-born.


Table 8: Ancestry of the Australian population, 2001

	Number	Percentage
Oceanian		
Australian	6,739,595	31.46
Other Australian Peoples	106,454	0.50
Maori	72,959	0.34
New Zealander	123,328	0.58
Other Oceanian	91,727	0.43
North West European		
English	6,358,882	29.69
Scottish	540,043	2.52
Irish	1,919,723	8.96
Dutch	268,754	1.25
German	742,210	3.47
Other NW European	346,441	1.62
Southern and Eastern European		
Italian	800,257	3.74
Maltese	136,755	0.64
Croatian	105,745	0.49
Greek	375,699	1.75
Macedonian	81,893	0.38
Serbian	97,326	0.45
Polish	150,903	0.70
Russian	60,213	0.28
Other SE European	353,646	1.65
North African and Middle Eastern		
Lebanese	162,245	0.76
Turkish	54,597	0.25
Other North Africa and Middle Eastern	147,030	0.69
South-East Asian		
Vietnamese	156,572	0.73
Filipino	129,831	0.61
Indonesian	28,265	0.13
Other SE Asian	91,316	0.43
North-East Asian		
Chinese	556,553	2.60
Other NE Asian	80,676	0.38
Southern and Central Asian		
Indian	156,624	0.73
Other Southern and Central Asian	139,223	0.65
Peoples of the Americas	140,121	0.65
Sub-Saharan Africa	103,750	0.48
Total	21,419,356	100.00

Source: ABS 2001 Census.

Note: Table excludes inadequately described, not stated and not applicable.

Figure 9: Growth of the New Zealand-born population in Australia, 1861-2001




Source: Price *et al.* (1984); Australian Censuses (1901 to 2001).

Distribution of the New Zealand-Born


The spatial distribution of the New Zealand-born population in Australia is depicted in Figure 11. The distribution of the New Zealand-born is quite different from that of most other overseas-born groups. Australia and New Zealand are moving towards a single labour market as evidenced by the movement of a large number of New Zealand-born to Queensland, which now has a significant overrepresentation. In 2001, Queensland had 35.9 per cent of the nation's New Zealand-born and only 19.3 per cent of the total population. They are also over represented in the other 'frontier' areas of Western Australia (12.6 per cent compared with 9.9 per cent of the total population). Hence, more than half of Australia's New Zealanders live in these two states which are the two main destinations of Australian *internal* migrants (Bell and Hugo 2000).

Figure 10: Birthplace of the overseas-born population in Australia, 2001



Source: ABS, 2001 Census.

Figure 11: New Zealand-born population distribution by statistical division in Australia, 2001



Source: Calculated from ABS Census (2001).

New South Wales and especially Sydney are the main destinations of immigrants to Australia (Hugo 2004). Although there are a large proportion of Australia's New Zealanders in this state (29.7 per cent), it is smaller than New South Wales' share of the total immigrant inflow in Australia (38.8 per cent in 2002-03) and the total Australia population.

Australia's largest single community of the New Zealand-born is in Sydney where 23 per cent of all New Zealanders in the country live. However, Sydney accounts for 37.4 per cent of recent migrants to Australia and 30.0 per cent of all migrants so the concentration in Sydney is not as great as for many other migrant groups (Hugo 2004).

Figure 11 shows that one of the distinctive features of the New Zealand-born compared to other overseas-born groups is that the former are more widely distributed across the nation than most immigrant groups. This is reflected in Table 9 which shows that while New Zealanders are more

concentrated in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, they are more strongly represented in non metropolitan areas than almost all other birthplace groups (Hugo 2004). In fact 15.1 per cent of the New Zealand-born live in provincial urban centres compared to 10.8 of the total overseas-born and 24.5 per cent of the Australia-born. There are significant numbers of New Zealanders in mining centres and in many parts of the wheat-sheep belt, where many work as shearers, farm-workers and managers. More than a quarter of New Zealanders live in Sydney-Newcastle-Wollongong and also more than a quarter in Brisbane-Gold Coast-Tweed Heads and a tenth in Perth.

Table 9: Australia, section of state: New Zealand-born by year of arrival and Australia-born population, 2001

	New Zealand-born						Australia-born	
	Total **		Year of Arrival 1996-2001		Year of Arrival Prior to 1996			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Major Urban	265,662	74.7	78,126	82.1	172,294	71.8	8,163,371	59.9
Other Urban	53,670	15.1	11,621	12.2	41,733	17.4	3,335,084	24.5
Rural *	36,433	10.2	5,418	5.7	26,051	10.9	2,131,230	15.6
Total	355,765	100.0	95,165	100.0	240,078	100.0	13,629,685	100.0

Source: ABS Census (2001).

* Includes migratory


** Includes New Zealand-born who did not state their year of arrival

Age-Sex Distribution

Perhaps the main way in which the New Zealand-born differ from the Australia-born population is in age structure. The New Zealand-born are a relatively young population as Figure 12 indicates and the bulk of the population are in the working age groups. They are strongly over concentrated compared with the Australia-born in the 20-54 age groups, especially 25-49. As would be expected, the 0-19 group are strongly underrepresented since many of the children born to Australian New Zealand residents are in fact Australia-born. This is partly because over half of the New Zealand-born in Australia have been in Australia for over 15 years. Unlike many of the overseas-born groups in Australia, the New

Zealand-born are underrepresented among the 65+ older population. The latter reflects two characteristics of New Zealand migration to Australia.

Figure 12: Age-sex distribution of the New-Zealand-born and Australia-born populations, 2001



Source: ABS Census (2001).

- The recency of much New Zealand migration to Australia. As Table 10 indicates, more than a fifth of Australia’s New Zealand-born at the 2001 census arrived in Australia since 1996 compared to an eighth of all the overseas-born. Of course all migration is highly selective of young adults so the more recently arrived groups will have younger populations.
- The high rate of return migration among the New Zealand-born. There is anecdotal evidence of some retirement migration of New Zealanders into the Gold Coast area (Rapson 1998) and indeed some 53 per cent of New Zealand migrants aged over 65 live in Queensland. This also is

similar to internal migration. Nevertheless, the aged are under-represented in the New Zealand-born age structure compared to the Australia-born.

Table 10: New Zealand-born: Year of arrival, 2001

	New Zealand-born	All Overseas-born
Before 1975	18.3	47.5
1976-1980	15.9	7.8
1981-1985	15.6	10.3
1986-1990	19.2	12.8
1991-1995	10.6	9.4
1996-2000	20.4	12.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: ABS (2002:23).

The dominance of the workforce ages in the New Zealand-born population of Australia means that they tend to have low dependency ratios and disproportionate representation in the Australian labour force. Hence, while the New Zealand-born make up 2.0 per cent of the total population, they comprise 2.7 per cent of the workforce. This needs to be considered in debates about the extent to which New Zealanders create pressures on Australian social security. This can be disputed on a number of grounds. Not only are they over-represented in the workforce ages but Table 11 shows that the labour force participation rate of the New Zealand-born is somewhat higher than that of both the Australia-born and the total overseas-born.

With regard to sex ratios there has been a pattern of consistency in the New Zealand-born population of Australia being male dominated. Whereas in 2001 the Australia-born population had a sex ratio of 97 and the total overseas-born ratio was 98.6, that for New Zealanders was 102.6. This compares with 102.5 in 1996 and 103.6 in 1991. This would suggest that the bulk of the migration across the Tasman is labour market related, as males tend to dominate in skilled migration to Australia while females are larger among family migrants.

Table 11: Immigrants who arrived after 1980^(a) and Australia-Born: Labour force participation and education, 1999

	New Zealand-Born		Total Overseas-Born		Australia-Born 15+	
	Males %	Females %	Males %	Females %	Males %	Females %
Unemployment rate	*2.7	5.4	4.7	4.6	6.0	6.0
Participation rate	89.5	67.1	81.5	57.1	72.0	54.0
Employed before migration	84.8	66.1	73.3	57.1	-	-
Had tertiary qualifications	73.0	47.3	79.4	61.7	-	-
Arrived with tertiary qualifications	82.3	75.9	78.8	76.0	-	-
Gained tertiary qualifications since arrival	17.7	24.1	21.2	24.0	-	-

Source: ABS (2002:25).

^(a) Aged 18 years and over at arrival.

* Estimate has a relative standard error of between 25% and 50% and should be used with caution.

Economic Characteristics

The New Zealand-born population in Australia tend to be a little better off than the Australia-born although this is obviously strongly influenced by the younger age structure and the small proportion of New Zealanders who are made up of aged pensioners than is the case for either the Australian or other overseas-born groups. Table 12 shows that in 2001 the proportion of New Zealanders with low incomes (less than A\$300 per week) was significantly less than for either the Australia-born or other immigrants while the opposite is the case for high incomes. Table 13 shows that there has been a substantial improvement in the incomes of New Zealanders over the 1996-2001 period.

In a 1999 survey of immigrants who had arrived in Australia since 1980, it was found that New Zealanders had higher rates of labour force participation than the total overseas-born and the Australia-born. Table 11 indicated this was the case for both females and males. Moreover, their rates of unemployment were significantly lower than both of the other groups. This may have been influenced by the fact that the proportion of New Zealanders who were employed *before* migrating to Australia was higher than for migrants as a whole. Nevertheless, it will be noted that the

proportion of New Zealanders with tertiary qualifications upon arrival in Australia was lower than for all immigrants. This reflects the fact that New Zealanders do not have to undertake the points test to enter Australia as do other birthplace groups seeking entry under the skill criteria.

Table 12: Weekly individual income by birthplace of individual in Australia, 2001

	Australia (incl. External Territories)	New Zealand	Remainder	Total Population
Less than \$300/week	4,070,283	95,432	1,727,520	5,893,235
\$300-\$799/week	3,829,880	135,307	1,291,527	5,256,714
\$800+/week	1,867,042	71,229	632,330	2,570,601
Not stated	484,320	14,055	637,849	1,136,224
Not applicable	3,378,160	39,742	494,573	3,912,475
Total	13,629,685	355,765	4,783,799	18,769,249
Percentage less than \$300	41.7	31.6	47.3	43.0
Percentage \$300-\$799	39.2	44.8	35.4	38.3
Percentage \$800+	19.1	23.6	17.3	18.7

Source: ABS 2001 Census unpublished tabulations.

Table 13: New Zealand and Australia-born: Individual income in 1996 and 2001

Individual Income	New Zealand-Born (%)		Australia-Born (%)	
	1996	2001	1996	2001
Less than \$300/week	40.1	31.6	49.8	41.7
\$300-\$799/week	45.8	44.8	40.2	39.2
\$800+/week	14.1	23.6	10.9	19.1

Source: ABS 1996 and 2001 Population Census.

Comparing the New Zealand-born and the total Australian workforce, in Table 14 the New Zealanders are over represented in property and business services among both men and women as well as in accommodation, construction, cafes and restaurants, and a little in manufacturing. However, they are underrepresented in retail trade and, to a lesser extent, health and community services.

Table 14: Employed people: Selected industries ^(a), 2001

	New Zealand-Born			Total Australia	
	Males %	Females %		Males %	Females %
Property & Business Services	14.2	17.6	Property & Business Services	11.3	11.8
Manufacturing	16.0	8.4	Manufacturing	15.7	7.2
Retail Trade	10.1	13.2	Retail Trade	13.0	17.6
Construction	17.4	*1.9	Construction	11.6	2.1
Health & Community Services	*3.3	15.7	Health & Community Services	3.9	17.1
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants	*3.5	10.4	Education	4.3	10.9
Total of selected industries	64.6	67.2	Total of selected industries	59.9	66.7

Source: ABS (2002:26).

^(a) Top six industries ranked on New Zealand-born people and Australian people respectively.

* Estimate has a relative standard error of between 25% and 50% and should be used with caution.

Table 15: Employed people: Occupations, 2001

	New Zealand-born		Total Australia	
	Males %	Females %	Males %	Females %
Managers and Administrators	7.4	*4.3	10.2	4.6
Professionals	14.2	19.2	17.1	20.7
Associate Professionals	12.6	11.7	12.8	10.2
Tradespersons and Related Workers	22.8	*3.9	20.5	3.0
Advanced Clerical, and Service Workers	**0.5	10.3	0.9	8.9
Intermediate Clerical, Sales and Services Workers	7.3	27.0	8.2	28.4
Intermediate Production and Transport Workers	16.4	*2.9	14.0	2.2
Elementary Clerical, Sales and Services Workers	6.2	11.9	6.1	14.4
Labourers and Related Workers	12.6	8.7	10.1	7.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: ABS (2002:27).

^(a) Top six industries ranked on New Zealand-born people and Australian people respectively.

* Estimate has a relative standard error of between 25% and 50% and should be used with caution.

The occupational profile of New Zealanders and the total Australian workforce are similar as Table 15 indicates. However, as the ABS (2002, 27) have pointed out, the mix is slightly skewed towards lower skilled occupations with an under-representation of male managers, administrators and professionals. On the other hand, there is an overrepresentation of tradespersons, intermediate production and transport workers and labourers.

Social Characteristics

Since the New Zealand-born are a young population, it is to be expected that they would have a higher education profile than the Australia-born. Table 16 shows that indeed the proportions with higher qualifications are certainly higher than for the Australia-born but the proportion with university qualifications are lower than for the remainder of the overseas-born. The latter reflects the fact that New Zealanders don't have to pass the points test for entry to Australia. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the proportion of New Zealanders with trade and other qualifications is higher not only than the Australia-born but the other overseas-born as well.

Table 16: Non-school qualification in Australia: Level of education by birthplace, 2001

Qualifications	Australia (incl. External territories)		New Zealand		Other Overseas-born		Total Population	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
University	1,271,234	9.3	39,277	11.0	608,402	12.7	1,918,913	10.2
Other	1,183,344	8.7	41,843	11.8	452,198	9.5	1,677,385	8.9
Trade	1,281,342	9.4	44,823	12.6	421,081	8.8	1,747,246	9.3
Not applicable	9,185,251	67.4	207,288	58.3	2,520,014	52.7	11,912,553	63.5
Level of education not stated	708,514	5.2	22,534	6.3	782,104	16.3	1,513,152	8.1
Total	13,629,685	100.0	355,765	00.0	4,783,799	00.0	18,769,249	00.0

Source: ABS 2001 Census unpublished tabulations.

It is interesting that despite the relatively sound economic position of New Zealanders, the proportion who owned or were purchasing their own homes in 2001 (54.3 per cent) was substantially lower than was the case for the Australia-born (70.7 per cent). This was also the case at the 1996 census (53 per cent compared with 71.3 per cent) and 1991 (50 per cent compared with

71.3 per cent). On the other hand, the proportion who are renting (45.7 per cent) is almost twice the proportion for the Australia-born (28.3 per cent). Of those renting, 75.2 per cent of the Australia-born rent from a private landlord compared to 86.9 of the New Zealand-born. These patterns may reflect the fact that a significant part of the Trans-Tasman flow is intended temporary.

The family household structure of the New Zealand-born population is shown in Table 17 and again age structure is an important explanation of the differences compared to the Australia-born. It is shown that New Zealanders were less likely to be living in a family relationship than the total population. More New Zealand males are likely to be living alone than all males and more are in group households. For females the proportion of New Zealanders in lone person households is smaller than for the Australia-born but for both males and females they tend to be young adults while in the Australia-born older persons predominate, especially among women. Both New Zealand-born females and males are more likely to live in group households than the Australia-born indicating this is an important form of household for Trans-Tasman migrants, especially among recent arrivals.

Table 17: Australia and New Zealand-born: Relationship in household, 2001

	New Zealand-born		Total Australia	
	Males (%)	Females (%)	Males (%)	Females (%)
Family member	<i>79.3</i>	<i>81.1</i>	<i>83.0</i>	<i>83.0</i>
Partner in relationship	65.3	61.7	61.7	58.3
With dependants	50.8	49.5	47.0	46.3
Without dependants	49.2	50.5	53.0	53.7
Lone parent	*2.4	11.9	1.6	9.2
Non-dependent child	4.7	*2.5	10.9	6.3
Dependent student	*2.9	*2.6	6.7	6.6
Other family person	4.1	*2.4	2.1	2.5
Non-family member	<i>20.7</i>	<i>18.9</i>	<i>17.0</i>	<i>17.0</i>
Lone person	11.4	11.5	10.8	12.6
Not living alone	9.4	7.4	6.2	4.4
Total	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Source: ABS (2002:24).

^(a) Top six industries ranked on New Zealand-born people and Australian people respectively.

* Estimate has a relative standard error of between 25% and 50% and should be used with caution.

Turning to family households both male and female New Zealanders are more likely to be lone parents than the total population. They are also more likely to be in partner households than the total population and more than a half of New Zealand persons in Australia live in a couple household with dependents – significantly higher than for the total population. This is a reflection of the young age structure of the New Zealand-born population.

Dependant children are therefore more represented in New Zealand households than other Australian households. Table 18 shows that the New Zealand-born Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Australia in 2000 was 1.77 which was only marginally higher than that for all of Australia (1.75) and of the total overseas-born (1.73). However this is considerably below average fertility in New Zealand over the 1995-2000 period when the TFR was 2.0 (ABS 2003, 15). Table 18 shows that a significantly greater proportion of New Zealand women having children were unmarried compared to the Australia-born and the total overseas-born. New Zealanders also have a slightly higher divorce rate than the Australia-born (ABS 2002:26).

Table 18: Fertility of the New Zealand-born, all overseas-born and total Australia populations, 2000

	Females			
	Units	New Zealand-born	Total overseas-born	Total Australia
Total fertility rate	Babies per female	1.77	1.73	1.75
Median age of mother at time of birth	Years	29.8	31.3	29.8
Married mother (registered)	%	56.4	80.4	70.6
Unmarried mother	%	43.6	19.6	29.4
Paternity acknowledged	%	38.9	17.0	25.9
Paternity not acknowledged	%	4.7	2.7	3.5

Source: ABS (2002:24).

Conclusion

This paper has presented an initial examination of New Zealand migration to, and settlement in, Australia focusing particularly on the situation in the early years of the twenty first century. The flow has long been a distinctive one, sharing more similarities with interstate migration within Australia than with other international flows into the country. However, this may be

changing with increased restrictions on the accessibility of New Zealanders to welfare and education services which previously differentiated them from other new settlers in Australia. It is too early to fully assess the impact of these changes, but the data presented here would suggest there has been some effect especially upon the movement of non-New Zealand-born, New Zealand citizens to Australia.

At the 2001 population census, the New Zealand-born made up the third largest birthplace group in Australia after the Australian and United Kingdom-born. They are a significantly younger population than the other two large groups and are dominated by the young adult age groups. This significant feature has been a major influence in differentiating the other social, economic and demographic characteristics of the New Zealand-born from the Australia-born. In most respects, the New Zealand-born differ little from the Australia-born when there is age standardisation which is in contrast to the Australia-born population in New Zealand where there are substantial differences. It is apparent that the movement from Australia to New Zealand is more positively selective than that from New Zealand to Australia. However it remains to be seen whether the apparent changes in the migration relationship between New Zealand and Australia are translated into increasing the differences in the demographic, economic and social characteristics between the New Zealand and Australia-born in Australia.

Notes

1. These figures are for 1996. They are not available for 2001.
2. Three years residence in New Zealand is required for obtaining New Zealand citizenship.
3. Australia recognises the following categories of international population movement for statistical purposes: *Permanent movement* – persons migrating to Australia and residents departing permanently; *Long-term movement* – visitors arriving and residents departing temporarily with the intention to stay in Australia or abroad for twelve months or more, and the departure of visitors and the return of residents who had stayed in Australia or abroad for twelve months or more; *Short-term movement* – travellers whose intended or actual stay in Australia or abroad is less than twelve months.

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Moving Away from Home: Some Social Consequences for Tūhoe Migrating to the Waikato

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Abstract

To better understand the social consequences of migration away from traditional iwi regions, Tūhoe researchers intensively interviewed 40 Tūhoe people who had moved to the Waikato. It was found that most missed whanau and the community and made regular visits back home. Participants reported utilizing extensive whanau links to set themselves up in the Waikato, and many joined the Tūhoe associations in the Waikato. Others who did not join reported liking the idea that Tūhoe were there if needed. Some participants felt stronger in their Tūhoe identity since moving, and most reported noticing changes occurring in themselves or those back home over this period (they felt more worldly but saw those back home as more insular). While they did not interact much with tangata whenua, or participate in tangata whenua events, many said that they had a better appreciation of the local Tainui and the Kīngitanga groups since migrating. Finally, most would like to return to their iwi region for employment if it were available but saw little chance of this happening, and most reported wanting to retire there. The policy implications of both these points are explored

Māori have been migrating for centuries. Oral traditions tell of the voyages from Hawaiiki, over a thousand years ago (Orbell 1975; Starzecka 1996). More recently, Māori were visiting Europe in the 1800s (Hogan 2003), and travelled to Australia and Hawaii, with some choosing to settle. During World War II, many served in Europe, Asia and

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North Africa. Of more importance for this paper, there have always been large movements of Māori within Aotearoa itself, even before colonisation (eg. Belich 1996; Morrison and Waldegrave 2002).

The most serious internal migration for Māori was that between the 1930s and 1960s, when thousands moved from 'traditional' rural regions to the new urban centres (Butterworth 1991; Kawharu 1968; Waitangi Tribunal 1998). Metge (1964) records that in 1936 there were about 10,000 Māori living in urban regions, making up about 13 per cent of the Māori population. In 1951 there were 27,000 Māori living in urban regions making up 23 per cent of the Māori population. By 1981, 80 per cent of Māori were living in urban regions (Metge 1995). In two generations, New Zealand experienced the emptying out of its Māori communities from their rural homelands and into the towns and cities.

There were numerous reasons for Māori urbanisation (Butterworth 1991). First, during the 1930s many Māori were directed to work in essential industries in the cities by the Department of Labour and Employment assisted by the Māori tribal committees of the day (Orange 2003). The committees could enforce registration of Māori for war-related service and recommend the type and locality of employment. The committees handled a range of issues: employer–employee relationships, absenteeism, tracing workers who used aliases to change jobs and other irregularities. Many also moved of their own accord to help out with the War effort, while some were attracted by higher wages and the greater availability of work in the urban setting. Education was another key motivator, even though secondary schooling was not compulsory at that time. Work and social activities were probably the greater attraction for young people (Broughton, Grace, Ramsden and Dennis 2001).

As mentioned above, World War II had exposed Māori to the greater world, and many more Māori were venturing across the seas. This exposure to lifestyles other than those of their rural homelands also probably appeared attractive to many at the time. Those who migrated in turn were likely to have a 'snowball effect', with relatives and friends encouraging those at 'home', to move as they had. In addition, some moved simply to escape or avoid conflicts at home (Collette and O'Malley 1974; Hohepa 1964; Metge 1964; Ritchie 1963).

Concurrently with the urban migration of this period, the Māori population more than doubled its size between 1936 and 1961, mostly by

natural increase aided by a decreasing mortality rate, particularly infant mortality (McCreary 1968). This, of course, put pressure on rural lifestyles and on Māori families reliant on seriously fragmented lands, the product of over a century of land legislation designed more to dispossess than entitle (Davey and Kearns 1994; Scott and Kearns 2000). The *Town and Country Planning Act 1947*, because of zoning restrictions, prevented many Māori building on their own land. This meant that without the ability to build housing on their own lands that had been set aside for housing/homes, or “papakāinga” lands (Davey and Kearns 1994), many simply had no choice but to migrate and find shelter elsewhere. All these factors contributed in different ways for groups to move, and this period saw a large proportion of younger Māori, as well as some older, move away from homelands and into the city.

In the 1980s, there was some migration back to rural areas reported, although the extent of it is not as well known (Pearson 1988; Scott and Kearns 2000). This also arose from several factors rather than a single cause, including economics and the high cost of living in urban areas, a revitalization of Māori identity, and people preferring the “quiet” life and a change from city living. For others, “home” was where familial ties were strong to the land, whānau or marae, and they chose to move to these areas regardless of the forces that propelled people into urban areas originally. Similarly, the perceived safety and freedom of country living also attracted some. Finally, the *Town and Country Planning Act 1947* had been changed which gave Māori the ability once again to build on communally owned land, and some chose to do this.

Despite the returning home of some Māori, migration away has continued, primarily by younger people seeking education and work opportunities. What is still not known, however, are the effects of such migrations, especially the social consequences. There are likely to be effects on the people moving away from homelands, on the people who remain with many of the youth gone, and also on Māori whose own urbanised homelands have been settled by incoming migrants. Very little is known about these questions.

Our bigger research project therefore set out to find more about such social consequences, by looking at one case study, of those Tūhoe who have migrated to the Waikato region and their families who have stayed behind. In this paper we report on the effects claimed by those who have moved, and

future papers will document the effects on those who stay behind and on *tangata whenua* (original inhabitants) who had other iwi migrate to their regions (Kawharu 1968). We were also keen on using this research to identify the strategies for enhancing supportive relationships between Māori outside and inside their iwi (tribal) or hapu (sub-tribal) regions.

Tūhoe in Waikato

Tūhoe have traditionally lived in a region that overlaps the Whakatane and Wairoa Districts, mostly incorporating the Urewera Ranges. In 2001, 29,256 people (five per cent of the total Māori population) reported belonging to Tūhoe, although most now live outside the traditional region. In 2001, 81 per cent of Tūhoe reported living outside their iwi region, with 35 per cent of all Tūhoe in the Bay of Plenty region, 17 per cent in the Auckland region, 11 per cent in the Wellington region, and 10 per cent in the Waikato region. This last group makes up the population for the present research.

The size of the Tūhoe ki Waikato (Tūhoe in the Waikato region) population is uncertain because of high mobility and other iwi affiliations. For these reasons, we have seen estimates of the Tūhoe ki Waikato population varying from 800 to 3000, and we are trying to establish better estimates at present. Some have settled now for three or four generations, and many have come to study at Waikato education institutions. There is a strong Tūhoe sodality in Hamilton, and this group has at various times considered building a Marae in Hamilton. This last issue was explored in some of the interviews because it is contentious (Kawharu 1968; Waitangi Tribunal 1998): establishing a marae in Hamilton might be seen as disrespectful to those remaining in the homeland and might also mean fewer visits back home.

The Tūhoe ki Waikato therefore provide a good group for studying the social consequences of migration. Our aims were to describe the motivations, experiences, coping strategies, and intentions of those who have moved from the Tūhoe iwi region (and places in between) to the Waikato region in the last 1-5 years, 5-10 years, and 10 years. We also describe the community of Tūhoe people living within the Waikato region, the changes and challenges that community has gone through, its interactions with original Waikato groups such as Tainui (the *tangata whenua* of the Waikato region) and Kīngitanga (a Maori political

movement), and with te hau kainga (those Tūhoe remaining in the traditional Tūhoe iwi region).

Methods

We conducted lengthy, informal interviews with 40 people of Tūhoe descent who were currently living in the Waikato district, with five Tūhoe ki Waikato community researchers employed as the primary interviewers. Initial contact with potential participants was made through inter-whanau connections and snowballing from other contacts given by participants. All who were approached to participate agreed to do so. A semi-structured interview schedule was used but as the interviewers were from the community, there were subtle mixes of ethnographic and narrative enquiry. The main areas explored were: who does the “homeland” contact in Waikato, why and when; who does Tūhoe ki Waikato contact in the homeland, why and when; how socially coherent is the Tūhoe ki Waikato community; where do Tūhoe ki Waikato congregate; how do latter generations of Tūhoe ki Waikato view themselves as Tūhoe; how is Tūhoe ki Waikato perceived; and your future intentions. The research proposal was examined and approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Waikato Psychology Department, and was discussed with a number of Tūhoe beforehand.

Participants

There were 24 females and 16 males interviewed, their average age being 39 years old. Of the 40, the majority lived in Hamilton and its suburbs. Of importance to the research questions, 75 per cent had lived in their tribal boundaries at one point or another, meaning that they had migrated out of the homelands, even if not immediately to the Waikato region. As their first language, 47 per cent reported both Māori and English, 27 per cent Māori alone, and 25 per cent reported English alone as their first language. The majority, therefore, had Māori as a first language. Since moving from the homeland region, the participants had lived in an average of 2.5 places before the Waikato. One participant, for example, moved from Ruatoki in the homeland region to Auckland, back to Ruatoki, and then to Hamilton in the Waikato. Another moved from Ruatahuna in the homeland region, to live in Auckland, then Rotorua, then Opotiki, before moving to Hamilton.

The majority of participants moved to the Waikato for education or employment opportunities.

Results

Why Move to the Waikato?

Education was the primary reason reported by the majority of participants, with the University being the main point of that attraction and the biggest beneficiary. Many of those interviewed were completing a qualification and continuing to live in Hamilton for work opportunities. More often than not, the education pathway to the Waikato had been established beforehand by family or friends, which made the transition easier.

As a note, it should be remembered that these results come from 40 participants and might not be indicative of the larger population trends. Also, the interviewers could have biased their initial sampling towards educational-migrants since a few of the interviewers were in the education system themselves.

Work was another attractive feature of the Waikato although this lagged well behind tertiary education in terms of reasons to move. Finding work had proved difficult for some, in fact, although a few had opportunities in place through family and friends. Some participants spoke about “coming with parents” and having very little choice in the matter.

One reported attraction of the Waikato included being “close to home”. The geographical proximity to Tūhoe homelands makes it easier for members to readily return. The often 2.5 hour drive from the Waikato to the Tūhoe region is easier than a four hour drive from Auckland or a six hour drive from Wellington. However, while some reported proximity to home as a good feature, another common theme of moving included the desire to start afresh away from the limited education and employment opportunities of their homelands. This invoked comments about self-sufficiency, independence, and improving one’s circumstances.

Challenges Faced When Moving

Coming to the Waikato meant moving away from parents, grandparents and extended family for the majority of participants, and most reported this as the most serious challenge in moving. Many left smaller rural centres and

towns for the Waikato: “I was leaving my whanau behind, leaving everything I had behind and starting up a new life”. This movement included adults with pre-school age children to secondary school students and the many challenges of settling them into a new life. A small number felt it necessary to leave their children and/or partners behind with the intention of them joining later. Not having family and friends to call upon was a challenge which was lamented, “I miss the country life. I miss seeing whanau. I miss whanau being around. It’s hard for them to come up here and visit”. One participant was quite overawed at first and exclaimed, “I had no one here!”

The obligation to return to home was mentioned as a challenge by some, including the duty to attend family events such as tangihanga (death and grieving rituals) and ra whanau (birthdays). Although not always stated in the interviews, this responsibility probably strained the resources of most participants, both financially in terms of travel, particularly for students, and culturally in terms of whanau commitments.

The logistics of setting up base in a new environment was highlighted as a major ordeal. Finding accommodation and fitting into the new environment is a concern, as is dealing with rental agencies and landlords, and having enough money for rental deposits and advances. The main strategy in dealing with accommodation was contacting family networks for immediate accommodation. As one person mentioned, “It’s probably easier if you’ve got relations staying in the area just to start off, before you break out on your own”. A small number were upfront about homesickness and others longed to hear their dialect being spoken. A few of those interviewed missed being involved in Tūhoe activities within their tribal area.

What Helped Them Cope?

Having family contacts within the region was the main coping mechanism reported by those interviewed. As mentioned above, having contacts already established in the Waikato eased the burden of “finding a place”. More often than not these places were inhabited by other whanau members including aunts, uncles and cousins, the main recommendation being, “Go stay with some friends or family”. As a warning to others, participants also spoke of the need to establish this contact before moving to the Waikato. As one may expect, the younger participants found this task a little more daunting

compared with the more mature participants. Overall, very few of those interviewed needed to set up in the Waikato on their own.

Having family present went beyond having a room in which to board. For some, familial connections allowed face to face get togethers and a shoulder to lean on. This connection helped orient people with their new environment and circumstances as "...networking is probably the main thing". Having family present also meant that news of "home" and events related to "home" were relayed through this network. It helped people keep abreast of tribal and whanau activities. Networks also appeared to assist in the maintenance and strengthening of Tūhoe identity outside of tribal boundaries. The Tūhoe ki Waikato group in particular was seen as assisting this maintenance and was noted by many as a positive interest group within the Waikato region. As one person said, "I think it (Tūhoe ki Waikato) tries to get that whanaungatanga (sense of connectedness)...tries to get everyone together". One other participant extended this by claiming Tūhoe ki Waikato also provided, "a sense of belonging... [and] a place of learning".

Trips back home were important to most participants in one way or another. The organisation of "Tūhoe" events and trips back within tribal borders is considered essential according to another, who claimed: "We're pretty lucky that we do have our haka group because then we can go back to the Ahurei (a biennial Tūhoe festival of celebration) and meet the rest of the whanau".

Te hau kainga is referred to by the majority of participants and most return home for particular events or for no other reason but to "be at home". If returning home is impractical then keeping in touch via phone and email is important. Te hau kainga for many also includes catching up on gossip through Tūhoe ki Waikato networks from those who have recently returned. It is very apparent that returning home is important for visits and keeping an ear out for employment opportunities (particularly for students). For most, returning home is a necessary facet of their lives as they attempt to maintain links with immediate and extended family members.

Tainui, Kīngitanga, all that stuff is like the main focus here...so when you get to see the ones from back home it's like a breath of fresh air.

I wish there was more work back home so I could go back home. Not just for myself but for my partner as well. That's probably the main reason we're still here.

When asked about giving advice to others who might move to the Waikato region, the answers generally reflected the strategies reported for coping:

I think just like everything else there are networks here. Come and see your families. The other thing, of course, is a lot of our people, especially our kids who come from back home, they're a bit shy. You come out here. [If] you're shy -- you're last!

... I think it's having that confidence and belief in their ability and being safe in the knowledge that they've got family here also to help them out if they fall over.

Being Tūhoe Outside of the Tūhoe Region: How Life has Changed

Moving from relatively isolated rural homelands to a city obviously means a number of changes. In general, participants reported that they were less suspicious of people now than those back home. They were a lot more sociable, more appreciative of Te Urewera and Tūhoe history, and more individualistic in pursuing personal goals and ambitions (focused on own work and achievements). As an example of the latter, one participant reported:

Probably [changed] because I'm staying amongst a few Pakeha and there is sort of no whanau around to give you that, you know, that whanau feeling. So I just work. You know work is work.

However life does not have to change for others.

First of all being Tūhoe to me is about being staunch about your tribal identity and to remain staunch to that; be family orientated, be staunch to that... which also means your reo (language) and tikanga (customs). Don't compromise on those even though you're somewhere else, but also one of the things with Tūhoe is, what I would like to think is, that they don't go trampling on other peoples mana and tikanga—know your place. That doesn't mean to say you just roll over for every Tom, Dick and Harry, but you don't go around and takahi (put down) another people's mana.

I stick to my Tūhoe tikanga ...we sort of know who's Tūhoe and where everyone else is from but all of us ones for Tūhoe stay tuturu (genuine) with our tikanga.

Some also reported that Tūhoe in the Waikato were different to those back home; they were more inclined to help out others, and extend their personal networks:

I think the ones back at home... I think they stick to their own and they only help their own whereas the ones here in Waikato, they're helping

everyone else; you know they're helping all the other iwi, especially like at the varsity. There are more and more Tūhoe tutors out there helping all these other iwi whereas the ones from back at home, they just look after the ones back home and even the ones back home, it's usually each family or each hapu looks after their own before they look after the ones down the road or the ones across the river, however it goes.

One person reported that those back home had, in fact, changed and were different now; and more likely to look inward and keep to themselves:

Ruatoki now is no longer as... it wasn't totally isolated when I was growing up back at home, but it was to a certain extent. You know for us going to Taneatua, Whakatane and Rotorua were big things, you planned it for a week, therefore we tended to depend on each other a hell of a lot more. Now I can't really speak about back home, but I have suspicions that depending on one another back at home is starting to wane a bit, you know, that people are now focusing on their own individual families more and more now, rather than the wider family, which is the whole valley.

Others have learned more about Te Urewera and Tūhoe history and feel stronger for it, but are also aware of the home people's view of their enthusiasm:

... The relationship definitely changes in that for people like me anyway, who are staunch about their identity as Tūhoe and staunch about helping our people, because you've been away from te ahi kaa [a metaphoric fire; right to land by occupation] for such a long time, you can't just force those intentions on the people back home. What you do is you be patient and signal your availability to help out if it's needed, and they'll let you know when they want your help, but you don't force [it] ...or they'll say 'It's that bloody know-all from Waikato again!', you know, you don't go down that track!

Relationships with Nga Iwi o Waikato

Interacting with tangata whenua and participating in tangata whenua activities were infrequent for those interviewed. The idea of moving into another iwi area did not seem to be of concern. Although some participated in various Tainui events, it was not common and mostly occurred through activities at the University. Others spoke of friends and family who are of Waikato descent but believe this has little impact upon them in terms of their own tangata whenua interaction.

In spite of this, many reported an appreciation for Waikato and Tainui kawa (rules of conduct) and history, and many now understand this difference better and respect it as they would like others to respect Tūhoe kawa. The differences also highlighted to some the need to strengthen their sense of being Tūhoe within Waikato.

I suppose at that time I wasn't really worried and I didn't think about it that much

[Family] told me to watch out because their iwi will be different to ours and because their ways are different to ours and to have respect

The Waikato people, they're good people when you get to know them. They tend to treat you like one of their own after a while

I think te iwi o Waikato is, from my association with them back here, it's a very cosmopolitan type tribe you know because they've had longer links and interaction with tauīwi (non-Maori) than the ones from back home. Now, whether that's a positive or a negative, I'm not too sure. I really appreciate the fact that we were quite isolated back home and I think through that isolation it made us, we've held onto those [old] values and made us who we are and actually quite stronger in my opinion.

On Tūhoe ki Waikato Needing a Place or Marae

The contentious question was raised in the Introduction of building a marae in the Waikato or establishing a special place or centre, and the results showed arguments for and against such a proposal. Some felt a need to have a "place" for Tūhoe to congregate, host events, hold activities and to give visible and physical expression to the notion of "Tūhoe ki Waikato". Some also felt that a physical "place" could engender a greater sense of social cohesiveness and be more accessible to newcomers. It could also provide a focal point of contact for other groups or organisations. While these positive aspects were identified, some felt that the establishment of a Tūhoe marae in the Waikato could detract from supporting marae in Te Urewera. One participant spoke of an earlier attempt to establish a marae in the Waikato:

Personally, I would like that people who come away from back home to always think of their marae back home as being their marae... I was part of a group in the early years that looked around for a place for us as our Tūrangawaewae here, and I'm glad that we failed because it's still making us go back to our own marae.

While a marae may have been the initial type of "place" first considered, other "places" were also considered:

...one of the things we were looking at was to see if we could purchase a hostel and that's for the ones who were coming from back home here and providing them with a place to stay till they can find their own. I don't mind that being a kāinga, you know it's not that I'm opposed to that, it's just that I, I'm not a staunch supporter of us building a marae like Tirahou or Mātaatua in Rotorua, because I think when we start doing that, you start losing your links with your own tūrangawaewae.

Ironically, the Mātaatua marae in Rotorua began originally as an accommodation facility for Te Urewera families who had people being treated at Rotorua Hospital in the early 1900s, in the same way this participant suggested building a hostel for accommodation instead of a marae.

On Tūhoe ki Waikato as a Social Network

Tūhoe ki Waikato is a social network that has supported many Tūhoe engagements and activities within the Waikato region. Synonymous with Tūhoe have been taurahere (connecting groups) groups living outside of Tūhoe boundaries. For most of the participants, connecting with other Tūhoe taurahere groups such as Tūhoe ki Poneke and Tūhoe ki Rotorua, was not a significant part of their life as a Tūhoe person within Waikato. It occurred on an infrequent basis, usually every two years for the Hui Ahurei. For a small minority, connections with another urban taurahere group (Tūhoe groups living outside of Te Urewera) were sustained because of established kinship ties and being from the same community. Going “home” and connecting with those at home appeared to be more important.

Taurahere groups such as Tūhoe ki Waikato often return to the bi-annual Tūhoe festival and become active as and when called upon to respond to various requests. While participants were aware of the broader Tūhoe ki Waikato network, and of other Tūhoe taurahere groups, many were neither actively involved in them nor sought involvement. Nevertheless, knowing this type of group exists was important to them and having the option to participate was comforting.

Keeping in contact with Tūhoe people has increased with the advent of the Internet and email. Many spoke of the usefulness of email and email networks set up to distribute information relevant to Tūhoe issues. Being informed is appreciated even if connecting with the wider Tūhoe base is not always managed.

Changes over Time Away

The amount of time spent away from te hau kainga varied for participants. There were a few differences noted between those who had moved in the last few years and those who had moved more than 10 years ago. This is

illustrated by the following person who had moved away from Te Urewera more than 10 years ago, and made comparisons between the two:

My view of Waikato was the Kīngitanga and I was pretty ignorant; I didn't know what the Kīngitanga was all about and the Treaty and all that. My excuse was that Tūhoe didn't sign the Treaty and we don't have a Māori Queen, but then now I've learnt more about that I kind of respect that. I think it was just being ignorant at first and the more you find out the more you know.

[It] just opens your mind right up to the fact that there are other iwi in this motu... I don't mind anything about Waikato or Tainui and all the Kīngitanga stuff ...you respect them because that's something that they really believe in, they passionately pursue, so you respect them for what they're trying to achieve.

This is in contrast to the thoughts of some of the more recent arrivals, who are much more inward looking about their place in this new environment.

Probably be more staunch and more protective...you come across other Māori and they're trying to get your reo or our reo and our ways... There's a lot of wannabes out there. So you have to be pretty protective.

I came here as a single person but now I'm starting a family of my own...No matter what goes on, I stick to my Tūhoe ways.

On Returning to the Tūhoe Region

When asked about intentions to return home, some spoke about the desire to return and assist with social, educational and employment ventures and even seek employment opportunities if possible. These people usually moved away from the Tūhoe region for education and employment in the first place and were keen to return with those newly acquired skills when the opportunity arose.

The majority of participants, however, claimed that a return to Te Urewera was an option more likely to be pursued on their retirement from work.

I don't want to be growing old up here. Once I hit my retirement I expect to go home, but if my daughter wants to stay up here for instance, that's her choice, but for me and my partner we'll just like to go back home because we wouldn't want to die up here.

Ka noho ahau ki konei, kia kuia ra ano ahau ka hoki atu ai ki te kainga na te mea ki a ahau nei kare tonu he mahi ki reira
I'll continue living here until I'm an old lady then I'll return home. There's no reason for me to return because there's no work back there [translated by the researcher].

Conclusion

Through all this material, we can begin to get some answers to our research questions. First, those Tūhoe ki Waikato interviewed seemed well aware of the social consequences of their migration, but most had little choice but to move. The bottom lines were education and employment, which at present are just not available in their homelands, although the education possibilities have changed somewhat with the development of Te Whare Wananga o Awanuiarangi, an indigenous university and Anamata, a private training establishment. It was clear from the interviews that this situation was causing some stress; by missing whanau and the Urewera environment, by becoming different in some ways to those back home, and by setting up a residence.

Secondly, it was also found that initially, when first moving, that there was considerable reliance on whanau and other Tūhoe already living in the Waikato. Many reported visiting first and linking up with these relatives to make arrangements. In the interviews, many also spontaneously gave these ideas as advice to those who might intend moving in the near future – to network with relatives here before moving and staying with them upon arrival.

Not everyone interviewed participated in the Tūhoe ki Waikato group but they all knew about it and some of those not directly involved with the group were reassured by knowing Tūhoe ki Waikato were available if and when required. Most not only enjoyed the contact and talk in Tūhoe ki Waikato, but also used the group as a networking vehicle to remain in touch and or visit the homelands on a regular basis.

Third, another social consequence to come from this migration was a changing view of the people back home which has not been reported in previous literature as strongly as here. This was reported as both a negative consequence and as a positive consequence. Some were saddened that they were changing because of their move to Waikato and people back home were treating them differently as a result. Others reported that they now saw those back home as living in a restricted world, as it were, and that they themselves had a broader grasp of the world. In all likelihood, these two views had probably occurred to most of the participants, and this would be worth pursuing in further research.

Fourth, in answer to the question of relations with tangata whenua, little real contact was reported except when dictated by circumstances (at

the university). Living in the Waikato did lead to a better appreciation of both Tainui and the Kīngitanga, however, and at the same time, to a strengthening of their Tūhoe identity as a result. So while more was learned about other iwi, this led to a strengthening of Tūhoe identity on the whole.

Finally, when asked about returning to Tūhoe lands, most were hoping to move back for employment but could see little chance of that happening given the poor employment prospects in rural areas of New Zealand/Aotearoa. Most were also hoping to retire back home eventually as well, although there are issues mentioned in the Introduction about land use that could arise if many took up this option (Davey and Kearns 1994).

The results of this study, show, then, that despite some mobility of Māori towards going back to homelands, there are realities of employment and education that still mean a loss of a significant age group away. Many of the social consequences from this are similar to earlier reports (Butterworth, 1991; Kawharu 1968; Metge 1964; Scott and Kearns 2000; Waitangi Tribunal 1998). Of particular interest here, though, are the scattered references to changes in the people back home, as seen by those who move, which we do not think were as evident in earlier reports. This is being followed up by interviews with those back home about those who have moved.

For policy purposes, though, this does suggest that if the situation in rural regions could be reversed and local employment improved, perhaps by a radical decentralization of government services, then many of these educated Tūhoe would return for those jobs. Despite the low chance of this occurring, most of them anticipated moving back for retirement, and wished to die there, even if this meant leaving their Waikato-raised children in the Waikato. This raises a further policy issue of providing for a larger number of aged persons in such rural areas in the future. Notwithstanding good community cooperation, small areas and towns are not likely to have the specialised health resources, reliable public transport and appropriate housing and land to cope with a large re-migration for retirement. Ideally, Government provision for the aged could be funded by employing locals, or people from the region who are enticed back. In this way, perhaps, both implementations could work together, with the people returning to employment, and the aged being looked after by their own people.

Note

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Glossary

- ahi kaa* - a metaphoric fire; right to land by occupation
- ahurei* - a bi-annual Tūhoe festival of celebration
- hapu* - sub-tribe, sub-tribal
- hau kainga* - the collective of those people living in the various home regions in Te Urewera
- iwi* - tribal, tribe
- kāinga* - a home
- karwa* - rules of conduct
- kīngitanga* - a Maori political movement based in the Waikato
- papakāinga* - an area set aside for housing/homes
- ra whanau* - birthday
- reo* - language
- takahi* - put down, to trample
- tangata whenua* - the original inhabitants of an area
- tangihanga* - Maori grieving and internment rituals
- tauiwi* - non-Maori
- taurahere* - a tribal group living away from their tribal homelands
- tikanga* - customs
- tūrangaruaewae* - a place to stand
- whanaungatanga* - connectedness

New Zealand Women's Employment Patterns: Diversity or Homogeneity?

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Abstract

New Zealand has experienced sustained increases in women's labour force participation since the post-war period. When observed across time, work patterns provide insights to the changing overall lifetime attachment of women to the labour market. Using data from the 1995 sample survey *New Zealand Women: Family, Employment, Education*, we present descriptive findings on the work patterns of women born between 1936 and 1965, and depict these patterns in terms of spells in and out of work. A cohort perspective is taken. We then proceed to summarise the details of these individual work histories using summary measures which can then be correlated with potential explanatory factors. The results show that by the age of 30, successive birth cohorts have experienced: (i) increasing complexities in their work and non-work trajectories; (ii) childbearing continues to depress women's engagement in paid work across time; and (iii) the influence of educational attainment and ethnicity seems to be changing.

New Zealand has experienced sustained increases in women's labour force participation since the post-war period. The census of Populations and Dwellings and Household Labour Force Survey give details of labour force participation rates, but rely on the compilation of cross-sectional data to provide indicators of long-term trends in women's engagement in the labour force. At present, short-run transitions can be measured with data from the Household and Labour Force surveys but only for a period of up to two years, and the forthcoming SOFIE surveys will provide long-run transitions in the future. Hence whilst we know from existing data sources that women's participation in paid employment has increased progressively since the Second World War period, they do not at present provide us with insights into two aspects of women's work: the

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sequencing of work patterns across the life course, in terms of periods in and out of employment and *how much* of their potential working lives they will spend in employment.

From a policy perspective, the need to monitor these aspects of women's work has become increasingly recognised, for several reasons (Harré-Hindmarsh and Davies 1995; Walby 1991). International research suggests that gendered differences in accumulated work experience is an important explanatory factor of unequal labour market outcomes between men and women in terms of occupational segregation, loss of skills, pay inequities and current labour force status (Blau and Kahn 2000; Dex and McCulloch 1998; Huber and Spitze 1981; Rosenfeld 1980; Stewart and Greenhalgh 1984).

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the work history patterns of New Zealand women born between 1936 and 1965. More specifically, the paper presents two sets of descriptive analyses of these histories. We draw on graphical representation techniques first developed by Corcoran in the US (Corcoran 1979) and later applied to UK data (Stewart and Greenhalgh 1982) to describe work history patterns in New Zealand in terms of the sequencing and frequency of spells in and out of work. Summary measures of these histories are also presented along with a brief descriptive statistical analysis examining differences in work patterns by educational achievement, childbearing status and ethnicity. Second, by comparing the graphical representations and summary measures across different cohorts of women as they have reached given ages, we are able to look at cohort and life course effects (Main 1988). We therefore examine the work history patterns experienced by age 30 for three groups of birth cohorts, and those experienced between the ages of 30-39 for the older birth cohorts.

Data are from the 1995 sample survey *New Zealand Women: Family, Employment, Education/NZW:FEE* (Johnstone 2001; Marsault *et al.* 1997) which provides a unique source of retrospective, unit-level data on the current and previous work experiences of women aged between 20 and 59 years in 1995. The majority of women interviewed had worked at least once by 1995 (96.2% = 2868; 3.8% = 113 never worked).

Conceptualising Work History Patterns

Drawing on international research which has used retrospective, sample survey data to identify and explain the work history patterns of men and

women (Dex 1984; Elias and Main 1982; Jacobs 1999; Main 1988; Rimmer and Rimmer 1995), we conceptualise work in terms of periods during which women are involved in paid and unpaid activities, and which cumulatively, provide an individual's history of attachment to work across their life course.

In this paper, the concept of work is synonymous to employment, and refers to a self reported status by which survey respondents identified what they perceived to be their *main activity* at a given point in time¹. If this activity was reported as "employed" or "employed without pay", and provided the activity was for a period of at least 3 consecutive months, then it is considered as "work". This definition is not strictly comparable to standard labour force participation rates derived from the census or Household Labour Force survey which include the unemployed in the numerator populations, and which rely on a much shorter reference period within which labour force activity is recorded.²

The concept of *work spell* is central to the development of the work history patterns. Work and non-work spells were obtained from the survey data by following through each individual woman's employment history and collating the various periods of work and non-work into a continuous pattern. Patterns were documented for each woman following the age at which she left school.³ A *non-work spell* includes periods in which women reported either being a homemaker, being unemployed, studying or retired. A *work spell* includes women reporting paid or unpaid employment (full or part time). Any two work spells punctuated by a non-work spell of less than three months were collated to make one continuous work spell⁴. A third group "Other", included women who had never worked for more than a three month period, those who had worked for less than three months and refusals or "don't know" responses. This last group was merged into the *non-work spell* category.

Three concepts are used to describe the nature of these patterns: an *interruption* refers to a break from employment consisting of one non-work spell flanked by two work spells; *continuous* work spells describe patterns for women who have taken up work after school and have continued uninterrupted until the time of interview or a given age; a *delayed entrance spell* (into the workforce) refers to a spell of non-work immediately following the completion of full-time schooling.⁵

The graphical representations of work histories are a useful visual tool, and also provide some evidence of duration of spells, but serve essentially as a descriptive element. For the purpose of extending the analysis further towards explanation, we must summarise these patterns. Summary measures include: number of working, non-working and total spells, the average duration of each of the former spell types and the proportion of potential working life spent in work.

Data Considerations

A key problem encountered when using retrospective data is the risk of inaccurate data collection due to recall problems (Dex and McCulloch 1998; Elder and Johnson 1999; Jacobs 2003). To address this problem, we have compared the proportions of women in the sample who were at work at given ages in the past, to proportions obtained during four census periods (Elias and Main 1982:43). Data were collated as follows: for all survey women aged 59 in 1995, the proportion employed for every year between 1952 (age 16) and 1995 were obtained by tracing back through the retrospective histories. Accuracy of this recall data is then checked by aggregating the resulting proportions of women in employment across cohorts into five year age-groups. For example, the average proportion employed amongst all survey women who were 15-19 in the census year 1975 was then compared with the corresponding census year rate for that age group (Hillcoat-Nallétamby and Baxendine 2005). Comparison of age-specific participation rates obtained from the censuses of 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1991 with the proportions from the survey generally suggest that the recall of past work histories was fairly accurate because they reflect the trends documented at the aggregate level. As mentioned previously, some of the differences may be due to definitional issues related to the reference period during which data were collected. The census for example records employment activities in the reference week prior to the date of census day, unlike the NZW:FEE as outlined above.


Findings

Women's Increased Involvement in Employment across Time

Despite temporal fluctuations which are probably indicative of both time-specific conditions influencing the supply and demand for labour, as well as

inaccuracies of reporting due to recall, Figure 1 indicates that the proportions of women in employment at age 20 has generally been declining. About three out of four women born between 1936 and 1938 would have been in employment at this age, compared to fewer than four out of ten of their younger counterparts born in the early to mid-1970s. The picture is reversed at older ages, with each successive cohort of women, being more likely to be in employment at age 30 or 40. This analysis therefore affirms what we know, and hence reinforces the validity of our data – that women's participation in paid work has increased for successive birth cohorts, becoming more pronounced at older ages (Davies and Jackson, 1993; Dixon, 1996).

Figure 1: Percentage of women employed at exact ages 20, 30 and 40 by birth cohort,⁶ NZW:FEE




Work History Patterns in the 1990s

All Women

We first describe the broadest of cross-sectional pictures of work histories for *all women* aged 20-59 in 1995 (Figure 2). A striking feature of the graph⁷ is the variety of patterns observed, as about four out of every ten women (39.3 per cent) have experienced a sequence of five or more work and non-work spells.⁸

Figure 2: Average duration of work and non-work spells for all women (aged 20-59) as reported in 1995 (N=2,981)



To the far left of the histogram we see that 10 per cent of women have experienced only one spell, less than half (3.8 per cent) of whom having *never worked*, the remainder having worked *continuously* since leaving school. Reading from left to right, about 16 per cent of women have experienced two spells, with similar proportions having worked and then ceased (“*work/non-work*”), or having *delayed* taking up paid work by having a spell of non-work immediately following the completion of full-time schooling (“*non-work/work*”). Just under one fifth of women (18.4 per cent) have experienced three spells: 12 per cent have worked on leaving school, withdrawn from the labour market and then returned to paid work; their counterparts who have experienced one work spell flanked by two non-work spells (6.4 per cent) have yet to return to paid work, if at all, and have therefore not experienced a completed interruption. For the 16 per cent who have experienced four spells, some have currently left work for a second time (6.3 per cent) and the remainder have returned after a first completed interruption (9.5 per cent), having initially delayed their start in paid work. The more complex patterns consisting of five or more spells appear at the far right side of the histogram.

The patterns are therefore predominantly characterised by complex sequences of five or more spells, with only a small proportion of one spell. In terms of work behaviour, a minority of women has never worked, but only a slightly higher proportion has worked continuously since leaving school. Less than eight per cent have had only one work spell and are yet to return to work. The majority of women therefore (over two thirds) have experienced at least one interruption (or return).

Looking at specific work patterns (reading Figure 2 from left to right), the average duration in the case of a continuous work spell is 17.6 years. For those who have worked and are currently experiencing their first, uncompleted break or *out-spell* from work they have on average, been out of work for over 11 years, a longer period than their initial experience of work which lasted on average, 8.5 years. This suggests that they may have opted to leave work on a permanent basis, after an extended period of initial work activity. This interpretation is somewhat substantiated by the fact that the average duration in years of this incomplete *out-spell*, 11.2 years, is the longest of any of the other non-work spells, barring those who have never worked. The reverse of this particular pattern appears for women who are currently in work, following an initial *delayed entry* of about 4 years. Since engaging in paid work, they have remained active for about 11.5 years.

Women have experienced about four and a half spells (slightly more work than non-work), with an average duration of about six and a half years (again, a higher duration for work than non-work spells). Of all the time they might have spent in paid work since leaving school, about sixty-one per cent have done so.

Variations by Age, Childbearing Status, Education and Ethnicity⁹

Previous research on women's work experience would suggest that the work history patterns thus far described will vary by age, childbearing status, educational experience and ethnicity. We briefly examine the influence of these factors at the bivariate level.

Remembering that these results reflect a cross-sectional perspective, the likelihood of having experienced the more complex histories of 4 or more spells increases with age as we would expect. Generally speaking, the number of working and non-working spells increases with age for those having worked two or more spells (Table 3). For the youngest women,

about one out of 10 have experienced neither type, probably indicating the effect of prolonging education into the early twenties. The majority in this same age group (close to half), have had only one working or non-working spell. In contrast, as would be expected, it is the older women who are the most likely to have experienced four or more work or non-work spells, and their experience of work and non-work is concentrated in patterns of one, two or three spells (see Hillcoat-Nallétamby and Baxendine 2005 for details).

Similarly, average numbers and durations of spells increase with age, and are higher for work than non-work spells, this difference again increasing with age, suggesting that women of all ages spend more of their potential work life in work than out. Interestingly however, the total proportion of life worked remains strikingly consistent at about 60 per cent once women reach their thirties.

For women with at least one child, the impact of childbearing upon their participation is evident (Table 1). Compared to women with no children, those with at least one child are more likely to have worked three or more spells, and are concentrated in the more complex of patterns. There are similar frequency distributions for work and non-work spells. The ability to work continuously when no children are present is undoubtedly a key reason why nearly half of childless women have worked only 1 work spell. The average duration of non-work spells for childless women is only about half that of mothers (1.53 years compared to 2.24 years) and the former have worked more of their potential working life (65 per cent compared to 57 per cent).

Education seems to have no clear impact on the frequency of total spells, although the likelihood of experiencing two or three spells decreases with increasing levels of qualification, and in turn, those with the highest level of qualification are concentrated in the four and five plus spells. The latter pattern also holds true for both work and non-work spell distributions. Very few women with higher education have never worked, and they have a higher mean number of total, work and non-work spells and shorter duration of non-work spells (average duration of 0.62 years compared to 0.48 for those with none). This suggests that high educational achievement enhances attachment to work through more complex patterns of entry and exit.

Table 1: Frequency distribution of total, work and non-work spells by childbearing status, all women, 1995 (%)

Number of spells	<u>Total</u>			<u>Work</u>			<u>Non-work</u>		
	No child	≥ 1	<u>Total</u>	No child	≥ 1	<u>Total</u>	No child	≥ 1	<u>Total</u>
0	-	-	-	7.2	3.0	3.8	14.8	4.1	6.1
1	21.9	7.1	9.9	48.6	24.4	29.1	45.7	29.1	32.3
2	29.3	13.5	16.5	23.9	33.6	31.7	22.3	32.0	30.1
3	13.9	19.5	18.4	12.1	20.3	18.8	10.7	18.5	17.0
4	13.0	16.5	15.8	5.3	10.9	9.8	4.6	9.7	8.8
5+	21.9	43.4	39.3	3.0	7.8	6.9	1.9	6.6	5.7
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	570	2410	2980	570	2411	2981	569	2411	2980

Compared to Maori, Non-Maori are more likely to have experienced complex patterns of five or more spells (Table 2), have higher proportions in work and non-work spells of 3 or more periods, and lower proportions who have never worked. Non-Maori have higher mean numbers and durations of total, work and non-work spells, whilst the mean duration of non-work spells for Maori is higher. Maori have spent about 50 per cent of their potential working life in work compared to 60 per cent for Non-Maori.

Table 2: Frequency distribution of total, work and non-work spells by ethnicity, all women, 1995 (%)

Number of spells	<u>Total</u>			<u>Work</u>			<u>Non-work</u>		
	Maori	Non-Maori	<u>Total</u>	Maori	Non-Maori	<u>Total</u>	Maori	Non-Maori	<u>Total</u>
0	-	-	-	6.5	3.4	4.0	4.0	6.4	6.0
1	10.5	9.9	10.0	34.5	28.3	29.4	37.2	31.6	32.6
2	20.0	16.0	16.7	31.2	31.8	31.7	32.6	29.8	30.3
3	21.3	18.0	18.6	16.4	19.1	18.6	16.4	17.1	17.0
4	16.4	15.8	15.9	7.9	10.1	9.7	6.9	9.0	8.6
5+	31.8	40.3	38.9	3.6	7.4	6.7	3.0	6.1	5.5
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	506	2475	2980	506	2475	2981	506	2475	2980

In sum, at the bivariate level, all four factors influence the sequencing, number and length of spells. As would be expected, increasing age is associated with more varied sequencing of patterns and longer durations in

and out of work. Childbearing reduces the time mothers can potentially spend in work, makes their non-work spells lengthy and creates more varied patterns, suggestive of more movements in and out of work. Being highly qualified is a facilitating factor in increasing the number and length of work spells and in reducing time spent out of work, and having never completed an educational qualification has a depressing effect upon potential time that might have been spent working. For Maori, their work histories are less complex in terms of pattern sequences, numbers and durations of spells and they will experience longer non-work periods and less of their potential life in work.

At time of interview in 1995, the vast majority of women will have experienced paid work at least once and will have developed complex work histories. The patterns observed thus far suggest that they have a firm, but far from continuous involvement in employment, with significant variation in the types of patterns of engagement depending upon current age, educational achievement, childbearing status and ethnicity. Behind the well-known bi-modal curve which is so often used to characterise women's involvement in the labour market lie complex patterns of entry, exit and re-entry.

Work History Patterns by Age 30: A Cohort Perspective

This initial description of work history patterns masks the effects of life cycle stage and changes across time. By examining work patterns for women of different birth cohorts as they reach a given age, we are able to distinguish more readily, whether there have been any significant changes across successive generations in terms of engagement in paid work. Figures 4-6 represent the work history experiences for three cohorts of women by the time they had reached age 30, and who in 1995 were aged between 30 and 39, 40 and 49 and 50 to 59 years. Patterns are compared across the three groups at age 30. When the data are presented in this way, we have an insight into both cohort change and life cycle influences.

Figure 3: Work and non-work spell patterns for women at age 30, birth cohorts 1946-55 aged 30-39 years in 1995 (N = 838)




Figure 4: Work and non-work spell patterns for women at age 30, birth cohorts 1946-55 aged 40-49 years in 1995 (N = 838)





Figure 5: Work and non-work spell patterns for women at age 30, birth cohorts 1946-55 aged 50-59 years in 1995 (N = 838)



First, and irrespective of birth cohort, by age 30 roughly equal proportions of women (about one quarter in each case), had experienced work patterns of two, three or five spells, the remainder similarly divided between patterns of one and four spells. As expected, this represents a markedly different distribution of spell frequency when compared with all women in 1995 where the majority had lived five or more spells. Even if we consider this period of the life course as one of initial family formation, very few women by age 30 had not worked: of the 12 per cent who had experienced only one spell, for the majority, this had been a work spell.

Comparing the birth cohorts (Figures 3-5), there are three noticeable changes in terms of total spells worked by age 30. First, there has been only a slight increase in the proportions of women who have experienced one spell, either of continuous work or no work. In each cohort group, they represent about nine per cent and three per cent respectively of all work patterns experienced by women. Second, moving from older to younger cohort groups, work histories become increasingly punctuated by a sequence of entries and exits. For the youngest women close to a third (30.6 per cent) had already experienced patterns of at least five consecutive work and non work spells, compared to only about one seventh (14.3 per cent) of the oldest cohorts. These differences are explained in part by the greater proportions

of older women (60.1 per cent) who had experienced work patterns of two or three spells respectively, compared to far fewer amongst the youngest cohorts (41.7 per cent).

The third noticeable change is the decrease in the share of work patterns of one work phase followed by no work. Nearly one quarter of the oldest cohorts (23.6 per cent) had experienced this pattern by the time they were thirty (Figure 5), compared to only 12 per cent of the youngest groups (Figure 4). These findings, which also correspond to British data from the 1980 Women and Employment Survey (Main 1988) probably reflect the declining influence of social and legal expectations to withdraw from employment once married and the impact that the Second World War period had on the supply of women to the labour force (Davies and Jackson 1993).

These changes are reflected in an increasing average number of total, work and non-work spells experienced by age 30, and as a result, a decrease in the mean length of these spells for each successive birth cohort group. Whilst it is the youngest birth cohorts who have the most varied patterns, there is also an indication that they were likely to have spent more of their potential working life by age 30 actually in paid employment. They were probably also returning to work more quickly than their older counterparts, as is suggested by the lower average duration of non-work spells.

In sum, the overall changes indicate that with each successive birth cohort group comes a greater fragmentation of work patterns, but with this, a stronger attachment to paid employment by younger women who spend less time away from work.

Variations by Childbearing Status, Education and Ethnicity

As with the cross-sectional patterns examined previously, we would expect that the patterns identified for the three birth cohorts by age 30 will vary depending upon individual level factors of childbearing status, educational achievement and ethnicity.

By age 30, irrespective of birth cohort, childless women are about twice as likely to have experienced only one spell and are significantly less likely to have experienced three spells (Table 3). Overall the likelihood of experiencing more complex patterns increases across the birth cohorts regardless of childbearing status, but childless women amongst the youngest cohorts will be less likely to have had five or more spells.

Table 3: Frequency distribution of total spells experienced by age 30 for birth cohorts by childbearing status, women aged 30-59 in 1995 (%)

Number of spells	1956-65			1946-55			1936-45		
	None	≤1	Total	None	≤1	Total	None	≤1	Total
1	20.7	9.6	12.6	21.9	9.6	12.5	20.5	9.4	11.2
2	20.7	21.6	21.3	27.6	27.9	27.8	30.8	30.5	30.6
3	15.5	22.3	20.5	16.2	25.9	23.7	16.7	32.3	29.7
4	15.1	15.2	15.2	10.2	13.9	13.1	15.4	13.9	14.1
5+	27.9	31.3	30.4	23.5	22.7	22.9	16.7	13.9	14.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	251	686	937	196	638	834	78	403	481

The effect of educational achievement on the number of spells experienced by age 30 has changed across successive birth cohorts. By age 30, women with higher education were the most likely to have worked complex patterns, but this is the least pronounced amongst the oldest cohorts. For the oldest group, having a secondary level qualification reduced the likelihood of experiencing only one spell, and those with no qualification were the least likely to experience the more complex spells. Amongst the youngest cohorts, one quarter with no educational qualification were likely to have experienced more complex patterns, a much higher proportion than unqualified women in the other two birth cohorts. The effect of not having obtained any educational qualification by age 30 is to concentrate 30 per cent or more women in each birth cohort in the two spells pattern, and this holds true for secondary level qualifications but only for the two older birth cohort groups. It therefore appears that the effect of educational achievement on work patterns experienced by age 30 has changed more significantly amongst the youngest of women.

It appears that in the past, Maori women would have been more concentrated in the one or two spell patterns, and although not statistically significant, the distribution for the youngest group suggests ethnic differences are attenuated (Table 4). When compared to the frequencies for the total sample of women in 1995 which is statistically significant (Table 3) this distribution is somewhat similar with the exception of pronounced ethnic differences for the more complex spells.

Table 4: Frequency distribution of total spells experienced by age 30 by birth cohort and ethnicity, women aged 30-59 in 1995 (%)

Number of spells	1956-65			1946-55			1936-45		
	Maori	Non-Maori	Total	Maori	Non-Maori	Total	Maori	Non-Maori	Total
1	10.6	12.9	12.5	20.2	11.9	12.8	18.2	10.8	11.7
2	20.6	21.3	21.2	29.8	27.5	27.8	41.8	29.7	31.1
3	22.4	20.3	20.7	19.0	24.1	23.6	20.0	30.5	29.2
4	14.7	15.2	15.1	11.9	13.3	13.1	10.9	14.4	14.0
5+	31.8	30.3	30.6	19.0	23.2	22.7	9.1	14.6	14.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	170	769	939	84	730	814	55	417	472

In sum, despite the passage of time, childbearing continues to influence the relative continuity of mothers' as opposed to childless women's work patterns by the time they reached 30. Whilst higher educational achievements are clearly associated with more work entries and exits, an increase in these types of patterns in the youngest cohorts is also apparent. Maori women appear to maintain a weaker attachment to work with each successive birth cohort inasmuch as the time they have spent out of work on average remains higher than for Non-Maori.

Cohort Experience During Later Stages of the Life Course

If we consider the work pattern experiences of the two oldest cohorts when they were aged between 30 and 39, and then place them adjacent to their histories lived until age 30, we begin to develop a visual picture of a life course perspective to their trajectories. As the bivariate relationships observed between birth cohorts and number of spells is not statistically significant, we cannot comment with any great accuracy on the patterns we have observed, so limit our discussion to a brief description of the histogram representations and frequency distributions.

First, from a cohort perspective there is an indication that the frequency of patterns of one continuous work spell have increased (from 25 per cent to 30 per cent), whilst continuous non work periods decline (from 23 per cent to 13 per cent) (Figures 6 and 7). Second, there appears to be a slight increase (from five per cent to seven per cent) in the proportions of women who have experienced five or more spells. This reflects the tendency

towards increasingly complex work patterns across cohorts by age 30 which we noted earlier.

Figure 6: Distribution of work and non-work spell patterns for women between ages 30-39, aged 40-49 years in 1995 (N=835)





Figure 7: Distribution of work and non-work spell patterns for women between ages 30-39, aged 50-59 years in 1995 (N=835)



The summary work history measures show similar pattern changes to those found for the earlier period of the life course: the greater diversity of patterns displayed by the women born between 1946-55 by the time they had reached 30 continues through into the later phase of their life course with, on average more total and non-work spells than those born between 1936-45. Again, this is reflected in a decrease in the mean length of spells. The main difference compared to the earlier phase of the life course is that the younger cohorts born between 1946-55 appear to have spent less of their potential working life actually in work between the ages of 30-39 than the older group.

Moving away from the focus on cohort changes to life course patterns, if we consider the histograms as representing a continuum of work pattern histories experienced by age 40 (considering Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 together), we see that the latter stage of the life course clearly seems to provide greater continuity in work patterns. The increase in the proportion of single spells of work during the 30-39 year period (from 9.4 per cent before age 30 to 29.6 per cent for the 1946-55 birth cohorts and 8.5 per cent to 25.4 per cent for the 1936-45 groups) suggests the decreasing need to move in and out of work because of childcare responsibilities. This is mirrored in the progressive decline of the importance of complex sequences of five or more non work and work spells once women are over 30 (from 22.9 per cent before age 30 to 7.4 per cent between 30-39 for the 1946-55 birth cohorts and from 14.4 per cent to 4.6 per cent for the 1936-45 groups).

Conclusion

Whilst we know from aggregate data sources of the census and specialised labour force surveys in New Zealand that women's involvement in paid work has increased over the past decades, by analyzing work histories and taking a cohort perspective, it becomes possible both to trace the sequencing of their work and non-work experiences and to monitor changing patterns across time. Taking a cross-sectional picture, which obviously confounds effects of age and childbearing status, the NZW:FEE data indicate that very few New Zealand women aged between 20 and 59 in 1995 had never been in paid work, only a small proportion had worked continuously since leaving school and the majority had switched at least five times between work and non-work states. Once we control for age and cohort, we see that by the age of 30, successive birth cohorts have experienced increasing complexities in

their work and non-work trajectories. This suggests a progressive shift towards greater attachment to work, although a greater variety in the sequencing of patterns is not necessarily consistent with more time actually spent in paid work over the potential working life available to women. The influence of childbearing continues to depress women's engagement in paid work across time, particularly in the early phase of the life course prior to age 30, but the influence of educational attainment and ethnicity seem to be changing. The correlates of these patterns and their relationship with women's current labour force status, occupational mobility, earnings and savings capacities now remain to be explored.

Notes

This paper was initially prepared during a study leave period hosted at the Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques, Paris in 2001 and as a working paper presented at the Sociological Association of Aotearoa New Zealand Conference, "Social Science in the 21st Century: Challenges to Theory/Policy/Practice", University of Canterbury, December 2002.

- 1 This meant that a woman who was actually involved in home work whilst also being engaged in a few hours paid employment might report the former as her main activity. She would consequently have been classified as "not in the labour force".
- 2 This definition also differs from that of the NZ Census or HLFS in which a person working one hour or more per week is in the labour force.
- 3 For women who started work under the age of 14, their age was imputed up to 14.
- 4 If a respondent reported being "employed" between jobs, but for a period of less than three months, this was not considered a job per se; it was assumed that any gap of less than three months was equivalent to a continuous employment spell. In work histories however, the number of jobs was counted.
- 5 Excludes women who have never worked.
- 6 Points on graph represent average for 3 year single birth cohorts. Due to small cell sizes for single ages, data have been aggregated into three year birth cohort groupings and smoothed. For example, the points plotted are for each third group (eg. Figure 1: the first set of points to the far left of the figure show the proportions of women employed at ages 20, 30 and 40 respectively for those born between 1936 and 1938).
- 7 Data are presented as histograms representing the sequencing of work and non-work spells reported by women. For each histogram, the column width represents the relative frequency of a given work pattern among all women in a

given age group. The vertical axes represents the average duration in number of years spent in each work and non-work spell. The graphs are read from left to right. The columns on the extreme right which are not shaded represent complex or rare work patterns. In reading the graphical representations it must be remembered that some cell sizes are very small, which can lead to considerable variation around the average durations represented.

- 8 For details of frequencies see Hillcoat-Nallétamby and Baxendine (2005).
- 9 Where cell sizes are too small to enable meaningful descriptions, categories for variables of total number of living children, current marital status and educational achievement have been collapsed in view of analysis by cohort.

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Maori Internal and International Migration at the Turn of the Century: An Australasian Perspective

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Abstract

At the beginning of the twenty-first century there were two major national clusters of Maori: New Zealand, the ancestral home for Maori, and Australia, home to a much smaller Maori population from the early years of the nineteenth century. In the 2001 censuses of New Zealand and Australia, the usually resident Maori populations were, respectively, 526,281 (ethnic group classification) and 72,956 (ancestry classification). In this paper we examine four dimensions of Maori population movement between 1996 and 2001 using the census data from New Zealand and Australia: 1) internal migration between rural and urban areas in New Zealand; 2) internal migration between rural and urban areas in Australia; 3) migration into New Zealand of Maori resident overseas in 1996; 4) migration into Australia of Maori resident overseas in 1996. There has never been a comprehensive assessment of Maori migration in an Australasian context before, but in the light of developments in population exchanges between New Zealand and Australia this sort of analysis is critical if one wishes to understand contemporary Maori population dynamics.

A statistical and demographic challenge faced by many small island nations in the 21st century is that significant shares of the people with rights to residence are living overseas. This is the case for indigenous populations as much as the later waves of settlers and their descendants. In this paper we present some preliminary findings from an analysis of the populations of New Zealand's indigenous Maori peoples who

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were living in New Zealand and Australia at the time of their last population censuses in 2001. The focus of attention is on the mobility status of the population in 2001 as this can be defined by comparing their places of usual residence at the time of the last two censuses. In both New Zealand and Australia censuses are held every five years, so the mobility status relates to the period 1996 to 2001.

Maori are defined in this paper on the basis of responses to a question on ethnicity in New Zealand's census and a question on ancestry in Australia's census. Both questions allow for multiple responses. In the case of the New Zealand data cited in this paper all people who indicated that one of their ethnicities was New Zealand Maori are included. In the case of the Australian data, only the first two ancestry responses have been coded, so the Maori population (which could also include "Cook Island Maori" as well as "New Zealand Maori") is more narrowly defined. The data on Australia's Maori population have been drawn from two series of unpublished tables produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics for Robert Didham in August 2002 and Graeme Hugo in April 2005.

The problem of inclusion of "Cook Island Maori" in the Australian data for "Maori" in 2001 is not addressed in this paper. Jeremy Lowe (1990:7), in the only substantive published discussion of the Maori in Australia to date, has discussed this issue with regard to Australia's 1986 Census of Population and Buildings that also allowed Maori to be identified in the resident population. He found that there were some Cook Island Maori included in the "Maori" ancestry data for that year, but their numbers were not large. It can be noted in passing, that all Cook Island Maori are entitled to New Zealand citizenship, and in this context Cook Island Maori tend to be regarded as "New Zealanders" in Australia.

In the first section we establish the size of the Maori populations in Australia and New Zealand, and outline some of their basic characteristics. The second section uses a simple mover-stayer framework to identify the main groups in the populations in terms of their mobility status in 2001, and comments briefly on the changing spatial distribution of Maori within and between the two countries. In the concluding section we introduce an analysis of labour force characteristics of the adult Maori populations in Australia and New Zealand, noting that the data we currently have available are incomplete for this purpose.

Notwithstanding the limited data available for this analysis, we consider that further examination of New Zealand's Maori population in its trans-Tasman context will yield useful insights into the contemporary demography of an indigenous population that is rarely examined outside of its national setting. Echoing Ward's (1997:10) observations about the need for a more holistic analysis of urbanization of Pacific peoples (see Bedford and Didham 2005), we argue that studies of indigenous peoples generally need to consider the spread of people beyond national boundaries. New Zealand Maori have their "diaspora" and have been settling in Australia and other parts of the world for over two centuries (Bedford and Pool 2004)

Dimensions of a Trans-National Population

In 2001 New Zealand's indigenous Maori population probably numbered somewhere between 680,000 and 700,000 if both the New Zealand resident and the overseas resident Maori are taken into consideration. The New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings in March of that year recorded 526,281 people who recorded "NZ Maori" as one of their ethnicities (Statistics New Zealand 2002). Allowing for under-enumeration, and the absence of some people temporarily overseas, the estimated total Maori population in New Zealand in March 2001 was around 586,000 (Didham April 2005:personal communication).

The Australian Census of Population and Buildings in August 2001 recorded a total of 90,350 people who had recorded "Maori" as one of their responses to the ancestry question (Didham April 2005:personal communication). However, as noted above, only the first two responses to the ancestry question were actually coded, and the number of Maori given in the published census data for Australia is 72,956.¹ Allowing for some under-enumeration of Maori in Australia, and for the fact that some Cook Island Maori will be included in both the 90,350 and the 72,956 totals, we can probably assume that there were at least 90,000 New Zealand Maori in Australia in August 2001.

When this population is added to the estimated Maori population in New Zealand of 586,000 (allowing for post-census adjustments for under-enumeration and temporary absence overseas), then the total in the two countries was around 676,000. If we allow for a further 15,000 to be resident in all other countries (and there are likely to be several thousand Maori in the United Kingdom and Ireland, as well as some hundreds of people who

might claim Maori ethnicity in the Pacific Islands), then the global total in 2001 comes close to 700,000. The proportion of Maori living overseas in 2001 could have been as high as 16 per cent – a significant “diaspora” by international standards.

Table 1: The Maori population in New Zealand and Australia, 2001

Birthplace	New Zealand	Australia	Total
New Zealand	513,126	49,241	562,367
Australia	4,932	20,596	25,528
Other countries	2,493	1,023	3,516
Not stated	5,730	2,110	7,840
Total	526,281	72,970	599,251

Source: Statistics New Zealand, Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Amongst the New Zealand-resident Maori in 2001, the great majority (97.5 per cent) had been born in New Zealand (Table 1). Only 4,932 of the 526,281 (0.9 per cent) gave Australia as their birthplace, with a further 2,493 citing birthplaces in the Pacific, UK and Ireland and other countries (Statistics New Zealand 2002). Just over 5,700 (1.1 per cent) of Maori in New Zealand did not record a birthplace in the 2001 census. In the case of the Australia-resident Maori, 67.5 per cent had been born in New Zealand. A significant Australia-born Maori population has evolved with over 20,000 (28.2 per cent) recording Maori as their first or second ancestries. This Australia-born Maori population is heavily weighted towards the younger age groups, with two thirds aged under 15 years. However, the long history of trans-Tasman migration of Maori is reflected in the fact that there were over 400 Australia-born Maori aged 60 years and over. There were just over 1,000 Australia-resident Maori born in countries other than the two Tasman neighbours and a further 2,110 did not record a birthplace in the 2001 census (Table 1).

The gender balance in the New Zealand population has attracted some media attention on both sides of the Tasman in recent weeks (Laugesen and Courtney 2005:A5; Leys 2005:8). A surplus of 53,000 females in the total New Zealand population aged 20-49 years (or just under seven per cent of all people in this age group) is matched by a similar shortfall of males in the Maori population in the same age group (Table 2). There are 13,000 more

Maori females than males aged 20-49 years in New Zealand – the equivalent of six per cent of Maori in this age group (Table 2). Not all of the “lost manhood” is in Australia, however, notwithstanding Nick Ley’s (2005:8) suggestion that “going on a pub crawl around Bondi and Manly with a clipboard” would be “not a bad way to start” trying to find New Zealand’s adult male deficit. In fact, in the Australia-resident Maori population aged 20-49 there were still more females than males (albeit only 193 more, or 0.5 per cent of all Maori in the age group). It is going to take more than a search of Sydney pubs to find the missing men (Table 3).

Table 2: The Maori population in New Zealand by broad age groups, 2001

Age group	Male	Female	Total
0-14	100,653	95,829	196,482
15-29	63,342	68,444	131,786
30-44	51,636	58,796	110,432
45-59	28,266	30,127	58,393
60-74	11,734	12,826	24,560
75+	1,852	2,776	4,628
Total	257,483	268,798	526,281
Total 20-49	102,427	115,356	217,783
More females		12,929	5.94%

Source: Statistics New Zealand, Australian Bureau of Statistics

Table 3: The Maori population in Australia by broad age groups, 2001

	Male	Female	Total
0-14	11,597	10,879	22,476
15-29	9,871	10,347	20,218
30-44	9,531	9,695	19,226
45-59	4,806	4,120	8,926
60-74	958	922	1,880
75+	95	149	244
Total	36,858	36,112	72,970
Total 20-49	18,663	18,856	37,519
More females		193	0.51%

Source: Statistics New Zealand, Australian Bureau of Statistics

Figure 1: Age-sex structure of Maori populations in New Zealand and Australia, 2001 (percentages of total)





Figure 2: Age-sex structure of “stayers” and total Maori populations in New Zealand and Australia, 2001 (numbers)



The age structures of the two populations reflect the comparative “youthfulness” of the Maori populations in both countries (Figure 1). Over 30 per cent of the Maori in New Zealand and Australia are under 15 years of age (with this share reaching 37 per cent in the case of the New Zealand residents), and both have around 15-16 per cent aged over 45 years. The major differences are in the populations aged 15-44 years: 46 per cent for the New Zealand-resident Maori and 54 per cent for Maori in Australia (Figure 1). The largest variation for a single five year age group is found in the 25-29 year old Maori: 7.6 per cent of the total in New Zealand and 10.2 per cent in Australia.

With regard to population distribution, a higher proportion of Maori in Australia are concentrated into the eight major metropolitan areas (72.6 per cent) than into New Zealand's 15 main urban areas (63.7 per cent). Sydney is the place of residence for 30 per cent of Australia's Maori while Auckland accounts for 22 per cent of those usually resident in New Zealand. The Maori population in Australia is distributed across all of the major metropolitan areas and States, while in New Zealand Maori comprise highly variable shares of the regions and major cities across the country. Maori are less concentrated in the major metropolitan areas than many migrant groups in Australia; their distribution in both countries reflects their willingness to work in a wide range of semi-skilled and labouring jobs in rural as well as urban areas.

Movers and Stayers, 1996-2001

The Maori populations of New Zealand and Australia are highly mobile. Only 38 per cent of the New Zealand-resident Maori aged five years and over were living at the same address in 1996 and 2001, while in Australia the share of “stayers” was only 26 per cent (Table 4). In the case of the total New Zealand resident population in 2001, around 50 per cent were living at the same address in the two censuses.

The shares of the population who moved within the same Regional Council Areas (New Zealand) or State (Australia) are shown in Table 5 as percentages of all Maori (including those not born in 1996). The largest group of movers is the intra-regional migrants, accounting for more than one third of Maori in both countries. Much smaller shares moved between regions/states. The biggest difference in the shares of movers was in the Maori population that was living overseas in 1996. In the case of New

Zealand, only 1.5 per cent of the Maori resident in 2001 were in this category, while in Australia 23 per cent were overseas immigrants. Unfortunately the Australian census data do not permit any analysis by country of residence for those living overseas in 1996; in the case of New Zealand, 5,342 of the Maori classed as overseas immigrants in 2001 had been living in Australia in 1996. The other 34 per cent had been usually resident in other countries in that year. Overseas migration of Maori clearly has more than just a trans-Tasman dimension.

Table 4: The Maori population, 2001: Mover-stayer groups

Regional migration	In NZ	In Australia	Total
Stayers: (same res 96/01)	174,419	17,199	191,618
Movers:			
Intra-State/Region	177,840	25,063	202,903
Inter-State/Region	71,733	3,681	75,414
Total internal migration	249,573	28,744	278,317
Overseas in-migrants	8,105	16,767	24,872
Total movers	257,678	45,511	303,189
Not born	67,561	7,724	75,285
Not otherwise defined	26,623	2,536	29,159
Total	526,281	2,970	599,251
Total pop aged 5 years and over	458,720	65,246	523,966
% stayers of populations 5+	38.0	26.4	6.6

Source: Statistics New Zealand, Australian Bureau of Statistics

Another perspective on Maori mobility within Australia and New Zealand is gained from an assessment of the movement into and out of metropolitan areas (Australia's eight major cities) and main urban areas (New Zealand's 15 cities with populations in excess of 30,000). The "metropolitan" classifications are not consistent, but these two categories are at the apex of the urban hierarchy in the two countries. Differences in the spread of movers across the various categories of Metro/MUA and "other" (minor urban and rural) areas are more apparent in this classification than was the case for the region/state classification (Table 6). Maori in Australia have been more involved in intra-metropolitan migration than is the case in New Zealand (intra-MUA migration). Movement between urban areas and to and from rural areas is more apparent in the New Zealand data.

This is hardly surprising given the fact that Maori, while very heavily urbanised, still have significant resources in rural areas. Interestingly, in Australia, the second largest share of internal movers was found in the intra-other category: movement within smaller urban places and rural areas.

Table 5: The Maori population, 2001: Mover/stayer groups (% total)

Regional migration	In New Zealand	In Australia	Total
Stayers: (same res 96/01)	33.1	23.6	32.0
Movers:			
Intra-State/Region	33.8	34.3	33.9
Inter-State/Region	13.6	5.0	12.6
Total internal migration	47.4	39.4	46.5
Overseas in	1.5	23.0	4.0
Total movers	49.0	62.4	50.6
Not born	12.8	10.6	12.6
Not otherwise defined	5.1	3.5	4.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 6: The Maori population, 2001: Mover/stayer groups in metropolitan and main urban areas (% total)

Metropolitan migration	In New Zealand	In Australia	Total
Stayers: (same res 96/01)	33.1	23.6	32.0
Movers:			
Intra-metro/MUA	17.4	21.3	18.4
Inter-metro/MUA	6.9	1.8	6.2
Metro/MUA-other	4.3	2.9	4.0
Other-Metro/MUA	5.0	3.0	4.6
Intra-other	6.6	9.2	7.0
Inter-other	3.0	1.2	2.7
Total internal migration	43.2	39.4	42.9
Overseas in	1.5	23.0	4.0
Total movers	44.7	62.4	46.9
Not born	12.8	10.6	12.6
Not otherwise defined	9.3	3.5	8.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

There is a lot more that can be done with these data, especially with the characteristics of the different components of the population: the stayers, the

internal movers, the overseas movers. This is not the place for an extended analysis, but the pyramids showing the total numbers of Maori by age and sex in Australia and New Zealand, and the stayer components of these populations, give an indication of the differences between the movers and stayers (Figure 2). As expected, in both countries the movers have higher shares in the younger working population by comparison with the stayers, and lower shares in some of the younger and older age groups.

The other area of analysis that is currently underway, but for which we need further Australian census data, relates to the labour force characteristics of the mover/stayer Maori populations in the two countries. One interesting dimension of this is shown in Table 7. Maori male internal migrants are more heavily involved in the full-time workforce, and are more likely to be employed, in New Zealand than in Australia. In the case of female migrants, the situation with regard to unemployment is different. Both the internal and international Maori female migrants aged 15 years and over in Australia had lower proportions unemployed than was the case in New Zealand (Table 7).

Table 7: Maori labour force participation, 2001: Migrant groups aged 15+

	In NZ		In Australia	
	Internal	Overseas	Internal	Overseas
Males				
Employed Full-time	72.7	75.1	70.8	71.7
Employed Part-time	11.2	11.1	18.0	18.8
Unemployed	16.1	13.8	11.2	9.5
Females				
Employed Full-time	52.4	56.1	49.9	54.3
Employed Part-time	26.6	26.8	37.7	30.7
Unemployed	21.1	17.1	12.4	15.1

Conclusion

New Zealand's Maori population in the twenty-first century will become more "international" in its distribution and, in common with the situation relating to other "small" populations, it will be necessary to examine their characteristics in an international as well as a national context. There are significant challenges to the official statistical agencies in this regard,

especially in ensuring greater consistency in data bases so that trans-national, as well as national populations can be defined and analysed. This project on the Maori populations of New Zealand and Australia is a beginning of such an analysis; hopefully such an analysis will provide some insights into New Zealand's indigenous population in its broader Australasian context.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

- 1 New Zealand census data is rounded to base three and Australian data is randomly adjusted to prevent release of confidential information. For this reason, data may vary slightly between tables. For example the Australian tables used for this paper consequently add to 72,970 and we have not adjusted the data to match the total of 72,956 people. These differences are not statistically significant.

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